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ABSTRACT 
This study seeks to uncover the non-coercive, intricate and insidious ways which have 
generated both the ‘willing’ acceptance of and resistance to the rule of Robert 
Mugabe and ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe. I consider how popular culture is a site that 
produces complex and persuasive meanings and enactments of citizenship and 
belonging in contemporary Zimbabwe and focus on ‘agency,’ ‘subversion’ and their 
interconnectedness or blurring. The study argues that understanding nationalism’s 
impact in Zimbabwe necessitates an analysis of the complex ways in which dominant 
articulations of nationalism are both imbibed and contested, with its contestation often 
demonstrating the tremendous power of covert forms of resistance. The focus on the 
politics of popular culture in Zimbabwe called for eclectic and critical engagements 
with different social constructionist traditions, including postcolonial feminism, 
aspects of the work of Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault. My eclectic borrowing is 
aimed at enlisting theory to analyse ways in which co-optation, subversion and 
compromise often coexist in the meanings generated by various popular and public 
culture forms. These include revered national figures and symbols, sacrosanct dead 
bodies and retrievals, slogans and campaign material, sport, public speeches, the mass 
media and music. The study therefore explores political sites and responses that 
existing disciplinary studies, especially politics and history, tend to side-line. A 
central thesis of the study is that Zimbabwe, in dominant articulations of the nation, is 
often constituted in a discourse of anti-colonial war, and its present and future are 
imagined as a defence of what has already been gained from previous wars in the 
form of “chimurenga.” I argue that formal sites of political contestation often 
reinforce forms of patriarchal, heterosexist, ethnic, neo-imperial and class 
authoritarianism often associated only with the ZANUPF as the overtly autocratic 
ruling party. In turning to diverse forms of popular culture and their reception, I 
identify and analyze sites and texts that, rather than constituting mere entertainment or 
reflecting organized and party political struggles, testify to the complexity and 
intensity of current forms of domination and resistance in the country. Contrary to the 
view that Zimbabwe has been witnessing a steady paralysis of popular protest, the 
study argues that slogans, satire, jokes, metaphor, music and general performance arts 
by the ordinary people are spaces on which “even the highly spectacular deployment 
of gender and sexuality to naturalize a nationalism informed by the ‘efficacy’ of a 
phallocentric power ‘cult’ is full of contestations and ruptures.”  
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CHAPTER 1: DECENTERING ZIMBABWEAN NATIONALISM 
(Re)Thinking Zimbabwean Nationalism 
Nationalism in Zimbabwe has become increasingly prescriptive and violent in its 
impacts on citizens. At the same time, ‘nationalism’ has become a site of growing 
contestation within popular culture. The escalating intensity of state and elite-driven 
articulations of nationalism has been matched by equally intense and complex forms 
of resistance to it. Expressions of and resistances to dominant expressions of 
nationalism pervade popular culture within the mass media, on television, radio and in 
public and everyday ‘performances.’  
 
Yet studies of Zimbabwean nationalism have tended to be historical or political 
analyses of its origins and implications in creating and reinforcing certain groups’ 
power and others’ subordination. There is limited interdisciplinary scholarship on the 
complex and rich expressions of nationalism in public life or popular culture. 
Moreover, there are limited studies on the inter-play of gender, sexuality and 
nationalism. 
 
In this study, I make a general use of Judith Butler’s concepts of gender 
‘performance’ and ‘performativity’ in exploring how gender and sexuality discourses 
and gendered meanings are ‘made real’ through ‘performances’ of the nation that are 
embedded in public texts (Butler, 1990, 1988). Butler argues that in practice, gender 
and sexuality are codified by activities, practices and cultural meanings that make 
gendered and sexual identities and discourses ‘meaningful’ to subjects. This means 
that gender identities are imaged as ‘performances’ or ‘acts’ where different social 
subjects perform ‘scripts’ involving their participation in social ‘plots.’ As I show, 
these ‘plots’ can include discourses of nationalism, citizenship and belonging. Thus, 
certain expected sexualized and gendered subjectivities, behaviors and actions are 
actually ‘rehearsed’ in certain discourses about the nation. Although these behaviors 
and subjectivities may not be explicit, they are situated in the shared language of 
certain groups in ways that powerfully ‘naturalize’ and enforce them. This makes 
nationalism a ‘theatre’ of gender and sexuality. I also find Homi Bhabha’s (1993) 
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study on nation and narration and Kelly Askew’s (2002) study on performance very 
important to this study. 
 
I turn to cultural texts such as music, galas, bashes, funerals/burials, images, 
metaphors and public pronouncements to deepen existing studies which tend to 
universalize and homogenize nationalism. 
1
 My study is concerned with exploring 
sites of nationalism that existing disciplinary studies, especially politics and history, 
tend to sideline. I am strongly persuaded that history, politics and therefore 
nationalism is also located in ‘unconventional’ texts that have been grossly sidelined 
by researchers because of ‘lacking’ disciplinary impetus. The study therefore, is also 
an attempt to rupture existing disciplinary boundaries and problematize knowledge 
construction.   
 
To explore the noted rich neglected spaces, I deal with selected cultural texts that are 
readily available to the broader public so that they absorb, internalize and reproduce 
the meanings intended by dominant regimes. For example, in Zimbabwe the soccer 
metaphor ‘team’ exemplifies a politically charged ‘text’ that emphasizes and instils a 
sense of ‘unity’ and unquestioned loyalty. However, as Robert Muponde & Kizito 
Muchemwa (2011) argue, soccer offers space for ‘planting’ and spreading symbols 
that carry contested discourses. An analysis of the ‘theatre’ of soccer demonstrates 
interesting contestations around Zimbabwean nationalism. I am interested in 
analysing ways in which these same texts and others unsettle or create alternative or 
subversive meanings to the dominant ones. The particular articulation of gender, 
sexuality and nationalism within the Zimbabwean state, offers subject positions – 
both in confirming and contesting nationalism. I explore ways in which dominant and 
oppositional discourses of national un/belonging become recognizable and real 
through ‘performance’ as well as how they are destabilized or subverted.  
 
My interest in this study is in discourse and textual analysis and in the ideological and 
social construction of the meanings of the texts under study as they fictionalize and 
‘perform’ Zimbabwean nationalism. I aim to explore how they re/construct or 
challenge patriarchal, patriotic, militaristic, xenophobic, nativist and hetero-normative 
                                                          
1
 Norma Kriger (2003) asserts that Zimbabwean nationalism is scripted around the specific party 
slogans, symbols, songs, and regalia made use of by national bodies at national ceremonies.  
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nationalism. I explore the language (syntax and pragmatic), visual, aural, nasal, 
memory appeal and effects of the afore-mentioned texts. I intend to explore how these 
texts under study employ the techniques of cultural persuasion to construct a certain 
package of Zimbabwean nationalism. I focus especially on ‘agency,’ ‘subversion,’ 
and their interconnectedness or blurring. In doing this, I indicate how an 
understanding of nationalism in Zimbabwe necessitates an analysis of the complex 
and often indirect ways in which dominant definitions and articulations of nationalism 
are both imbibed and contested. 
 
In this study, I do not exclusively reserve separate chapters for each group of texts or 
genre. The aim is to demonstrate how different media texts and ‘performances’ 
collectively work to reinforce certain themes and discursive processes. My own 
reading and analysis of these cultural texts will also rely on historical narratives and 
the works of other relevant researchers and related actual processes taking place in 
Zimbabwe. It will also invoke certain literary texts that deal with the issues in 
question. I am aware that my analysis of these texts might be limited by my interest in 
their engagement with particular issues. As the growing body of criticism on 
Zimbabwean literature indicates, prose fiction since the end of the twentieth century 
critically explores various aspects of Zimbabwean society and culture. Outlining the 
ways in which aspects of public culture intersect with literary culture is therefore 
important to my attempt to consider how complicatedly individuals, groups and texts 
‘talk back’ to official and authoritarian ideas about ‘un/belonging’ to the Zimbabwean 
nation.  
 
Theorizing Power, Culture and Nationalism  
My methods and modes of analysis draw on cross-disciplinary approaches as I 
incorporate concepts, paradigms and strategies from various fields such as literary 
analysis, gender, cultural, political, media and performance studies. My approach to 
theory is eclectic to allow a free and flexible play of analytical methods from different 
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traditions. In developing this methodology I deploy an analytical framework that 
draws from different traditions and cross references theoretical approaches. 
2
 
 
My selection of texts is guided by on-sight analysis of their prominence in the 
Zimbabwean society. I have observed and analyzed the effects of texts on certain 
audiences through participatory methods. Living in Zimbabwe allowed me access to 
this period of ‘hyper-Zimbabweaness.’ My concern was with making sense of how 
texts function in contexts that include audiences. 
3
 I refer to how groups and 
individuals ‘perform’ belonging, for example through songs, watching television, or 
listening to speeches, or consuming national symbols and spectacles. However, I 
focus mainly on analyzing these different texts in relation to the construction of 
Zimbabwean nationalism. In so doing, I show how they re/acquire meanings in 
Zimbabwe. 
4
 Ideally, the study pursues reader-response approaches in the absence of 
‘empirical’ work involving interviewing human subjects. This gives the study some 
form of participatory action research, which allowed me to observe audiences while 
positioning myself as part of the ‘world’ they are negotiating.  
 
On the one hand, I focus on texts meant to construct and reproduce the dominant 
narrative of the nation as crafted by the Zimbabwean state and the Zimbabwe African 
National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). On the other hand, I turn to texts that 
explicitly or directly destabilize dominant state-driven narratives of nationalism. As I 
show, these include messages intended to confirm official versions of the nation as 
well as those created and circulated by groups and social subjects to rupture dominant 
narratives of the nation. I reflect on how the subversive impact of the latter is 
manifested in diverse and interesting ways, often opening up other multiple readings 
of the nation. I also show how texts reveal fissures even within the hegemonic 
                                                          
2
 In the Zimbabwean context, a number of scholars such as Robert Muponde, Kizito Muchemwa and 
Brian Raftopoulos have used such cross disciplinary approaches to produce rich analyses of 
Zimbabwean history and politics (Wendy Willems, 2009). 
3
 In the South African context, Anne McClintock (1995) analyses symbols, parades and spectacles that 
were invented to fabricate ethnic identities by both Afrikaners and Africans to authenticate their 
identities as national citizens. She also looks into issues of symbolism and performance in the 
manufacturing of identities. Kelly Askew (2002) also analyses the everyday lives of people as 
performing national identities in her work on Swahili music and cultural politics in Tanzania. She does 
this by analysing everyday life experiences of citizens and ceremonies amidst state surveillance. In 
Zimbabwe, Kizito Muchemwa’s (2010) focus on galas, biras and state funerals and Joost Fontein’s 
(2009) analysis of bones and bodies have also employed a similar approach.  
4
 Among others, Joost Fontein (2010, 2009) and Moses Chikowero (2008) have used a similar 
approach in analysing cultural texts in Zimbabwe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
constructions of Zimbabwean nationalism associated with the ‘ruling party’ and 
dominant gender and authoritarian regimes. Firstly, I show how certain state-driven 
and state-supported texts, especially those promoted by ZANU-PF, are 
simultaneously sites of reproduction and subversion. Secondly, I deal with texts that 
are produced by non-state actors and the ways they offer multiple meanings (from 
reproduction to subversion) arising out of specific experiences and contexts. My 
argument is that the fluidity of time and space brings discontinuities and ruptures of 
the above texts and therefore influencing how they are read and the meanings attached 
to them by different people and groups in different contexts. 
5
 
 
These text messages effectively constitute cultural texts that ‘perform’ Zimbabwean 
nationalism. Kizito Muchemwa (2010), Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Wendy Willems 
(2010, 2009) and Moses Chikowero (2008), examine how some national public 
holidays, events, traditional songs and dance, heroes and other national iconographies 
have been re/invented. Invested as cultural capital, they create differential ‘senses’ of 
belonging within a ‘nationalism’ that entrenches the authority of particular classed, 
gendered and sexualized groups. This is often done in a persuasive manner that 
‘silences’ and ‘marginalizes’ other narratives of the nation that fall out of the 
‘normalized’ package of stories of the nation.  
 
The texts I focus on can broadly be situated in four flexible categories which I will 
deal with under certain subtitles. Although these categories describe dominant ideas 
about the Zimbabwean nation, they also produce an oppositional discourse as 
‘ordinary’ people play around with them in a manner that defies and defiles state and 
elite pretentions. ‘Icons and symbols of the nation’ include selected figures, artefacts 
and images narrativizing the nation. A second category, ‘public enactments of reform 
and national control’ focuses on popularized texts reflecting the transition from an 
‘imperial’ and ‘colonial’ identity to a ‘sovereign’ one. ‘Public pronouncements and 
displays of national loyalty’ demonstrate subject interpellation, thus showing how 
individuals and groups ‘willingly’ position themselves as subjects of the nation. 
Lastly, ‘public celebrations of citizenship’ generally reveal the ‘glories’ of 
interpellated subjects in a manner that both ‘traps’ others into subjectivity and 
                                                          
5
 Media texts may be overlooked or engaged, spurned or appreciated, critiqued or endorsed depending 
on the context, audience and audience temperament (Edward Mcquarrie & David Mick, 1999). 
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publicize that their positions are a result of ‘free will’ and are ‘rewarding.’ Among the 
various textual performances and subversions of the nation, musical performance has 
been a recurring characteristic.  
 
Texts that confirm dominant imaginings of the nation are made accessible to the 
public through organized and elaborate ‘performances’ and or intensive and excessive 
coverage by the media. These texts include a number of organized national events 
such as musical galas, bashes, funerals/burials, commemorations and the public 
speeches accompanying them. Such texts speak to Zimbabwean nationhood, not 
simply in a direct way, but also in highly circuitous and covert ways. How these texts 
are created, who creates them and for whom, how they circulate, where and when 
they circulate is very significant to my study. I find Jacques Ranciere’s profound 
rethinking of the relationship between politics and aesthetics through his notion of the 
‘distribution of the sensible’ highly significant to my reading of popular cultural texts. 
The notion provides “…the system of divisions and boundaries that define, among 
other things, what is visible and audible within a particular aesthetic-political regime” 
(Ranciere, 2006:1). For elaboration, Ross Birrell (2008) posits that Ranciere’s notion 
of the distribution of the sensible refers to the boundaries of spaces and times, of the 
visible and the invisible, of speech and noise, and of the speakables and unspeakables 
(my addition) that concurrently determine the locations and the stakes of politics as a 
turn of experiences. The overall effect renders politics as a ‘performance.’ What has 
been regarded ‘sensible’ has been the carefully re/constructed ‘sensual’ material that 
easily instill particular thoughts, emotions, behaviors and actions that tally with 
prevailing elite ideologies. 
 
In post-2000 Zimbabwe, one may argue that elaborate instruments were mobilized to 
enjoin ‘citizens’ to partake in what was regarded as a common narrative of  
nationhood, based on their prescribed roles in time and space. Thus time and space 
became locations and interlocutors for correctness. For example, cultural texts that 
tended to critique the Zimbabwe state, ZANU-PF and President Robert Mugabe 
6
 
were labelled counter revolutionary and were denied space in the ‘formal’ narratives 
                                                          
6
 Robert Mugabe is the current president of Zimbabwe and has been at the helm of state power from 
1980, when the country attained ‘independence’ from Britain. He has also been holding the reins of 
power in his party, ZANU-PF.    
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of the nation. They were linked to foreign attacks on national sovereignty. At the 
same time, texts supporting and publicizing state policies, programs and linking 
ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe to the ‘struggle history’ and defense of national 
‘sovereignty’ were, in an emotionally and psychologically compelling way, made 
public narratives of the nation. This was done, for example through media coverage 
and appearances as well as their involvement in national activities and ceremonies. 
This again speaks to that distribution of the sensible – what the public had to consume 
and what had to be kept away from it.  
 
I consider how  these cultural texts have functioned in Zimbabwe in similar ways to 
other class contexts where ruling classes are especially repressive and have taken 
exclusive ownership of the liberation struggle. Such ruling factions have made 
considerable investments in culture to guarantee hegemony, and  have given rise to 
the masses’ absorption of elite worldviews and discourses as their own (Antonio 
Gramsci, 1971). Gramsci posits that culture, as an indispensable yardstick in the 
reproduction of power requires not only coercion to survive, but also consent. Culture 
is crucial to such consent because of the emotional, unconscious and psychological 
attachments that usually travel along with it. This speaks to Larry Grossberg (1989) 
who sees popular culture as a fundamental aspect of affective investment for people 
since it ‘touches’ their hearts and minds as well as aid  their imagination.  
 
Determinist explanations of how elites instrumentalize culture and ideology have 
often been criticized by scholars such as Mikael Karlstrom (2003) and John Storey 
(1994) as shall be discussed below. While my study’s attention to  resistance is alert 
to the limits of these determinist arguments, Gramscian  theorizations of power 
remain, for me, crucial in explaining the covert violence of certain states’ 
deployments of culture and the extent to which they can permeate consciousness 
among many citizens within nation-states.  
 
Gramsci (1971) notes how culture is instrumentalized by the state to ensure that there 
is domination by consent, since overt force needs to be supplemented by covert 
control and can prove to be more effective. Thus, in some cases, the ruling regime in 
Zimbabwe offered a carrot to the people through both tangible and intangible 
purchases of their appeals. This speaks to Stuart Hall’s sentiments which 
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acknowledge areas of cooperation as well as cleavages between the interests of the 
state and those of ‘ordinary’ people in a hegemonic situation (Hall, 1994). Implied 
here is that there are moments when those in power and those occupying subject 
positions engage to achieve a certain end. However, this achievement may be for 
different benefits and might have diverging meanings. 
7
 There are also moments of 
disengagement if what is meant to be achieved does not benefit the other. This is why 
Gramsci argues that hegemonic struggle assumes that considerations be made of the 
physical welfares of the governed even when those concessions may not in all cases 
be economically significant.  
 
Running parallel to my reading of the instrumentalization of culture and ideology is a 
reading of both officially-driven texts and others as troubling hegemonic narratives by 
offering multiple imaginations or contestations of national belonging. My interest is 
not only in texts that project different ‘nationalisms,’ but also in those that destabilize 
without necessarily outlining other subject positions. Here, I follow various cultural 
studies scholars like John Fiske (1987) and Stuart Hall (1980). These scholars critique 
Gramsci’s conclusions and demonstrate that ‘mass culture’ is not inevitably 
hegemonic and that ideology is not totally state-centric. I show that subjects of the 
nation have agency and do not necessarily submit to dominant discourses or share 
dominant meanings of texts. Furthermore, I show that the meanings attached to texts 
are not uniform among subjects, and are not totalizing. Instead, they are continuously 
affected and redefined by subject positioning, by time and by space. For example, 
texts situated in certain contexts can encourage readings, linked to emerging social 
struggles, that shake and resist the very ideologies that initially promoted them 
(Storey, 1994). I work from the premise that individuals and groups do not blindly 
and passively consume popular culture, but on the contrary, use it in their lives in 
innovative ways that relate to their circumstances (Cameron McCarthy, 1998; Paul 
Willis, 1990; Hall, 1973). 
 
I am therefore concerned not only with texts in themselves, but also with the ways in 
which individuals and groups actively engage with them, and with how they function 
as messages at specific historical and political moments. In thinking around this, I am 
                                                          
7
 For example post-2000 government sponsored land reform, promotion of local artists on the media, 
and general affirmative action programs, in the case of Zimbabwe. 
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motivated to a certain extent, by Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1994) notion of spatio-
temporalities which deals with how specific moments, and spaces define how people 
interact with power and how texts are interpreted. 
8
 In many ways, this echoes 
Ranciere’s (2006) thinking of power as a process of an event, and not a tool or 
instrument in the hands of an individual or a group. These understandings of how 
discourses are actively read and defined, rather than understood in any sense of their 
innate meaning helps to counter theories of reproduction where power is seen as an 
instrument rather than as a constantly  contested and negotiated process.  
 
Since my project deals with representations, performances and subject formations in 
the public sphere, I also make reference to literary texts that deal with the 
representations and constructions of identities. My reference to literary works is based 
on the view that literary works are discursive projects with discursive effects. They 
therefore often provide multiple and open-ended writings and readings of history, 
identities and meanings that go beyond the limited scope, for example, of official and 
grand discourses. 
9
 In the literary text, Nehanda, Yvonne Vera (1993) reimagines 
Nehanda, the legendary figure in Zimbabwean history and rethinks central themes, 
symbols and myths in a manner that challenges her re/presentation in dominant 
historical, nationalist and male-written literary texts (Desiree Lewis, 2004). This is 
especially so because representations and identities of the same historical subjects in 
literary works and ‘official’ texts may differ. 10  This divergence also exists across 
literary works, offering differing versions, varying identities and multiple meanings of 
subjects, space and time. 
11
 
 
As a Zimbabwean myself, from the start of 2000, I have experienced the important 
‘performative roles’ of the state media and a range of media texts, public events, 
particular forms of dress and certain public speeches by the elite.  While discourses of 
                                                          
8
 See Mikael Karlstrom (2003). 
9
 Many writers, especially women writers such as Buchi Emecheta, Yvonne Vera, Bessie Head, Ellen 
Kuzwayo and Emma Mashinini have subverted canonized, specialist historical knowledge and 
dominant nationalist narratives by factoring in non-scholarly interventions into history and 
marginalized narratives like personal narratives and fiction (Desiree Lewis, 2004, 2002). 
10
 Desiree Lewis (2004) points to the limitations of cultural nationalism imbedded in the patrilineal 
myths, fictions and histories. She sees some writing by women like Yvonne Vera as debunking this 
phallicism.  
11
 The figure of Nehanda is presented different in works such as Solomon Mutsvairo’s (1988) text, 
Mweya WaNehanda and Yvonne Vera’s Nehanda (1993).  
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nationalism took centre stage, these performative acts of the nation were powerfully 
gendered and sexualized. In particular, they clearly conveyed gender and sexual roles 
and expectations and re/definitions of femininities and masculinities for the ‘true’ and 
‘legitimate’ citizen of Zimbabwe. In all these texts of nation, the centrality of gender 
and sexuality cults have been phenomenal. This confirms the views of scholars such 
as Anne McClintock and Floya Anthias & Nira Yuval-Davis that discourses of the 
nation cannot be adequately understood outside discourses of gender and sexuality 
(McClintock, 1995; Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1989).  
 
The ideas of McClintock and Anthias & Yuval-Davis about the affect functions of 
nationalism resonate with the claims made by analysts of Zimbabwean nationalism 
from the start of the present century. Although  scholars such as Muchemwa (2010), 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems (2009) and Chikowero (2008) assert that cultural 
performances were adopted by ZANU-PF from 1980, they make it clear that they 
became more intense from the 2000s when they populated the national media. 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems (2009) go on to argue that a form of nationalist politics 
that spoke to the heart, the politics of affect, emotion and drama, which can be called 
the politics of performance, became necessary in the face of an insider-outsider divide 
that characterize Zimbabwean nationalism from the 2000s. Chikowero (2011) posits 
that from 2000, the state-sponsored music and songs were an invaluable yardstick to 
construct and disseminate nationalist narratives summed the ‘Third Chimurenga.’ He 
notes that specific cultural texts that narrate Zimbabwean nationalism correspond to 
specific circumstances, allowing a particular and usable construction of Zimbabwean 
nationalism. It is in illustrating this that Thomas Turino (2000:14) states that 
Zimbabwean nationalism banks on cultural and artistic domains, with language, 
music-dance, sports, food, religion, and clothing style often being central. It is 
interesting how these cultural and artistic domains speak to Zimbabwean nationalism 
in various ways and the kind of responses that different people make with regard to 
these articulations. The question that is therefore raised is how Zimbabwean 
nationalism is mediated in the cultural domains I have already identified, and this is  a 
central subject within my study. 
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Conceptualizing Zimbabwean Nationalism: Repression, Subversion and 
Performance  
As has been noted earlier, the nature of this study requires an eclectic borrowing from 
different social constructionist traditions. However, in understanding the state’s 
production and reproduction of Zimbabwean nationalism, and consequently, gendered 
and sexualized subjects of the Zimbabwean nation, I draw extensively on Louis 
Althusser’s (1971) perspectives on ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA) 
as well as Michel Foucault’s perspectives on bio-power (Foucault, 1983, 1978, 1977). 
Although persuasive critiques of these theories have been offered, I argue that they 
offer an understanding of the production of meanings in contexts where states are 
hegemonic. As my analysis demonstrates, their value in understanding nationalism, 
subjectivity and culture varies and is context-specific. 
 
It is necessary to note that reproduction theories such as that of Althusser, although so 
often heavily criticized by recent theories of power and resistance,  are useful in 
explaining particular moments where oppressive regimes have survived despite the 
obvious weaknesses of their rule. Althusser (1971) argues that for the state to govern 
its subjects in an effective and persuasive manner, it uses ideology and ISAs which 
create present conditions as rational truths, and therefore enabling the subjects of the 
nation to enact them willingly (subjective consciousness). He argues that it is this 
subjective consciousness that constructs the citizen/national(ist) subject by organizing 
social life so that the dominant ideology can create subjects who reproduce the social 
order. He argues that nationalist ideologies construct national consciousness by 
inventing national history and culture. Althusser goes on to posit that the subjects of 
the nation who are produced by ideology and ISAs and concretized as free, in turn 
reproduce the nation or the system that has produced them by willingly and ritually 
‘performing’ it and therefore, being instruments of its reproduction (interpellation). 
 
As such, the relationship between the nation and its subjects becomes a complex 
network involving giving and receiving normalized thoughts and practices. This 
ensures both continuity and normalcy of the system to such an extent that throughout 
their lives, subjects are continuously learning and performing actions, practices and 
characteristics that facilitates their respect, acceptance and promotion of the existing 
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order. In this case the subjects think they are in control and free, unaware that they are 
actually being controlled and that control is made possible by creating an illusion that 
positions them as free and in control. It is this illusion that makes them reproduce 
(interpellate) the very systems of control, thereby enabling continuity for the system. 
Ieva Zake (2002) asserts that this demonstrates the regulatory and disciplinary 
abilities of modern power. Althusser’s interpellation supposes that power is wielded 
by the state over its subjects in the Marxian superstructure-base relationship. This is 
crucial in regulating and shaping subject positions. 
 
Relatedly, Foucault’s concept of bio-power could be seen as amplifying Althusser’s 
discussion of ISAs. This concept offers more understanding on how reproduction is 
enabled and how verifiable evidence is available to guide thoughts and actions. In 
some sense, Foucault’s ‘reason’ and ‘scientific’ knowledge may be read as ISAs, 
which allow the flow of dominant ideas, albeit with more vigour because of the more 
readily available ‘evidence’ around ‘naturalized’ embodied subjects. Foucault (1983) 
posits that power enables the creation of ‘scientific’ knowledge of the subject’s body. 
He also sees power as not having a clear ‘source’ in modern technologies of control. 
This provides a rational for self-discipline and self-surveillance, leading to the 
construction of a ‘national’ body. He argues that this is more effective than openly 
coercive means since it is based on ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘rationality’ around 
bodies. Thus, power uses reason and scientifically based knowledge to make the 
subject willingly and reasonably yield to its system. This results in the subjects 
performing the system as well as reproducing it through bodily effects of discipline 
and self-surveillance.  
 
Foucault (1983, 1978) therefore argues that power constructs the national body using 
related scientific and expert knowledge about individuals as both social and biological 
beings. This extends and complements Althusser’s ideas which focus primarily on 
represented knowledge such as history, religious dogma, culture, morality and 
language. Foucault’s understanding of the unrelenting impact of discourses in all 
forms of knowledge (such as sexuality, science or morality) draws attention to the 
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numerous sites in which subjectivity is produced. 
12
 This perspective sees institutions 
and social structures as actively producing citizens of the nation. From this 
perspective, the family becomes a very important policing space as it is rendered a 
miniature of the nation. In the Zimbabwean context, this makes sense since family 
and kinship have been implicated in discourses of the nation. An analysis of the texts 
under study in Foucault’s sense helps understand the nature of Zimbabwean 
nationalism better. McClintock (1993) suggests that the family is the focus because it 
offers a natural figure for prescribing social stratification within an organic unity of 
interests and also because it offers a natural trope for figuring historical time. As such, 
the sexual and gendered dichotomies which characterize the family and the domestic 
space become apparent in the nation. 
 
Zake (2002) explains that it is not only the subjective consciousness that is produced 
and produces nationalism but also the material bodily aspects of national subjects. 
Many scholars, among others, Lewis (2008, 2004), Joane Nagel (1998), McClintock 
(1995, 1993), Anthias & Yuval-Davis (1989) and Rob Nixon (1993) have posited that 
ideal nationalism has a much greater interest in establishing the boundaries of a 
national body by using metaphors of physical bodies, familial relationships and 
family tropes. Thus, issues about the behaviour, actions, thoughts, regulations, duties 
and all practices of the national body are important in differentiating it from other 
bodies as well as in marking its uniqueness and purity. Emphasis is on the well-being 
of the body which is made possible by how the body manages self-discipline. Zake 
(2002:237) argues that this: 
...is an ideologically based political process of interpreting and treating 
national belonging as a literal aspect of human bodies. Thus, nationalism may 
not metaphorically describe nation as an organism, but also directly identify 
nation as a collective of purely national bodies. 
In light of the above, the Foucauldian theory of bio-power can be employed to unravel 
how the ideology of nationalism allies itself with scientific reason and rationality 
about bodies to construct well-disciplined bodies of the nations who in turn concretize 
and reproduce this knowledge and consequently, nationalism. Foucault argues that 
effective power operates by substituting force and coercion with subtle control of self-
                                                          
12
 See Michel Foucault’s The history of sexuality, Vol. 1 (1978), and Discipline and punish: The birth 
of the prison (1977).  
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discipline and self-surveillance. This self-discipline and self-surveillance usually 
thrives on the affective lives of bodies (Ben Anderson, 2012). 
 
Keyan Tomaselli (1988) presents ways in which successive South African policies for 
regulating films and film censorship were used by the apartheid government to 
reproduce and ‘naturalize’ the racial and class divisions of the country, showing how 
media control was at the heart of the apartheid regime. As Tomaselli argues, it is 
noteworthy how the media was used to convince the governed that a system of racial 
separation was for the benefit of all races. The Christian religion was also used to stir 
support for the status quo and to convince the governed that the system was ordained. 
This was done in a manner that enabled the governed to reproduce the state’s ideas.  
In Zimbabwe, during colonial rule, all state media were tailor made to convince the 
black population that their interests were best served by the colonial state rather than 
all those elements fighting against the settler regime (Sam Moyo, 2004). The 
nationalists were presented as terrorists, bandits and carnivals bent on disrupting the 
benefits that the population was enjoying from the settler regime.  
 
However, the relevance of Althusser’s ideas is not limited to the colonial period. 
Particularly, in the case of Zimbabwe, they significantly help to explain the 
constructions of the Zimbabwean nation and how structures within the Zimbabwean 
state have helped to ensure and maintain ZANU-PF’s hold on power. Ezra Chitando 
(2005:220-1) posits: 
Once in charge of the government, the ZANU nationalists continued with the 
previous regime’s policy of harnessing the media to further their own agendas. 
This aspect was to be perfected after the year 2000 as popular discontent 
threatened the nationalists’ grip on power. 
There is consensus among scholars such as Elaine Windrich (2010), Diane Thram 
(2006), and Willems (2004) that when Jonathan Moyo 
13
 was appointed Minister of 
Information, the media was transformed to levels more or less akin to those of the 
colonial era.  
 
                                                          
13
 Jonathan Moyo was the Minister of Information in the Zimbabwean government from 2000 to 2005. 
Formerly a critic of the Zimbabwean state, he has helped the Mugabe regime survive from 2000 after 
being absorbed into ZANU-PF and the government. However, his character and role remains 
controversial both within and outside ZANU-PF. 
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I also argue that Althusser’s  ideas partly aid an understanding of how ZANU-PF, 
despite the odds, has managed to survive, not only by the use of force, but also, by 
consent which has been necessitated by the complexities of ideology. Some 
academics and researchers have concluded that ZANU-PF’s control of state media 
won the hearts and minds of Zimbabweans, enabling it to succeed in creating a 
patriotic citizenry (Michael Bratton, Annie Chikwanha & Tulani Sithole, 2005). 
However, how the hearts and minds were actually won and the gendered and 
sexualized aspects of the ‘language’ that appealed to the hearts and minds are areas 
worth scouting. 
 
Although Althusser’s analysis of power helps to explain many aspects of 
Zimbabwean nationalism, I draw attention to its limitations in explaining power 
struggles in Zimbabwe. Althusser’s theory of the working of ideology has been 
heavily attacked for a number of reasons. Among others, critics such as Joao 
Ferdandes (1988), Hall (1985), Karlstrom (2003) argue that it focuses more on 
ideology as repeating, maintaining and reproducing state power and offers little on 
what may disrupt state power or empower the underdogs. It implies an unchanging 
consensus within the state or among those in power (Storey, 1994). This view of 
power is clearly simplistic and does not show any disruption of  the ruling class but 
instead, a steady continuation of the status quo (Hall, 1985). This in turn, gives no 
room for the presence of dissenting voices within and outside the state. 
 
As indicated above, on the one hand, the theory homogenizes power and ‘untroubles’ 
dominant positions while on the other, locates  subjects’ entrapment in hegemonic 
meanings. It tends to view the condition of the weak as futile. The weak are robbed of 
any ability to struggle and are rendered passive recipients of dominant groups’ 
hegemony. It is vital to uncover the agency of subjects even in the midst of incessant 
instruments of control.  
 
Arguably, reproduction theories, such as exemplified by Althusser’s  ISA: 
...usually embody a super-determinist and functionalist perspective of the 
reproduction of power relationships...since they are in general elaborated at a 
level of abstraction that does not consider the practice of concrete interaction 
of the relationships of domination/subordination (Ferdandes, 1988:169). 
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As Ferdandes (1988) indicates, human agency  always comes into play despite the 
presence of regimes of power. Ferdandes points out that within power, there are 
always fissures that are triggered by the availability of multiple tensions, divergences 
and contradictions between the various layers, divisions and practices of domination. 
This is supported by Masipula Sithole’s (1999) analysis of the war of liberation in 
Zimbabwe. It is the above framework that informs my analysis of gender, sexuality 
and nationalism.  
 
Rick Wilford and Robert Miller (1998) contends that discourses on the origins of 
nationalism and the nature of its manifestations are broadly contested from two major 
perspectives, i.e the ‘traditionalists/primordialists’ and modernists/constructionists. 
Modernist works on nationalism include Eric Hobsbawm (1990), Benedict Anderson 
(1983), Ernest Gellner (1983), Hans Kohn (1967) and Karl Deutsch (1966). 
Traditionalists’ works are exemplified by Walker Connor (1994), Anthony Smith 
(1983) and John Armstrong (1982). 
  
The traditionalists locate nationalism in primordial attachments and consider the 
significance of ethnic roots in the creation of nationalisms and nations. Smith (1983) 
urges a rethinking of nationalism and nations that includes the preservation of older or 
traditional attachments and sentiments. Connor (1994) points out that in the 
construction of nationalism, the material aspects and a greater awareness of 
commonalities do not supplant the significance of affective affiliations that move 
along with traditional links and an ethnic consciousness. In this sense, the ‘past’ 
provides an affective archive ensuring allegiance to one’s state or country and its 
current political establishment. In the case of Zimbabwe, Blessing-Miles Tendi (2010) 
reflects on how some public intellectuals drew on certain selected ethnic discourses 
that had an illusory and affective effect on the people and therefore giving an 
advantage to the dominant versions of the nation. He goes on to argue that those 
public intellectuals opposed to this did not offer any affective alternatives. This 
became problematic in a situation where affective sensibilities are associated with 
“…myth, symbol, communication and a cluster of associated attitudinal 
factors…usually more persistent than purely material factors” in the crafting of 
collective consciousness (Armstrong, 1982:9). In this study, I show how the ‘past’ is 
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invoked for affective and psychological manipulations in the re/making of a gendered 
and sexualized Zimbabwean nationalism.   
 
As indicated in my opening discussion, my analysis of nationalism is based on 
constructionist understandings. A number of scholars, among others, Connor (1994), 
Hobsbawm (1990), Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983), Smith (1983), Armstrong 
(1982), Kohn (1967) and Deutsch (1966) have produced influential works on the 
representation and construction of nationalism. However, the works of these founding 
figures in constructionist studies of nationalism share a common paralysis in their 
underestimation or neglect of a gendered and sexual comprehension of nation 
building and nationalism. My aim in this study is to show how attention to the 
gendered and sexualized dimensions of national discourses can enrich many of the 
dominant constructionist ideas of nationalism and nation formation. 
 
As a key figure in theorizing nationalism, Anderson (1983) regards nationality and 
nationalism as created cultural artefacts that were imagined at the end of the 
eighteenth century. He goes on to point out that what differentiates groups is the 
manner of imagination and the essence and form of manner is itself rooted in culture. 
For him therefore, nation should be conceptualized as belonging to the same family as 
‘kinship’ or ‘religion.’ He thus defines nation as: 
...an imagined political community and it is imagined as both inherently 
limited and sovereign...the members of even the smallest nation will never 
know most of their fellow-members meet them or even hear of them, yet in the 
minds of each lives the image of their communion (Anderson, 1983:6). 
The nation has fixed boundaries and the inherent inequalities and exploitations do not 
overwhelm the community created by a sense of ‘deep, horizontal’ comradeship 
(Anderson, 1983). The idea of fixed boundaries is however problematic in situations 
where belonging to the nation is not ‘permanent’ as certain subjects may be forced 
beyond national boundaries. 
 
Anderson acknowledges that the past, which may be expressed in culture and myth, is 
crucial to nation formation. However, questions of what to select, how much to select, 
when to select and who selects, are interesting to probe, since these questions may 
challenge Anderson’s formulations. Oliver Nyambi (2012) argues that post-2000 
Zimbabwe falls short of Anderson’s definition of the nation as an ‘imagined 
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community’ since political and racial differences witnessed from the 2000s reveal a 
nation where members are intimately ‘known’ and under surveillance rather than 
imagined and distant. Thus, nationalism in Zimbabwe is manifested as an intellectual 
and political elites’ project ensuring the formation of governable subjects with 
common and organized systems of knowledge, responsibilities and goals. In my study 
I draw on Nyambi’s elaboration of Anderson, but also go further to argue that the 
Zimbabwean nation-building project is broadly centered on and spoken in the 
language of gender and sexual ‘normatives.’ I argue that in Zimbabwe, discourses 
around old homes, family, graves, land, bones, symbols and prophecies for example, 
that are narrated around the ‘past,’ are gendered and sexualized, yet they also carry 
deep feelings around the ‘past’ and the ‘present.’ I argue that in addition to Nyambi’s 
formulation where members are intimately ‘known’ and under surveillance, the 
language and ‘performance’ of nationalism reveals that gender and sexual categories 
are also intimately ‘known’ and under surveillance.  
 
The presence of affective sensibilities in national discourses makes sense because in 
most countries, nationalism is often associated with unquestioned loyalty, sacrifice, 
and solidarity to dominant ideas and groups. Interestingly, loyalty, sacrifice and 
solidarity are anchored on gender and sexuality discourses. Sentiments around gender 
and sexual relations are especially charged and resonant for embodied social subjects. 
It is because of the salience of gendered and sexualized language in nationalist 
discourses that factoring in a gender and sexual lens in the understanding of 
nationalism is called for. Faced with a day to day patriarchal socio-familial sphere 
where loyalty, sacrifice and solidarity are valued, the transportation of such values to 
discourses of nationalism is meant to inculcate the politics of affect and to invade the 
sphere of conscience. In this regard, the ‘traitor’ label in Zimbabwean politics 
epitomizes a situation where those who do not support dominant ideas are seen as 
betraying the national ‘family’ and like wayward children, are met with the brute but 
‘legitimate’ force of the ‘caring’ father.  
 
Another way in which nationalism in Zimbabwe requires a modification of 
Anderson’s conceptualization is how it is linked to subjects of colonialism, 
imperialism, sovereignty and indigenization. In the West, nationalism arose as a result 
of the threats of fragmentation, pluralism and territorialism posed by the weakening of 
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the authority of religious communities, monarchies and long held notions that 
cosmology and history is indistinguishable (Anderson, 1991). In Africa, nationalism 
is a response to external forces with colonial and imperial ‘agendas.’ In countries such 
as Zimbabwe, recent evocations of collective identity as a guard against possible 
external threats have seen nationalism as a response to the ‘outsider’ and a claim for 
‘sovereignty.’ It is because of this that narratives of the nation are created in uniquely 
affective and persuasive ways that dig into ‘pastness’ to make purchases on the 
memories and emotions of past exploitations, sufferings and even ‘achievements.’ It 
is also because of the ‘imaged’ outside force seeking to ‘penetrate’ Zimbabwe that 
narratives of the nation are mirrored in the ‘naturalized’ family troupe that move 
around ties, responsibilities and sacrifices. In this study, I reflect how such forms of 
emotional and psychological purchases and their dis/associations with a ‘naturalized’ 
social space have been used in political contests between, especially ZANU-PF led by 
Robert Mugabe and Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan 
Tsvangirai. 
14
 
 
In Zimbabwe, nationalist leaders imbibed a certain skewed nationalist historiography 
which Ranger had largely helped to construct (Brian Raftopoulos, 1999). Terence 
Ranger’s (1967) version of uprisings, which remains dominant in nationalist 
narratives yet it has been largely contested, is used as a framework where certain 
figures and symbols are ‘fixed’ in order to serve certain moments. Of central 
importance has been the meanings attached to what has become known as 
chimurenga, the ‘historically’ based prime foundation of Zimbabwean nationhood. 
The First Chimurenga defeat which led to the persecution of Nehanda and Kaguvi 
(prominent Shona leaders) played a pivotal psychosomatic role in the Second 
Chimurenga of the 1960s.  This is because the defeat in the First Chimurenga offered 
the necessary stimulus and encouragement for waging the Second Chimurenga (Paul 
Gundani, 2002). Both the First Chimurenga and the Second Chimurenga (1970-1980) 
became a usable discursive background in the Third Chimurenga of the 2000s. In 
many ways, these mobilizations were similar to how Tanzania’s memories of defeats 
of primary resistances like the Hehe and Maji wars determined the strategy of 
                                                          
14
 Morgan Tsvangirai is a former trade unionist and current president of the MDC party. He has 
emerged as Robert Mugabe’s strongest opponent since independence and from 2000, has posed a 
significant challenge to Mugabe’s power and the ZANU-PF government.  
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Tanganyika’s independence struggle (Julius Nyerere, 1966). 15 This makes Africa in 
general and Zimbabwean nationalism in particular, an imagined response to very 
distinct political and historical memories of colonialism and anti-colonial struggle. It 
is necessary to probe the ways in which the past offers a ‘romantic’ appeal that 
tempers with the current feelings of national subjects. I will not only explore how 
political and historical memories are ‘dramatized’ in popular culture, but also how 
politics, historicity and memorialization are gendered and sexualized during the 
‘drama.’ I therefore explore the interpellation of subjects and problematize public 
performances that celebrate citizenship and belonging.  
 
The Althusserian concept of hailing, where subjects are called on to ‘take on’ certain 
identities is crucial to the politics of citizenship and belonging in the Zimbabwean 
nation. From 2000, Zimbabweans have been called upon to tie themselves to certain 
tangible and intangible ‘origin’ marks and markers, patriotic history and the related 
land and chimurenga discourses. The responses of many subjects to these and how 
they affected their responses to the call was an elementary process of defining 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders.’ Althusser argues that it is only subjects who have been 
interpellated who are able to pronounce and display national loyalty in a state of self-
regulation. This self-regulation involves willingly performing required roles of 
national service and loyalty without any awareness of simply ‘performing’ a given 
‘script.’ In this case, living out the identities made available becomes the only 
‘thinkable’ thing to do. Althusser argues that this willingness to take on the available 
identities is a result of an illusion of freedom and free will that has created and 
conscientized the subject. 
 
Since 2000, there has been a revival of myths, songs, slogans, regalia and campaign 
material with the magnitude and propensity more or less akin to the liberation war 
period and the 1980 elections. The state-owned electronic and print media became 
populated with these. Notably, they were a feature at campaign rallies, national 
celebrations and other public platforms. Inter-alia, Norma Kriger (2003) and 
McClintock (1993) mention slogans, symbols, dressing and other campaign material 
                                                          
15
 Terence Ranger (1968) argues that the environment of later politics is shaped by the consequences of 
the total defeats of earlier mobilizations and resistances since the defeats may be transformed into an 
instrumental psychological advantage. 
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as very crucial in the imagination of a nation. Althusser argues that all this is a willing 
narration and a reproduction of the imagined nation. 
 
However, displays of national loyalty may not be a result of willingness or pure 
loyalty. It can also involve uncertainty and tactical expressions of obedience inscribed 
at particular times and in certain spaces. This is so principally where belonging and 
being a citizen is linked to access to resources and safety, as is generally the situation 
in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Such strategic expressions of loyalty took root when the 
nationalist ideology employed by ZANU-PF was altered in more totalitarian, 
discriminatory and racialized concepts of citizenship and belonging, instituted along 
the supremacy of the land issue and patriotic history (James Muzondidya, 2009). As 
Muzondidya (2009: 192) posits:   
The government gradually abandoned both its conciliatory approach and the 
inclusive nationalism of the early period, and began to adopt a radical, 
exclusive nationalist stance. It redeployed race in the political and social 
arena, and tried to reconstitute the whole discourse of rights, justice and 
citizenship in Zimbabwe...  
 
However, history has reflected that subversion and agency characterize the living 
experiences of both the dominant and dominated. Ferdandes (1988) argues that there 
is always a struggle between structural determinants which are largely reproductive 
and real human action that offers resistance. He names “...the counter-hegemonic 
social attitudes, behaviours and actions which aim at weakening the classification 
among social categories and which are directed against the dominant power(s) and 
against those who exercise it (them)” as forms of resistance and subversion 
(Ferdandes, 1988:74). These resistances may be well organized and political such as 
mass protests and demonstrations, but they can also be subtle and lacking any formal 
organization, although they basically reflect the daily struggles of people (Douglas 
Haynes & Gyan Prakash, 1991). Wendy Willems (2010) argues that resistance is 
made up of a wide range of cultural practices like rituals, gossip, humour, dress and 
behavioural codes. This follows Tanya Korovkin (2000) who seems to suggest a 
relationship between everyday forms of resistance and the rise of political 
organization. He suggests that these everyday forms of resistance may themselves 
turn into well-organized movements or some of their features may be appropriated by 
other well organized movements. This stems from earlier sentiments by among others, 
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Benedict Kerkvliet (1993) and Andrew Turton (1986) that small acts of deviance have 
the capacity for creating a mobilization ground for organized and elaborate resistance. 
 
In the Zimbabwean case, Wendy Willems (2010) insists that the opposition party, 
MDC, would have emerged stronger if it had taken advantages of the everyday forms 
of resistance by Zimbabweans. James Scott (1990, 1986), posits that usually, these 
everyday forms of resistance have no heroes, bear no heroism and are carried out in 
subtle ways rather than direct political confrontation and basically deviate from and 
satirize the norms of elites in a manner that illegitimates existing structures of 
domination. Of course, it could be argued that the MDC’s insensitivity to these 
struggles is itself an indication of its own class and cultural orientation into a national 
ruling elite and global consumer capitalism. 
  
Generally, it is quite evident that at times, Zimbabweans engaged in low risk 
strategies to resist the unjust demands of ZANU-PF, especially in the context where 
open confrontation was met with brutal force. Scott (1990, 1986) argues that fear of 
negative and precarious consequences are behind people’s subtle resistances that bear 
no traces to the point of origin, or are lost in the anonymity of the crowds. This may 
speak to the Zimbabwean case in the post-2000. A lot of power was exerted through 
unscrupulous media laws, draconian legislation, security and para-security agents 
which made open and organized resistance almost impossible and dangerous (Chris 
Maroleng, 2005; Horace Campbell, 2003; Raftopoulos, 2003), hence the option for 
more fully masked resistances. The clean-up campaign code named Operation 
Murambatsvina, targeting the urban areas which was launched on the first of May 
2005 (Thram, 2006) and administered brutally to a level that attracted attention both 
within and beyond the country’s borders is evidence that the urban weak had for long 
engaged in everyday forms of struggle. The occupation of these urban spaces by the 
urban poor who had no formal employment and housing as well as work places 
chronicles the undermining of authority and available formalities for them to get such 
resources central to survival. It is also an avowal of belonging and citizenship rights 
in a situation where they had been made invisible. Gossip/rumour that some high 
level official had died, or was seriously ill, role-playing the characters of some 
prominent people, corrupting popular speeches of certain figures, corrupting names 
like ZBC to Zimbabwe Boring Corporation or Dead Broadcasting Corporation 
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(DBC), Zimbabwe Television (Ztv) to Zimbabwe terrorvision reflects both 
consciousness and resistance to domination. 
 
The above reflects what resistant theorists have named weapons of the weak. Laura 
Miller (1997:32) describes them as the masked strategies that subordinates use to 
resist oppression from above. Similarly, according to James Ockey (1997:1): 
Weapons of the weak are aimed at resisting oppression through methods like 
dissimilation, false compliance, foot-dragging, and sabotage. They are low-
risk strategies of resisting the unjust demands of those in power...if there is an 
urban equivalent of the everyday forms of peasant resistance outlined by 
Scott, it will be found among the urban weak; in slum and squatter 
communities. 
Adding to this, Scott (1990) and Erving Goffman (1971) contend that the relations of 
domination are made up of four texts, namely; the public text of the dominant and that 
of the dominated, and then the hidden text of the dominant and that of the dominated. 
They argue that the public text is what both sides present when in the presence of 
each other while the hidden text is what is presented when away from each other. The 
public text therefore, besides reproducing the expected, may be an object of ridicule 
and pretence, which may be offering subtle fights. The hidden transcript, however can 
be understood by “...scrutinizing everyday existence for clues to its character” (Scott, 
1990:597). 
 
Interestingly, Miller (1997:32) argues, “Structural analysis that divide the population 
into the powerful and the powerless are further limited because they do not account 
for coexisting multiple hierarchies of power.” Privilege and underprivileged also rests 
on issues of race, gender, age, ethnicity, nationality and so on and in this situation, 
power is not fixed but a matter of temporality. Miller elaborates this when he 
discusses the complex, shifting power positions of junior army men and their female 
superiors, an analysis which urges a shift from the polarization and fixity of the 
oppressor and the oppressed identities. This position has been taken by a number of 
postcolonial theorists. For example, African feminists do not simply position their 
struggles on the level of gender, but also issues of race, class, nationality and so on. 
This therefore explains the complex relations of domination which reproduction 
theories fail to articulate. 
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As such, there are contested meanings of citizenship and belonging in Zimbabwe. 
Political parties and the state do not always manage to control the flow and 
interpretation of their texts. Moreover, they can not avoid the reworking of these texts 
so that they become tenable to the worlds of the different audiences. Implied here is 
that public performances of citizenship and belonging are far from only being 
reproductive but instead, reflect how different moments have created ‘subaltern’ 
forms of citizenship and belonging. In addition, the performances themselves also 
contain multiple meanings of citizenship and belonging that appeal to the worlds of 
different audiences. Most important, however, is how the audiences either re-work the 
available performances of citizenship and belonging to the Zimbabwean nation or 
create new ones, in multiple ways that generate resistances to the given notions but 
being meaningful to their own spaces and time and therefore bringing in their own 
understandings of citizenship and belonging to the Zimbabwean nation. Notably, such 
understanding of citizenship and belonging intersect with notions of gender and 
sexuality. 
 
Gender, Sexuality and Nationalism: A Postcolonial Constructionist Lens.  
Sylvia Walby (1997) posits that the literature of nations and nationalism neglect the 
question of gender [and sexuality]. This exclusion of a gendered and sexual analysis 
disables a comprehensive understanding of nationalism. Gendered and sexual 
discourses are very instructive to the rise of nationalism and the formation of nations 
and ignoring them is foolhardy. This is especially so in the presence of perceptions 
that recognize nations as females and leaders as males.  Nyambi (2012:1), states that 
“Zimbabwe’s history of an often masculinized violent liberation war has created post-
war gendered political power configurations bordering on political misogyny.” 
Annah-Leena Toivanen agrees that women are presented as symbols of the nation and 
that national leadership, heroes and citizenship have a masculine character and 
practice as reflected by the notion of ‘sons of the soil’ (Toivanen, 2010). This brings 
to the fore the gendered and sexualized attributes of the nation and nationalism to 
such an extent that present nations and nationalisms only make ‘sense’ within the 
narratives of gender and sexuality. Yuval-Davis (1997, 1996) goes further and argues 
that gender and sexuality should not only be critiqued in terms of dominant and 
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missing voices and bodies, but also in terms of particular discourses that inscribe and 
naturalize particular gendered and sexed identities. 
 
Most postcolonial literature on gender shows women’s involvement in nationalist 
movements. This literature chronicles the centrality of gendered national identity 
constructions and the gender dimensions of cultural and social formations of ‘nation.’ 
Gender relations are therefore vital in understanding and analyzing nations and 
nationalism. Nationalism is associated with socially construed ideas of masculinity 
and femininity (Sikata Benerjee, 2003; Susan Brownell, 2000; George Mosse, 1985). 
The culture of nationalism accentuates and resonates with masculine cultural themes 
related to honour, patriotism, cowardice, bravery, territory and duty (Brownell, 2000; 
Nagel, 1998). This concurs with Cynthia Enloe’s study which relates nationalism to 
the experiences of men as she posits, “nationalism has sprung from masculinized 
memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope” (Enloe, 1989:44). The 
ever presence of hegemonic masculinity moving along conquest, control and power, 
makes manliness the psychological space on which the nation is constructed as well 
as the space where a passive femininity is constructed. Yuval-Davis (1997) brings out 
different ways in which women have been located in nationalism. Firstly, women are 
seen as the biological reproducers of group members, locating their centrality in 
reproductive roles. This is rooted from the idea of a universal origin which informs 
the construction of most ethnic and national collectives. One may argue that linking 
the universal origin of ethnic and national collectives to women is to preserve the 
purity of the group since it is easier to trace roots from the mother, who offers 
evidence through pregnancy and giving birth, than the father who may not always 
offer that evidence. One therefore joins the collectivity by being born into it. 
 
Secondly, she states that women are viewed as cultural carriers, thus they serve as the 
symbolic markers of the group or nation. In most cultures, the woman figure 
symbolizes the spirit of the collectivity. This emphasizes that every group member 
can be traced to the mother. To this extent, Yuval-Davis argues that gendered 
representations of the identities of collectivities have also led to the construction of 
women as the bearers of the collectivity’s honor, meaning that the honor of the group 
is enriched in the honor of its women. Any form of conduct which is seen as bringing 
dishonor to the women is seen as doing the same to the whole group. This makes it 
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important to keep in check the conduct of women to make sure that they have proper 
behavior, which signifies the collectivity’s boundaries as perceived. She points out 
that this is why any unsanctioned women behavior is met with severe punishment on 
those who go beyond boundaries. To safe guard honor therefore, women have a vital 
mandate in the ideological reproduction of collective identity. 
 
Thirdly, Yuval-Davis looks at women’s position in national projects and processes 
with regard to the concept of citizenship. She argues that although women may and do 
qualify as members of collectivities, and they enjoy formalized equality with other 
members, other modes of political, social and civil exclusions remain rife. She notes a 
significant contradiction on how on the one hand, women are always included in the 
general collective state citizens with certain responsibilities while on the other there is 
always a separate body of legislation and knowledge, which relates them as women 
rather than citizens. Yuval-Davies (1996) reflects on how women are involved in 
nationalism as activists at different levels, yet also in gender entrenched roles where 
they are implicated as nurturers of the nation akin to their ascribed significance as 
women/nurturers. Implied is the responsibility of women citizens primarily to 
reproduce the next generation of nationalists or for culturally transmitting the 
attributes of the nation. This tends to link with the limited recognition of women, for 
example, in pre-colonial Zimbabwe, as represented in history. Gerald Mazarire (2003) 
and Elizabeth Schmidt (1988) argue that in pre-colonial Zimbabwe, women’s worth 
was premised on fecundity, thus the more sons she had the more respect she mastered. 
Age, her family of origin, how she married as well as spirit possession were also 
foundations for respect. I purchase on postcolonial literature to further explore the 
constructions of nationalism by focusing on texts popularized to propel Zimbabwean 
nationalism in the post 2000s. 
 
The 1980s onwards witnessed a wide body of postcolonial literature locating women 
in nationalist projects and in that way, reflecting on the complex relationship between 
gender, sexuality and nationalism. As such, gender and sexuality became vital and 
indispensable constituencies in the analysis of nation building and nationalism. 
Feminist Postcolonial scholarship has argued that gender and sexuality discourses, in 
addition to defining the nation, also play a phenomenal role in the processes of both 
constructing and reproducing nationalism (Lewis, 2008; Kizito Muchemwa & Robert 
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Muponde, 2007; Oyeronke Oyewumi, 2000, 1998; Spike Peterson, 2000; Yuval-
Davis, 1996; McClintock, 1995, 1993). This then suggests that a configuration of the 
relationship between gender, sexuality and nationalism helps to examine the gendered 
and sexualized nature of nationalism. 
 
Robert Mugabe’s popular and recurring sentiments that Zimbabwe came out of blood 
and that a mere vote cannot change how the country is run reflect a warrior-
masculinist national project. 
16
 National control and protection is gendered. This 
makes ‘sense’ in Zimbabwe where those men who were not brave enough to go to the 
war front are feminised while those women who proved to be equal to the war task 
are masculinized. In order to understand Zimbabwean nationalism, it is vital to 
consider the feminizing and masculinizing aspects of the language, symbols and ‘acts’ 
of nationalism in a way that further interrogates Yuval-Davis’ framing especially in 
the context of Zimbabwe. It is in this light that I find the urge to problematize the 
signification of male figures like Joshua Nkomo 
17
 as ‘father Zimbabwe’ and Simon 
Muzenda 
18
 as ‘the soul of the nation’ in the re/making of Zimbabwean nationalism. 
One is made to ponder the implications of projecting a nation ‘fathered’ by a male and 
a nation whose ‘soul’ is male. This even becomes more interesting to probe 
considering the ‘sacredness’ given to the ‘father’ and the ‘soul’ in ensuring the 
‘purity’ of the nation. 
 
Mugabe’s sentiments that Zimbabwe needs ‘amadoda sibili,’ meaning ‘real men’ are 
telling of a characteristically masculinized nationhood. The macho-idolization of 
Nkomo and Muzenda and the nurture-valorisation of the female figure, Nehanda in 
dominant nationalist narratives hint on gendered nationalism. However, the 
construction of masculine and feminine identities in discourses of nationalism is much 
more complex. Lene Bull-Christiansen (2007) through the depiction of Joice Mujuru 
19
 as the ‘father’ of the nation reveals how some ‘masculinized’ women seek to 
                                                          
16
 http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/mugabe-mocks-the-vote-1.404654#.Va91XPmqqko.  
17
 Joshua Nkomo, aka Father Zimbabwe was one of Zimbabwe’s vice presidents from 1987 when the 
Govevernment of National Unity was formed until his death in 1999.  
18
 Simon Muzenda, aka Mzee was Zimbabwe’s deputy prime minister from 1980 to 1987, then one of 
Zimbabwe’s vice presidents from 1987 to 2003 when he died. 
19
 Joice Mujuru is currently the leader of Zimbabwe People First (ZimPF). She was one of Zimbabwe’s 
vice presidents from 2004 to 2014 when she was expelled from ZANU. She held different ministerial 
posts from 1980 to 2004. 
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perpetuate the oppression of women. This takes nation-gender relationships deeper as 
masculinities and femininities tend to cut across all ‘sexualized’ bodies depending on 
the context. This proves that exploring nation-gender relations in simple terms of 
women exclusion is inadequate. It is crucial to address the complex and hideous ways 
in which gender and sexuality politics shape and drive the masculine national project 
in Zimbabwe. 
 
The attachment of women like Joice Mujuru to power and authority teases out 
discussions of the victimhood normally associated with women. Mazarire (2003) 
draws attention to the obviously constructed idea of women’s marginal role by 
unearthing how women traditionally, were the basis of chieftainship formation, how 
they effected political hierarchies as well as determined resource distribution. By 
factoring in a discussion and description on the contrast between vahosi and varongo 
(senior and junior wives), Mazarire argues that in the Shona cosmology, some women 
were powerful. This includes, for example, the senior wives whose sons were used to 
determine heirs, women with many sons who would influence resource distribution 
and therefore power and women/wives from monarchies who wield some power, 
although its degree may be contested. 
20
 
 
However, the kind of women used to illustrate women’s power is problematic as this 
often reveals masculine power and representations of masculine authority. For 
example, Mazarire’s attention to the importance of women is linked to their adjunct 
roles. He also skews things by presenting women as national ‘wombs’ and definers of 
national purity. It is important to explore challenges associated with the patriarchal 
functions of their power. One may argue that the said women had masculinized 
femininities that served the interests of men and patriarchal societies and therefore 
could not be representative of the specific interests of women. In the constructions of 
femininities and masculinities in Zimbabwe, I explore Marc Epprecht’s (2001) notion 
that powerful women do not necessarily exemplify proto-feminism or feminine 
                                                          
20
 Stanislaus Mudenge (1988), in his history of the Mutapa dynasty also features important women 
such as the wives of the Mutapas. He mentions only the senior wives of the Mutapas by name since 
they determined power and assertion to the throne. 
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heroism, but are rather, masculinized honorary males. 
21
 In this regard, one is 
persuaded to re/think the identities of the likes of Nehanda and Joice Mujuru and what 
they mean to Zimbabwean nationalism. 
 
Certain feminists have also shown how gendered narratives and symbols have also 
been central to historiography. 
22
 For Joan Scott (1988), gender has by and large, 
provided a playing field for the performance of political history especially since it 
makes women invisible, subordinate and passive. She argues for an examination of 
history to unearth gender representation as this would aid an understanding of both 
the absence and misrepresentation of women in historical narratives. 
 
The depiction of history as linked to the politics of gender and sexuality is therefore 
crucial for analyses on the gendered and sexual constructions of nationalism. Glenda 
Sluga (2000:495) points out that: 
...the theorization of nationalism has relied upon engendered historical 
narratives which reinforce depictions of nationalism, nation-building as having 
universal and sex-neutral significance. They have reminded us if nations are 
“imagined communities,” then imagining has “gender dimensions.”  
Critical therefore, is the thinking of ‘performances’ of nationalism in line with how 
male and female subjects of the nation have to take up ‘naturalized’ and historically 
‘correct’ femininities and masculinities that ‘fit’ them into national communities. 
Generally, history has organized national movements on gender dichotomies that link 
men to the defense of the nation and women to the reproduction of the nation (Silke 
Wenk, 2000). This, however, is not enough considering that masculinities and 
femininities are complex identities that cannot be polarized and that in nationalisms, 
not all men are man enough to defend nations. As I show in what follows, the fixity of 
gendered roles that align masculinities with defense and femininities with 
reproduction is a result of Western-centric modernity. 
 
                                                          
21
 Margaret Gallagher (2001) notes that writing key women into men’s history leads to either 
misrepresentation or lack of representation of the histories of the majority of women, leading to male 
experiences and masculinities as normative and simplifying the power dynamics of gender. 
22
 In Zimbabwe one would think of the diverging versions in the presentation of the Nehanda narrative 
by David Beach (1979) and Ruramisai Charumbira (2008) or how she is literary imagined in Yvonne 
Vera’s Nehanda (1993), Chenjerai Hove’s Bones (1988) or Solomon Mutswairo’s Mweya WaNehanda 
(1988) as well as in various songs and poetry. Still, one can think of how Nehanda’s history is re-lived 
in the nationalist symbols figuring her as well as her place in nationalist discourses.  
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Oyewumi’s (2000, 1998) ideas about gender challenge the relevance of such a model 
in the understanding of African gender identities. There is a strong argument that the 
writing of African history, which was initiated and administered by the whites, was 
informed by the Western prototype. This gave rise to representations akin to the 
Western episteme rather than specific to ‘indigenous’ Africa (Oyewumi, 1998; 
Schmidt, 1990, 1988). There is also a way in which African indigenous structures and 
systems were altered to ensure control and domination of women. Oyewumi (1998) 
argues that ideology influenced the construction of African history, allowing tradition 
to be constantly re-invented in accordance to those interests. Basing her studies on 
what she calls ‘a patriachalization of Oyo history’ where history inscribes gender to 
the non-gender specificity of Oyo names, pronouns and social groupings, she posits: 
Men and women have been invented as social categories, and history is 
presented as being dominated by male actors. Female actors are virtually 
absent and where they are recognized, they are reduced to exceptions 
(Oyewumi, 1998:264).  
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) also reflects on the re/invention of history to entrench 
hegemonic masculinities. He shows the reinvention of the pre-colonial chiefly system 
of governance in colonial Zimbabwe to accommodate gendered-colonial interests. 
The veneration of masculinities made the colonialist’s indirect rule work through 
authoritative and violent masculine systems. 
23
 Violent masculinities have played a 
big role in the contestations of nationalism in new millennium Zimbabwe. As I show 
later, the identification of the likes of Chenjerai Hunzvi, 
24
 Border Gezi 
25
 and Joseph 
Chinotimba 
26
 is part of ‘writing’ Zimbabwean nationalism. I also discuss the 
significance of the Mugabe regime’s post-2000 re/invention of the masculinities of 
the war veterans, the National Youth Service (NYS) graduates and all ‘loyal’ ZANU-
                                                          
23
 Elizabeth Schmidt (1990, 1988) poses how indigenous and colonial systems of patriarchal control 
anchored and transformed one another, generating into newer and worse forms of domination. She 
reflects on how the creation of native reserves was not only positive to the colonial administration, but 
also to chiefs, headmen and older men who wanted to control the mobility of women for their own 
interests. Interesting as well, is her reflection on how the African customary law is a hybrid of African 
and Western patriarchal crafts. 
24
 Chenjerai Hunzvi aka Hitler, was the leader of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans 
Association (ZNLWVA), and one of Zimbabwe’s controversial war veterans. When he died, he was 
accorded a national hero status. 
25
 Border Gezi rose from being a provincial governor to being the Minister for Gender, Youth and 
Employment from 2000 and the National Youth Service, popularly known as Border Gezi Training 
was introduced during his tenure. He died in a car accident in 2001 when he was doing party business 
as ZANU-PF’s Secretary for the Commissariat. 
26
 Joseph Chinotimba is one of Zimbabwe’s controversial war veterans. He became prominent with the 
occupation of white-owned farms that started in 2000. He is currently a parliamentarian and is very 
popular in Zimbabwe as both a violent person and comical figure. 
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PF politicians and supporters in crafting a nationalism befitting the Third 
Chimurenga. 
 
McClintock (1995:105) articulates; “[i]n the chronicles of male nationalism, women 
are all too often figured as mere scenic backdrops to the big-brass business of 
masculine armies and uprisings.” This links nationalism to masculine and patriarchal 
features of possession, dominance and accumulation (Josephine Nhongo-
Simbanegavi, 2000). This undermines fragments of the nations such as religious, 
gender and ethnic fissures, rendering nationalist revolutions and patriarchal 
revolutions symmetrical (Joyce Chadya, 2003).  
 
For Peterson (1995), the making of group or communal identity of ‘us against them’ 
rests on divisions of masculinity and femininity. The ‘us’ is masculinized while 
‘them’ is feminized in Carl Schmitt’s controversial concept of the political, in which 
he discusses the importance of the friend-enemy binary as the base of the ‘political’ or 
state (Charles Frye, 1996). For Frye, this ensures a fighting human totality conceived 
around notions of war, battle, death/killing and losing/winning. Interestingly, the texts 
under study, in different ways, mirror a Zimbabwe made up of binaries. These include 
foreign/native, outsider/insider, enemies/friends, man/woman, 
homosexual/heterosexual, Zimbabwe/the West and a recent invention of 
weevils/gamatox 
27
 that polarized the 2014 fallout within ZANU-PF. Exposing the 
gendered and sexualized aspects of such texts deepen studies on nationalism. 
 
In Zimbabwean nationalist politics, divergence is taken as opposition and ‘opposition’ 
political parties like the MDC are seen as ‘prostituting’ with the whites, who are 
‘outsiders.’ This calls for more nuanced discussions on how the naturalized 
domination of ‘us against them’ is connected to the naturalization of men/masculinity 
over women/femininity. It is therefore essential to explore inherent masculinities and 
femininities as well as the highly charged significance of sexuality in the making of 
the Zimbabwean nation/al family. 
                                                          
27
 Gamatox is used to refer to the pro-Joice Mujuru faction that is said to embrace veteran ZANU-PF 
members. The name can imply a poisonous and dangerous chemical or an anti-pest chemical used to 
guard and preserve grain. The Weevils refer to a faction which the likes of Jonathan Moyo and Grace 
Mugabe and ‘fresh’ ZANU-PF members are aligned to. Literally weevil refers to insects which destroy 
grain from within, but metaphorically it implies the destruction of ZANU-PF from within. 
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In Zimbabwe, the language and practice of the nation and nationalism are entrenched 
through the treatises of gender and sexuality. Very often, the collectivity and 
continuity of the nation has been imagined and legitimated according to the gendered 
metaphors of reproduction. Robert Mugabe has often argued that homosexuality 
destroys nations hence discipline and control are necessary in ensuring 
heterosexuality and therefore, nationhood. Among others, Epprecht argues that 
Zimbabwe’s heterosexual mantra is a manifestation of colonial inheritance: 
The focus is on ways in which notions of appropriate, respectable, exclusive 
heterosexuality within the ‘cowboy’ culture of White Rhodesia trickled into, 
or were interpreted within the African nationalist movement. ‘Cowboy’ is 
understood here as used by both admirers and critical observers at the time – 
boldly   macho and heterosexually lusty (Epprecht, 2005:254).  
 
Not only are many understandings of deviant sexuality colonial, rather than 
traditional; so too are many notions of women’s roles in contemporary African 
nationalist myth-making. In state-driven discourses, familial notions frequently 
construct women as central to the procreation of citizens and reproduction of the 
nation. In this case, the penchant of nationalists is to equate the nation with a nuclear 
family in its conventional sense. This culturally distinct notion of family assumes a 
single male-headed household where both men and women have differential natural 
roles to play. While women are subordinated politically in nationalist movements and 
politics, they are symbolically located as mothers of nations (Yuval-Davies, 1997). 
The family trope naturalizes the nation just as the biological family and consequently 
naturalizes social hierarchies based on women’s subordination. McClintock (1993) 
posits that nations are recurrently figured out through the iconography of familial and 
domestic space. She conveys that the term ‘nation’ is rooted in ‘natio’ which means to 
be born, offering reason why nations are thought of as ‘motherlands’ and 
‘fatherlands.’ McClintock’s major point here is that the family presents an apparently 
natural figure for engendering social hierarchy within an organic unity of interests as 
well as a metaphoric figure by which hierarchical social differences could be crafted 
to narrate a mono-historical genesis. Discovering the nation as a family entails the 
acquisition of a patriarchal hierarchy within which distinct roles of members are 
modeled by their gender – as in the patriarchal family. Thus, for self-preservation, the 
nation needs both masculinity and femininity and nations are symbolically larger 
families. 
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Lynn Hunt argues that the family ‘romance’ provides a script for organizing political 
experience. Implied is the fact that most organized social relations are founded on 
kinship, meaning that the family is an important category for comprehending political 
power. She points out that: 
...the most obvious material at hand for thinking politically was the family, not 
the family as some kind of model social experience, but the family as an 
imaginative construct of power relations (Hunt, 1992:196). 
Complementing work such as McClintock’s and Hunt’s is a body of literature 
showing how to varying degrees, women’s bodies are permeated with unique 
significance as markers of community and cultural preservation and reproduction. 
These works show how idealized metaphors and bodies of women ‘act’ as margins of 
the nation. Zillah Eisenstein (2000) states that the female and maternalized body is 
reduced to a space for configuring the nation. Thus the nation is a naturalized 
imaginary space constructed through the symbolization of the female body. She goes 
on to say that “it is the bordered differentiation of women’s bodies from men’s bodies 
rather than the bodies themselves that construct the fiction of nations” (Eisenstein, 
2000:43). Thus, the depiction of women’s bodies in nationalism makes sense only 
through the process of dichotomized differentiation. Since the nation locates women 
in a familial order “women become a metaphor for what they present, rather than 
what they are” (Eisenstein, 2000:43). 
 
Noting the above, it is understandable to point out that sexuality and its associated 
social meanings and attributes are significant to women’s national identity. The strict 
control of female sexuality is an essential mechanism of nation formation. Nagel 
(1998) makes an interesting argument: that it is very common for women’s sexuality 
to be charged with political and symbolic meaning in relation to discourses about ‘the 
national interest.’ Nagel suggests that this is because nationalism positions woman as 
mother, a signification of the national hearth and home and also because women as 
wives and daughters transmit masculine honour and therefore, national honour. 
 
In the 1980s, there were frequent and random raids on women who were labelled as 
prostitutes and vagrants in Zimbabwe (Sita Ranchod-Nilson, 2006). This reveals how 
women’s bodies and at times, the bodies of feminized men and certain sexualities 
have been imagined in terms of tropes of contamination and as disturbing the natural 
body politic. Women supposedly represent dominated beings and therefore weak and 
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feminine subjects who cannot defend themselves. Moreover, their ‘frailty’ may lead 
them to ‘prostitute’ and pollute and dishonour the nation. If those who are strong, the 
masculine, make sure that the outside does not ‘penetrate’ the weak, then the nation is 
protected. Turning to the Zimbabwean manifestation of all this, in many incidences, 
Morgan Tsvangirai has been projected as weak, a coward and a ‘prostitute’ and 
therefore not fitting the billing of amadoda sibili.  I discuss this in more detail in 
Chapter 2 and 4. 
 
On a similar note, Tamar Mayer (2000) raises the idea that nationalism, gender and 
sexuality are embedded in social and cultural regimes and they immensely contribute 
to each other’s  construction by invoking the ‘us’ and ‘them’ polarities and the 
exclusion of the othered. Thus to her, one gender, one sexuality, one nation, is 
empowered only and always at the expense and the disempowerment of another. 
Mayer’s analysis points out that notwithstanding its narrative of equality for subjects, 
nation remains masculine and the material of men. Thus control over the benefits 
enshrined in national belonging and citizenship is grotesquely gendered. This 
replicates and shows the persistence of Aristotle’s philosophy that politics is the place 
of men (Richard Mulgan, 1974). By controlling sexuality in all its aspects, and the 
avenues of imaginations, men attain the authorship of, and the authority to define the 
nation. Using Butler’s concept of ‘performativity,’ Mayer asserts that the nation is 
populated with sexed subjects whose ‘performativity’ or ‘scripts’ underwrite their 
own gender identity and also that of the entire nation:  
...through the repetition of accepted norms and behaviours – control over 
reproduction, militarism and heroism and heterosexuality – members help to 
construct the privileged nation; equally the repetitive performances of these 
acts in the name of the nation help to construct gender and sexuality (Mayer, 
2000:5). 
 
In addition, Mayer sees the nexus of nation, gender and sexuality as primarily a 
discourse about an ethical code, which rallies men and in some cases women, to 
become the sole guardians of the nation while women are its biological and symbolic 
reproducers. Thus the crafting of the nation as the hegemonic sphere of both 
masculinity and heterosexuality, and as a space for the institutionalization and 
naturalization of gender differences and the naturalization of knowledge regimes 
created by a reference to polarised sexualities. In this regard, Peterson (2000) argues 
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that heterosexuality is central to nationalism with regard to group reproduction since 
it presupposes a dual signification of dichotomized identities of male/masculine and 
female/feminine that are hierarchical. In turn, heterosexual relations are naturalized as 
the only sexual identity, sexual practice and social relations and the foundation of 
group continuity. 
28
 To Peterson, in existence is a signified structuring of polarized 
male-female bodies and masculine-feminine identities that is instructed by the idea of 
heterosexuality. To this extent, the structuring of masculine over feminine is 
inevitable due to the political structuring inscribed in the formation of states and 
reproduced through masculine discourses that rationalize the hierarchical relations of 
the state. 
 
Another body of literature on gender and nationalism has very radical implications in 
guiding how feminist intellectual and political activism has contributed to and in 
some cases challenges male-centred nationalism. This scholarship therefore directly 
helps to explain the forms and effects of much oppositional discourse in contesting 
the Zimbabwean state’s patriarchal authoritarianism. In most cases, nationalist and 
feminist practices are usually conflicting rather than harmonious. Generally, 
nationalisms endeavour to prioritize the two practices, consequently removing 
feminism from the agenda until nationalist goals are achieved. Sometimes, even when 
nationalist practice appears to engender feminism, any resulting feminist practice is 
limited to narrowly defined spheres by nationalist insistence on the importance of 
women’s traditional roles for the nationalist project as a whole (Charlotte Davies, 
1996). 
 
Suad Joseph (2000) sees gender as central to state-building enterprises. To her, 
nation-building and state-building projects have not necessarily given rise to the same 
and attuned results for women who have been caught between the conflicting 
demands of nation-building and state-building projects. She does not refute some 
reforms underpinning patriarchy, but contends that the reproduction of gendered and 
sexual dichotomized power relations that have institutionalized gendered and 
sexualized citizenship in state building projects are anchored in the relationship of 
woman/mother to the nation and man/father to the state. The above position is shared 
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 Watch https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPpme0-U9vk.  
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by Jean Elshtain (1981) who notes a paradox on how women are disallowed civic 
identity training, yet expected to transmit to their sons, a passion for exemplary 
families needed to foster that identity and as such, disqualifying mothers from 
citizenry but making them mothers of citizens. 
 
A small but lively body of feminist intellectual work was produced by scholars, 
academics, journalists and artists, with some of this being co-ordinated by SAPEs in 
Harare. This includes work by Patricia McFadden, Everjoice Win, Terry Barnes, 
Rudo Gaidzanwa and Yvonne Vera working both as a fiction-writer and as the head 
of the national gallery in Bulawayo. Much of this work, however, thrived before, 
rather than after 2000. In the post-2000, many feminists and radical women, just like 
other intellectual activists outside of Zimbabwe (like Patricia McFadden, Terry 
Barnes and Everjoice Win) turned increasingly to more focused and less radical 
intellectual work in their respective working sites. 
 
To explore the above issues, I identify the following central themes in Zimbabwean 
nationalism: Origin Stories of the Zimbabwean Nation and their Contestations, The 
‘Land Question’ and its Symbolic Meanings and Narratives and Performances of 
Struggle in the Zimbabwean Nation. Notions of citizenship and belonging as well as 
metaphors of the Zimbabwean nation cut across the above themes. Origin Stories of 
the Zimbabwean Nation and their Contestations deals mainly with the performances 
of icons and symbols of the nation. I trace and critique the founding stories, figures 
and symbols of the Zimbabwean nation and how different texts work to reflect these 
and how they shape the present and the future. The ‘Land Question’ and its Symbolic 
Meanings focuses on how subjects are hailed mainly through public enactments of 
reform and national control. I delve into the land question and its material and 
immaterial or metaphorically charged meanings. Narratives and Performances of 
Struggle in the Zimbabwean Nation focuses on national identity and its purchase on a 
genealogy of unyielding revolutions and revolutionaries in the nation’s becoming. In 
exploring the above thematic aspects, I discuss the dominant expectations marking 
citizenship and belonging and the various forms of acceptances and resistances that 
people have been making. I also discuss the gendered and sexualized dimensions of 
Zimbabwean nationalism. My focus especially on Zimbabwean music is to show 
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decentred notions of struggles, ones that have moved from a monolithic and 
untroubled centre. 
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CHAPTER 2: ORIGIN STORIES OF THE ZIMBABWEAN NATION AND 
THEIR CONTESTATIONS 
Roots, Triumphs and Destinies 
The relevance of Zimbabwe’s rich store of pre-colonial Shona and Ndebele symbols 
and stories to the imagining of contemporary nationalisms is phenomenal. One can 
note the significance of pre-colonial Shona symbols and stories such as Sororenzou 
Murenga, Nehanda, Chaminuka, Kaguvi, Mapondera, the Great Zimbabwe, the Great 
Zimbabwe birds and chimurenga narratives. Among the Ndebele pre-colonial 
symbols and stories, one can think of Mzilikazi, how he rose to fame in King Shaka’s 
kingdom, and how he built the Ndebele nation. Lobengula’s fame, the Imfazo 
Yokuqala or Mfazo 1 (Anglo-Ndebele war of 1893), and the British’s failure to 
capture the Ndebele King, Lobengula are also rich Ndebele ‘pasts.’ The recently 
‘acknowledged’ heroism of Gwasela and Gaigusvu, who had been labelled dissidents 
in the 1980s also provide rich symbols of resistance against the usurpation of Ndebele 
‘nationhood.’ Related to the above, there are among others, stories of colonial 
brutalities, callous deaths, prophecies and unyielding hope for restoration. These 
symbols and stories are ‘archives’ from which origin stories of the nation are 
retrieved, reinvented and reconfigured. They mark how subjects of the nation are 
hailed, and help determine notions of citizenship and belonging, exclusion and 
inclusion both to the social and political sphere. Notably, these ‘pre-colonial’ archives 
have also been instrumentalized as ideological platforms, and also as discursive 
repositories for resistance and alternatives for national imagining and imaging. 
 
This provides a narrative of the nation that is ambivalent in Homi Bhabha’s (1993) 
sense, especially because of a multiple and disturbed reading invoked by these 
archival texts. Bhabha argues that language is ambivalent and so is the discourse of 
the nation. He points out that “To encounter the nation as it is written displays a 
temporality of culture and social consciousness more in tune with the partial, 
overdetermined process by which textual meaning is produced through the 
articulation of difference in language…” (Bhabha, 1993:2). This results in a contested 
Zimbabwean nationalism that locates citizenship and belonging in a fluid space. I do 
not see these texts only as a distribution of the sensible in the Ranciere[an] sense, but 
also as going behind and beyond the sensible. There is a way in which looking 
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beyond the sensible, the unsaid spaces and the ways in which texts are received across 
time and context may bring in new questions and new understandings on the notions 
of citizenship and belonging. In the Zimbabwean case, different iconographical 
figures, stories and symbols have been used by different people and groups at 
different times to ‘act out’ the Zimbabwean nation. Important to note here are the 
ambivalences, acceptances and subversions and the convergences and divergences 
that emerge as figures, stories, symbols and meanings get mediated by contexts. 
 
More often than not, stories about a peoples’ origin usually have important roles to 
play in how people conceive their identities, loyalties and relations with others outside 
their group. As such, it is often argued that origin stories are reference points for 
commonalities, uniqueness, authenticity and expectations, all of which are crucial in 
the imaginings of nations. In fact, nations cannot be imaged without stories of their 
origins, although which stories are narrated at what times, who narrates the stories to 
whom and the ‘originality’ of the stories are complex and contested issues. 
Zimbabwean nationalism is by and large, predicated on stories of origin as these 
answer to calls of attachments and dis-attachments, recognitions and lack of 
recognitions and acceptances and rejections. In the imagining of belonging through 
origins, the coding of individuals and groups as occupying an outside zone makes 
their social identification, and therefore their very lives very precarious. This is 
because ‘insiders’ defend their right to authenticity through ‘othering’ and make sure 
that boundaries between belonging and not belonging are not crossed. Also created is 
a situation where the ‘others’ created by grand Zimbabwean nationalist projects 
become threats to those inhabiting the inside sphere. A context where origin 
determines authentic citizenship and belonging, with  certain advantages and 
disadvantages bestowed on those who belong and those who do not belong, usually 
gives rise to heated and at times, fatal confrontations between these polarities. Thus, 
there are strong connections between stories about the past, origins and ‘authenticity’ 
and citizenship and belonging. Gerald Mazarire (2009:1) claims that “…in its more 
recent assertions of sovereignty, reclamation, restitution, the return to tradition, and 
even anti-imperialism, the Zimbabwean state perceives the pre-colonial period as…” 
the foundation for national rebirth. 
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The above makes it clear that there are always attempts to go into the past to define 
Zimbabwe’s presence and future. It is crucial to look at how a sense of ‘pastness’ is 
‘extracted’ as well as how it is re/packaged, re/distributed and received or contested. 
Interesting are the ways in which this past is a ‘present’ past in Mazarire’s sense, that 
is, a creation of the past that is imagined basing on present and future needs 
(Mazarire, 2009). Joseph Mtisi, Munyaradzi Nyakudya & Teresa Barnes (2009) argue 
that in addition to race, discourses of origin were central to the nationalists in their 
construction of the nation. Discourses around the First Chimurenga became a useful 
mobilizing tool during Zimbabwe’s following struggles and also became instrumental 
in their coding. The liberation war starting in the 1960s and the post-2000 national 
reforms became known as the Second Chimurenga and the Third Chimurenga 
respectively, thus making chimurenga central in Zimbabwean nationalist myth-
making. 
 
It may be difficult to think of the possibilities of writing Zimbabwean history outside 
the chimurenga narrative. This is because of the emotional attachments the term 
carries. Katherine Verdery (1990) makes sense when she argues that the human 
universe always has affective and meaningful dimensions and these are attained 
through complex symbolic processes. As such, in the Zimbabwean case, it might be 
impossible to move out of the chimurenga narrative, but it is possible to see how 
people constantly give new or revised sense to what chimurenga means to them. 
 
The chimurenga discourse has been naturalized and turned into part of Zimbabwe’s 
‘common sense.’ This sense-making, however, emerges as contextual and temporal as 
struggles over meanings and significations are waged in different universes that 
people experience and imagine. If Zimbabwean history cannot be written outside the 
chimurenga narrative, then it raises questions whether it can possibly be written 
outside the Shona language, especially Zezuru ethnicity. It is almost clear that the 
chimurenga myth, which currently underwrites Zimbabwe’s patriotic history and 
consequently, Zimbabwe’s dominant nationalist narratives, is ethnically rooted. 
Fungai Muchirori points out that the revolutionary concept of chimurenga is situated 
in the Shona language (Shereen Essof, 2013). 
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Essof (2013) agrees with Muchirori’s observation, but adds that it is not just Shona 
language, but also principally Shona history. Maurice Vambe (2012) posits that 
historically, the word chimurenga antedates the colonial encroachment and originates 
from the Shona ancestor, Murenga Sororenzou, who was a hunter, great warrior, war 
genius, war-song composer and nation-builder. This adds to Vambe’s (2004:167) 
description of Murenga Sororenzou as “... a huge man with a head (soro), the size of 
an elephant’s (renzou)…” What complicates the idea of national coherence, then, is 
how there are sub-texts of ethnic nationalism with the overarching narrative of 
Zimbabwean nationalism. An equally interesting element that fragments a sense of 
national unity is the construction of ‘manliness’ and masculine authority in how 
Vambe (2004) describes Murenga Sororenzou. 
 
Considering how nationalism determines citizenship and belonging, it is crucial to 
disentangle how the appropriation of this gigantic, masculine, Shona legend with 
fighting prowess spills over into ethnic, race, class and gender identities in the 
Zimbabwean nation. One is tempted to suspect an attempt to imagine Zimbabwean 
polities analogous to the dominant narratives of Western polities that lauds manliness 
and militancy. Terence Ranger (1967) argues that religious leaders adopted and 
adapted the pre-colonial era myth founded on a millenarian revolution and assured 
their people of a novel nation free of whites. 
29
 Murenga or Mulenga was then drawn 
into the struggle as one who administered medicine that made Ndebele and Shona 
fighters untouchable and immune to the colonialists’ weaponry. Ranger notes how 
this myth of the 1896-97 African resistances was named chimurenga in nationalist 
historiography. However, Julian Cobbing (1977) and David Beach (1979) undermine 
the role of spirit mediums and the unified and integrated struggle waged by the 
natives, respectively, as narrated by Ranger. Nevertheless, despite the presence of a 
critique of Ranger’s account, it still remains very popular in discourses of the 
Zimbabwean nation. 
30
 This is because the narrative is very useful in constructing 
                                                          
29
 Such kind of ‘Afrocentric’ positioning that has been taken by a number of Southern African 
historians, exemplified by John. D. Omer-Cooper’s Zulu Aftermath (1966), a seminal work on African 
‘nation-building’ processes such as the mfecane, that romanticize African pasts and glorifies African 
military rulers such as Shaka and centralized military states has been seen as reproducing colonial 
knowledge systems and has been revisioned by writings such as Bessie Head’s A Bewitched Crossroad 
(Desiree Lewis, 2002). 
30
 Representations of the African past are more concerned with presenting the past in particular ways 
than with the ‘actual’ past (Desiree Lewis, 2002). 
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particular identities and a particular version and vision of nationalism. Such narratives 
re/produce and maintain masculinist, militarized and gendered national narratives and 
projects (Desiree Lewis, 2002). 
 
Regardless of how chimurenga narratives conceal fragmentation and differential 
forms of belonging to the Zimbabwean nation, the myth-making surrounding 
chimurenga should be fully understood in the sense of giving hope, patience and 
perseverance to the fighters. It also links up well with a cosmology that does not 
believe in ultimate death but a different world of the living dead where fighting 
continues. In that sense, Zimbabweans, despite the physical death of some, become 
invulnerable to the white settlers’ weapons. In the 2000s, after several decades of 
battling against various forms of settler and neo-colonialism, although suffering is 
acknowledged, there is hope that is fostered by nationalist discourses and the Third 
Chimurenga was said to give rise to a positive revolution. 
 
From the start of the new millennium, the state media’s coverage of the deaths and 
burials of national heroes and heroines as well as presentations of the suffering figures 
of the First and Second Chimurenga became very crucial. State newspapers, almost 
on a daily basis, from the death to a few days after burial, carried articles on and 
around the late national hero/heroine. This was also the case with the electronic 
media. Although it is usual for the deaths of prominent people to attract media 
attention, it is interesting how after death, biographies of individuals are selectively 
crafted into narratives of the nation by the state media. Interesting as well is the 
recycling of colonial brutalities and revised liberation war discourses during this 
period of death and burial to justify claims to the hero status. 
 
Discourses of origin feature especially prominently in the conceptualization of 
Zimbabwean nationalism in the 2000s. In fact, from 2000, the intensity of the ruling 
party’s efforts to monopolize the state led to its almost frenzied appropriation and 
reconstruction of ‘the’ story of Zimbabwe’s origins. Strong foundation myths around 
struggles are used to inform Zimbabwean nationalism. These foundation myths are 
circulated through performances of icons and symbols of the nation. Nevertheless, 
they are characterized by ambivalences that range from acceptance and re/production 
to rejection and re-imagining as instructed by time and space. Among other examples 
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is Robert Mugabe’s speech calling for reconciliation soon after independence, which 
is then followed by the continuous labeling of Zimbabweans of foreign descent as 
aliens and totem-less. The prevalence of Shona myths and symbols in national 
imaginations in the context of an ‘inclusive’ national project is ambivalent. Also 
paradoxical is Mugabe’s argument that the white man is not indigenous and that 
Africa is for Africans. Most interesting is the racialization of the MDC political party, 
particularly its leader, Morgan Tsvangirai as ‘white.’ 31 Mugabe’s construction of 
Morgan Tsvangirai makes one to understand ‘whiteness’ as a political construction 
within the Zimbabwean ‘body-politic.’ The above helps to reflect on the contestations 
around national belonging. In the discourses of nationalism, certain bodies have been 
associated with national defilement while others have been associated with nation/al 
purity and nation/al being. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that there are several definitions of nation, I find it 
appropriate from the onset, to argue that generally, ‘nation’ is a socially constructed 
concept. Just like ‘gender’ and sexuality, it is associated with notions of unity and 
differentiation which are internalized and ‘naturalized’ through various affiliations 
that people have. Ernest Renan (1996), for example, defines nation as a soul, a 
spiritual principle. He asserts: 
Two things, which, strictly speaking are just one, constitute this soul, this 
spiritual principle. One is past, the other is the present. One is the common 
possession of a rich legacy of memories; the other is actual consent, the desire 
to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage that has been 
received in common (Renan, 1996:57). 
Being a spiritual principle, it is associated with the elusive and the abstract; it calls 
upon faith and belief rather than ‘logic.’ This spiritual sense carries and gives 
meaning to existence. In the case of Zimbabwe, it creates feelings of guilt if one’s 
faith withers and one ceases to believe. It also builds ‘hope’ and loyalty if one 
continues to hold onto faith and belief. The spiritual sense therefore, is very forceful 
because it is founded on ‘irrational’ belief. Brian Osborne (2001:1342) indicates that 
state nationalist construction relies on elicitation “…of the ideas, myths, and dreams 
that comprise the non-rational core of national identity. That is, old nations and 
modern states alike cannot exist or function without symbolic underpinnings.” 
                                                          
31
 This alludes to among others, Foucault’s formulation where ‘race’ is not simply biologically 
determined, but also based on the polarities of those who belong and those who do not belong. 
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Community members have to believe in the existence of this soul; hence the need to 
have in place, systems and instruments inculcating belief, the absence of which 
destroys the ‘soul’ and therefore ‘nation.’ Such a language producing feelings that are 
extremely persuasive and defying logic is very important to nationalist projects. 
Edward Matenga’s (2011) analysis of the events around the return of revered 
Zimbabwean artefacts such as the lower part of one of the Great Zimbabwe bird 
carvings from foreign countries where they had been taken to interestingly describes 
the relevance of the ‘soul’ in representations of Zimbabwean nationalism. As he 
shows, traditional leaders as well as politicians have often mobilized this idea for their 
own interests. This is evident in the way part of the Zimbabwe bird carving has been 
received and interpreted. The recovery of part of the bird carving has been seen as the 
restoration of the ‘soul,’ the recovery of the ‘nation.’ ZANU-PF leaders read the 
return of the artefact alongside discourses of land recovery as exemplified by the 
compulsory acquisition of white-owned land from 2000. The spiritual echoes here are 
even more evident when one considers that in many pre-colonial African world views, 
artefacts are not just simple works of art, but sacred and invested with ‘life’ and 
divine meaning (Matenga, 2011). The presence of the spiritual in Zimbabwe is not 
limited to crafts, but extends to certain human figures as witnessed especially in the 
2000s. Thus, the spirituality of artefacts has also been greatly augmented by the 
spirituality of specific revered national leaders in whose selves the living fabric of the 
nation has been formulated. This is done in a way that invites subjects of the nation to 
sense the nation in line with the narrativization of the revered figures whose ‘bodies’ 
are taken as pure repositories of the national soul. 
 
Since 2000, the late Zimbabwean Vice President, Simon Vengesayi Muzenda has 
been regarded as the soul of the nation, establishing an umbilical cord with the spirit 
medium Nehanda. Thus, Muzenda is imagined as the link between Nehanda, one of 
Zimbabwe’s valorised spirit mediums representing the ancestral world, and 
contemporary Zimbabweans. Notable here is Muzenda’s popularized recitation of 
Solomon Mutswairo’s poem ‘Nehanda Nyakasikana’ 32 which transformed him into 
something approximating an actual ‘essence,’ the personality and life of the 
Zimbabwean nation that could not survive without Nehanda’s intervention. This 
                                                          
32
 See Solomon Mutsvairo’s Feso (1982) on page 35-36 for the poem. 
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deviates from the rationalist post-enlightenment notion at the heart of nation-states 
where the rational purposefulness of language, ethnicity, war, history and political 
affiliations are central to the idea of nation. The deep veneration of personality and 
spirituality that gives life to the Zimbabwean nation is located in Muzenda. He is 
taken as a repository of the nation’s memory by fondly being labelled ‘Mzee,’ 
meaning an old man. In most African societies, old men are revered as sacrosanct and 
seen as bearers of invaluable wisdom and a country’s memory bank. In Zimbabwe, 
however, dominant nationalist discourses purports that not all old men fall into this 
category, but only a few unique ones, as evidenced by the selection of those to be 
honoured. The figure of Muzenda is selected to symbolize traditional wisdom which 
guides the ‘re/writing’ and ‘rehearsal’ of the Zimbabwean nation. In the 
representations of Muzenda, is a re/packaging of the Zimbabwean national identity 
that shows belonging and performs nationalism as rooted in the constructed 
Zimbabwean past, particularly the chimurenga ideology. 
 
In post-independence Zimbabwe, the chimurenga ideology has been instrumental in 
perpetuating Robert Mugabe’s hegemony and by extension, that of ZANU-PF and 
resultantly ensuring the political safety of Mugabe and ZANU-PF. At the same time, 
the same ideology has been used as the foundation for a critique of Mugabe and 
ZANU-PF. This has resulted in complex, contested and fluid national identities that 
make purchases on symbolic underpinnings to ensure affective affiliations.  
 
Origin Stories: The (Un)Making of a Nation 
Origin stories, by their very nature, are fraught with ambivalences and contestations. 
This is so because they rely on myths, legends and historical accounts which are 
especially fluid and polysemous forms of narratives. They are often narrowed and 
instrumentalized, making one recall Beach (1999:6) who posits: 
…history is the memory of humanity. Just as any human from childhood to 
second childhood has memories of its experiences of varying degrees of 
accuracy, so humanity retains by one method or another evidence about its 
past. This may be based on the discipline of history itself or upon archaeology, 
linguistics, sociology, political science, law, commerce.  
Thomas Beidelman’s (1970) analysis uses a Kaguru traditional text to reflect on the 
intersections of the history of Kaguru, Bantu speaking people in east-central Tanzania 
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and their myths and legends. This also speaks to issues around representations of 
historical events in ‘imaginative’ discourses such as epics, folk tales, myths and 
legends as well as the idea that history has a figurative level of meaning (Hyden 
White, 1987, 1984, 1975). As articulated above, origin stories are selected and 
dis/remembered in a certain way that creates a certain world and particular 
movements of time, answering to a projected reality. When pointed to, they trigger 
feelings of betrayal, isolation, resentment, rebellion and re/imagining, giving rise to 
struggles that can be extremely intense. Characterized by such temporal affective 
reactions, origin stories are the foundation for the un/making of nations. Louis 
Althusser (1971) advances that the invention of history and culture, including stories 
of origin, is necessary in the creation of national consciousness. It is this collective 
consciousness of beginnings that is at the heart of nationalism (Benedict Anderson, 
1983; John Armstrong, 1982). As such, origin stories, icons and symbols of the nation 
have the ability to set common experiences, common destinies and therefore unity. 
Walker Connor (1994) argues that the capacity of origin stories, icons and symbols of 
the nation to set common experiences, common destinies and unity enables an 
affective affiliation to imaginations of the nation which Althusser sees as necessary 
for subjects to become controllable and mobilized to a particular project that is 
offered in the name of the nation. 
 
However, the evocation of origin stories, icons and symbols of the nation is not a 
closed package as there can be erasure to these, leading to newer stories, symbols and 
experiences. Nor are the meanings rigid and clear-cut as time and space tend to bring 
rupture effects. Thus, origin stories, icons and symbols of the nation have an ability to 
both set and expose fissures in the ‘nation.’  As a result, they also allude to numerous 
ripples and contestations in the re/constructions of citizenship and belonging in a 
nation. At certain moments, there are always questions around the narrator of the 
stories, the content of the stories, icons and symbols that are favored as well as the 
ones that are undermined or buried and at certain moments. Thus, although 
revolutions are linked to the formation of the Zimbabwean nation, there are 
contestations on how the revolutionary stories are told. 
 
The trend to remove the primacy of certain groups, for example the Ndebele, women, 
non-combatants, dissenters and the so called ‘born-frees’ in chimurenga narratives 
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has been very prevalent in Zimbabwe. James Muzondidya (2009:184) points to 
“…PF-ZAPU’s disgruntlement over ZANU-PF’s use of party slogans, songs and 
political speeches that portrayed ZANU-PF as the authentic liberator while 
disparaging Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and its supporters as 
villains.” Muzondidya adds that the government’s narratives emasculated and 
marginalized PF-ZAPU and other parties’ contributions. He says this was achieved by 
narrations, memorializations and performances of Shona pre-colonial heroes, artefacts 
and historical monuments and peripheralizing those of the Ndebele and other minority 
groups. The poor electoral performance of ZANU-PF in Matebeleland, the re-
invention of ZAPU and the emerging of a number of pro-Matebeleland movements 
and pressure groups with Ndebele particularities among others, are struggles meant to 
redeem chimurenga from state-centrism. More recently, in 2015, ZANU-PF and 
Robert Mugabe have re/written the histories of popular figures like Joice Mujuru, 
Didymus Mutasa 
33
 and Rugare Gumbo 
34
 as a result of the infighting between the 
‘Gamatox’ and the ‘Weevils’ factions.  
 
In view of the complex contestations around Zimbabwean founding myths and 
narratives of beginnings, Althusser’s perspective on the state becomes obviously 
simplistic as it fails to account for the existence of multiple struggles within nation-
states that cut across citizens’ experiences of origin. For example, origin stories, icons 
and symbols of the nation usually carry sub-texts of race, ethnicity, class, politics, 
gender and sexuality. To suppose that they are smoothly ‘given’ at the level of power 
or smoothly taken up by ‘dominated’ groups is naive. A linear trajectory of a war 
based origin in dominant accounts of the nation that is simplified to the binary 
divisions of enemy/friend villain/hero and loser/victor is challenged by research. Such 
research include; Tanya Lyons’ Guns and Guerrilla girls: Women in the Zimbabwean 
liberation struggle (2004), Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi’s For better or worse? 
Women and ZANLA in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle (2000) and Masipula Sithole’s 
Zimbabwe: Struggles Within the Struggle (1999). It is also destabilized by 
                                                          
33
 Didymus Mutasa became one of the founders of Zimbabwe People First (ZimPF) after being 
expelled from ZANU-PF in 2014. From 1980 to 1990, he was the speaker of parliament. He also held 
various ministerial posts. From 2009 t0 2014, he was Minister of State for Presidential Affairs. When 
he was expelled, he was also serving as ZANU-PF’s Secretary for Administration. 
34
 Rugare Gumbo is one of the founders of Zimbabwe People First (ZimPF) after being expelled from 
ZANU-PF in 2014. He had held positions such as Minister of Economic Developmentand and Minister 
of Agriculture. 
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autobiographies such as Edgar Tekere’s A lifetime of struggle (2007), Fay Chung’s 
Re-living the second Chimurenga: Memories from Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle 
(2006), and Wilfred Mhanda aka Dzinashe Machingura’s Dzino: Memories of a 
Freedom Fighter (2011).  Novels like Alexander Kanengoni’s Echoing silences 
(1997), Charles Samupindi’s Pawns (1992), Shimmer Chinodya’s Harvest of Thorns 
(1989) and Valentine Mazorodze’s Silent journey from the East (1989) add to texts 
that problematize linear war narratives. 
 
The above texts reveal the contradictions within the liberation struggle and after and 
provide evidence of people’s varying benefits and disadvantages that characterize 
Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. The texts question the celebratory and laudatory 
narratives given to certain moments, events and people and in the process, debunk 
power. They re/visit and re/narrate certain moments, events and people. This invites a 
discursive narrative of the nation and problematized belonging and citizenship, 
thereby opening up envisioned possibilities. This renders a critique of a 
conceptualization of ideology as something enabling fixed power and undying 
positionalities. 
 
As Laura Miller (1997) argues, at the level of domination, there are multiple spaces 
and hierarchies that unsettle power. Scholars such as Mark Bevir (1999), James Scott 
(1990), Joao Ferdandes (1988) and Stuart Hall (1985) concur that there is always 
agency in human experiences. To them, this agency unsettles and shifts power, 
thereby giving it temporality and continuous uneasiness, rather than a smooth 
continuum as suggested by Althusser’s role of ideological state apparatus. Implied are 
the limitations that dominant groups or dominant narratives have in retrieving, 
creating, transporting or giving meaning to the stories of origin. The kind of 
nationalism that is created therefore is one that is contestable, slippery and frequently 
revised. In Zimbabwe, dominant discourses have located origin stories in what Ranger 
(2004) calls patriotic history, which he argues is envisioned to assert the continuity of 
the Zimbabwean revolutionary tradition along ZANU-PF ideologies. Founded on the 
nation’s struggle history, which Robert Mugabe (2001) says is ‘necessary to retell,’ 
chimurenga becomes a definer for someone’s place in the nation. 
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The numerous utterances related to nation-state presidency by security generals such 
as Vitalis Zvinavashe, 
35
 Paradzai Zimhondi 
36
 and Augustine Chihuri, 
37
 as well as 
some high profile individuals in Zimbabwe like Didymus Mutasa, chronicles the 
connections between one’s chimurenga history and one’s national position. 38 Thus 
chimurenga, although it may be put in phases, is often taken as singular, a single war 
or war over an almost single issue. It is taken as a war that is unitary, uniform and 
uncomplicated as testified by Robert Mugabe’s disqualification of Tsvangirai’s 
presidential ambitions. Speaking at a ZANU-PF Congress that was covered by the 
Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), Mugabe rhetorically asks; 
“Tsvangison…aah ko anoziva nezvehondo yechimurenga kana kuti akatotiza. Akatiza 
aenda kunze. Kutya hondo asati atrenwa. Pfocho!!” [Tsvangison…what would he 
know about the war? He ran away…fled the country, scared of fighting without even 
being trained]. 
39
 
 
To Mugabe, Tsvangirai’s absence in the actual combat disqualifies him as someone 
worthy. He did not get any military training and did not fight in the liberation struggle 
and therefore, has not been ‘initiated’ into the masculine space which is impermeable 
to cowards. In this sense, Tsvangirai cannot be traced to pre-colonial heroes like 
Murenga Sororenzou and is unable to fulfill the prophecies of Nehanda, a pre-colonial 
legendary figure representing colonial resistance in nationalist narratives. He is denied 
the struggle history and a sense of Zimbabwean origin and this is emphasized by the 
Anglicization of his surname to Tsvangison, as an attempt to take away his 
indigeneity and discard him into the white troop besieging Zimbabwe. 
 
The Anglicization of African names is a way of showing a person’s twisted and 
confused identity, a sarcastic gesture and a way of dis/association and de/linking 
someone. I draw on the sarcastic nature of Ayi Kwei Armah’s characters such as 
Koomson, Fentengson, Blankson and Binful in his novel, The Beautyful Ones Are Not 
Yet Born (1988). The text deals with, among other issues, the mimicry of Western life 
by Africans in ‘post-colonial’ Ghana. In Tsvangirai’s case, this perception is further 
                                                          
35
 Vitalis Zvinavashe was Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces from 1994 to 2003. 
36
 Paradzai Zimhondi is the current Commissioner General of Prisons. 
37
 Augustine Chihuri is the current Commissioner General of the Zimbabwe Republic Police. 
38
 Documentary, Fighting for Rights. Zimbabwe before the 2002 Election Pre-poll, DANIDA, 2002. 
39
 Documentary, Fighting for Rights. Zimbabwe before the 2002 Election Pre-poll, DANIDA, 2002. 
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buttressed when he is castigated as an imperialist ‘puppet,’ ‘stooge’ and ‘tea boy.’ 40 
As the image below reflect, Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC party leader is regarded as 
a sell-out, alienated from Zimbabweaness, and an agent of recolonization and 
therefore a misfit in Zimbabwe and its political and nationalizing projects. 
 
Interestingly as shown above, in the Third Chimurenga era, the indigene and the 
citizen acquire new meanings as they are defined in racial, ideological and political 
terms. One may think of a situation where race is defined in terms of political 
affiliation rather than in biological terms, colour and origins. Those opposed to the 
state and ZANU-PF are de-racialized as black and in a sense, flung   into ‘the white 
race.’ For example, the MDC is not seen as indigenous, but as a ‘white’ party and its 
leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, as said earlier, is Anglicized to ‘Tsvangison.’ In South 
Africa, the introduction of seemingly radical and populist policies in the South 
African political space by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party has led it to be 
labelled a ZANU-PF machinery seeking after a ZANU-PF agenda as the EFF policies 
are associated with ZANU-PF policies. The Democratic Alliance (DA) party has also 
been labelled a front for the racist whites on a number of occasions, with Hallen Zille 
specifically being ‘Europeanized.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, Tsvangirai’s first name, Morgan is sometimes re-invented to ‘Moregay’ so 
as to associate him with homosexuality, which Mugabe terms unAfrican and ‘a white 
                                                          
40
 See Image 1 
 
Image 1: Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC as sell-outs 
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man’s sickness,’ never to be tolerated on Zimbabwean land. Moregay offers a 
seductive onomatopoeic quality that ‘attracts’ the ‘gay West.’ This ‘visualizes’ 
Tsvangirai as a ‘point’ of Western ‘penetration’ and therefore disqualifying him ‘to 
father’ the Zimbabwean nation. The image of ‘homosexual’ is therefore a message 
about his ‘selling out’ – of ‘offering’ his anus, his ‘feminine’ body for ‘penetration’ 
by ‘gay’ Britain and its allies in their bid to re/conquer Zimbabwe. Thus, the ‘selling 
out’ indicated by the above image ‘performs’ the feminization of Tsvangirai as he is 
associated with ‘prostituting’ the nation as well as ‘performing’ a gendered role by 
serving the nation to the West. 
 
Referring to the impermissible existence of ‘national-pollutants,’ the then 
Zimbabwean Minister of Education, Sports and Culture, Aneus Chigwedere, in a 
1995 parliamentary debate, makes a turn to the body-politics of nationalism as he 
articulates: 
What is at issue in cultural terms is a conflict of interest between the whole 
body, which is the Zimbabwean community and part of that body represented 
by individuals or groups of individuals… When your finger starts festering 
and becomes a danger to the body you cut it off. The homosexuals are the 
festering finger (Scott Long, 2005:88). 
In the context of the above, the association of homosexuality with the West and the 
‘colouring’ of Tsvangirai as homosexual is a strong psychological manoeuvre that 
situates him as unZimbabwean, unAfrican and ‘unnatural.’ The double identity that 
Mugabe and ZANU-PF give Morgan Tsvangirai as homosexual and the West’s 
puppet seems to plagiarize the Fanonesque analogy that homosexuality among Blacks 
was fundamentally an echo of black men’s debasement by white men (Frantz Fanon, 
1967). Thus homosexuality is taken as symbolic of a neo-colonial presence while 
heterosexuality signifies Zimbabwean nationhood, belonging and sovereign 
citizenship. 
 
To Mugabe, Morgan Tsvangirai’s identity as a Western front with an agenda to 
destroy the Zimbabwean nation and nationhood is graphically symbolized by an 
agenda to accept homosexuality, an ‘abnormality.’ Mugabe’s homophobia theatrically 
conflates masculinity with virility, respectability, ‘Zimbabweaness’ and the right to 
power. According to Mugabe, if homosexuality was to be allowed, the land would be 
aggrieved and never forgive the people. Articulated here is a polarized discourse that 
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naturalizes and cements positions in addition to resembling colonial state-craft. While 
in colonial Zimbabwe, heterosexuality was upheld and associated with a pure defence 
of white superiority, in post-2000 Zimbabwe, the homosexual is anyone who opposes 
the nation, ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe. The feminine-sexualized Tsvangirai’s 
‘marriage’ with for example  masculinized ‘gay Britain’ attest to the female-male or 
woman-man relations of domination, subsequently prospecting a Zimbabwe 
‘sexually’ dominated by the ‘gay West.’ This materializes as preposterous in a context 
where sexual domination is analogous to all other forms of domination – political, 
social, cultural and economic. 
 
In some adverts on Zimbabwe Television (Ztv), Tsvangirai’s face was shown 
undergoing some reversible transformation where it metamorphosed into that of Blair, 
then to that of Bush and thus categorizing him as white. The highly ‘theatrical’ 
display of deviant bodies is very pronounced here. The presence of a ‘white’ body is 
seen as Western defilement of the racially pure ‘black’ land and body. The 
transformation from his natural ‘blackness’ to an artificial ‘whiteness’ seems not only 
to give Tsvangirai a ‘race,’ but also to locate him within a particular gender. Skin 
lightening creams and a number of facials are associated more with femininity than 
with masculinity.  Tsvangirai’s change of colour is taken as reminiscent of the erosion 
of his masculinity, and his re/location into an ‘unstable’ and feminine gender ready to 
be ‘penetrated’ by white masculinity. Arguably, the feminized and sexualized Morgan 
Tsvangirai or the MDC can easily be ‘polluted’ and are rendered unfit to lead 
Zimbabwe. It is interesting to note that in addition to the racialization, feminization 
and connoted instability of Tsvangirai, there is also a corresponding discourse on the 
instability and impurity of women national subjects especially if they are seen as 
traitors of the ruling party. The depiction of individuals or groups who voice against 
the ‘norm’ as ‘national threats’ has also befallen the feminist scholar and activist, 
Patricia McFadden in the mid-1990s. 
41
 
 
                                                          
41
 In her article on the connection between feminism and sexual pleasure, Mc Fadden says “…the 
Zimbabwean government issued me with a deportation order, in which accusations of my betrayal of 
"Zimbabwean culture" and "family values" featured prominently. I was identified as a lesbian (and 
therefore automatically vilified), on the grounds that I wrote about women's rights to choose their 
intimate partners, and because I defended the rights of gays and lesbians (see 
http://agi.ac.za/sites/agi.ac.za/files/fa_2_standpoint_1.pdf ). 
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Many performances of belonging and citizenship in Zimbabwe have been synthesized 
into a persuasive script that naturalizes and normalizes a patriarchal model of 
Zimbabwean belonging and citizenship. Lene Bull-Christiansen (2007) alludes to this 
gendering of the nation as a Machiavellian power preservation ploy, as well as part of 
ZANU-PF’s culture of the spectacular. The President with macho elegance is 
presented as and seen to be embodied as the ‘father of the nation’ and also as the head 
in a re/invented Zimbabwean Africanist traditionalist logic. With nations presented as 
females and the states as males, Mugabe as head of state is sometimes given the 
position of husband of the Zimbabwean nation, giving him the natural ‘right’ to crush 
any adversary  who endeavors to ‘steal/rape’ his wife; that is, the nation’s people. 
 
Mugabe is also presented and presents himself as the father and husband of the 
Zimbabwean nation in the Western inclined oedipal sense where he is seen to deal 
with covetous and disloyal sons who seek to dispossess him of his rights to his 
feminized people. This perhaps explains why some prominent ZANU-PF figures 
almost compulsively pronounce their allegiance to Mugabe from time to time using 
the language of filial loyalty. Concluding his letters to Mugabe, Obert Mpofu 
42
 says 
“Your Ever Obedient Son, Obert Mpofu,” 43 making one recall the biblical Jesus’s 
loyalty statements to God. Offered here is a power-based relationship between a deity 
and a vassal. A similar quest to be Mugabe’s son is made by Webster Shamu,44 who 
publicly posits: 
Kudai ndaibvunzwa kudenga kuti pawakuenda pasi apa saka woenda kupi? 
Chatunga ndaimutangira ini. Ndaiita nhamba hwani kuFirst House 
kwaPresident Mugabe kuti ndo kwandinoda ikoko. 
45
 
[If I had been given the option to choose my father before birth, where would I have 
gone? I would have been Chatunga’s elder brother. I would have been number one at 
First House, at President Mugabe’s house. I would have said that’s where I want to be 
born]. 
 
                                                          
42
 Obert Mpofu is currently the Minister of Transport and Infrastructure Development. Previously, he 
was Minister of Mines and Mining Development. 
43
 http://mg.co.za/article/2014-06-20-loyalty-is-all-mugabe-demands.   
44
 Webster Shamu aka Charles Ndlovu was Minister of Publicity and Information and ZANU-PF 
Political Commissar from 2009 to 2013. In 2014, he was associated with the Joice Mujuru faction and 
lost favour with ZANU-PF. 
45
 http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-10971-Minister+wanted+Mugabe+for+father/news.aspx.  
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The above utterances by Shamu conjures Lucifer Mandengu, a character in Charles 
Mungoshi’s Waiting for the Rain who sees his birth in Manyene, an ‘impoverished’ 
rural village as a biological and geographical error. Lucifer says: 
I am Lucifer Mandengu. I was born here against my will. I should have been 
born elsewhere – of some other parents…I have been born here but is that a 
crime? That is only a biological and geographical error (Mungoshi, 1981:162). 
It is evident that Shamu belongs to the Lucifer generation which is fed up with its 
own identity and has a great quest for an ‘alien’ identity which makes them worship 
what they presume to be their heroes and help construct personality cults. Shamu’s 
case presents some form of dramatic irony as prior to being known as Webster 
Shamu, he was known by his liberation war name, Charles Ndlovu (even well after 
independence from colonial rule). 
 
Oliver Nyambi (2012) argues that the prevailing tendency to conceive of the nation 
figuratively as an extended family with a permanent power hierarchy elucidates the 
problems confronting any efforts to delineate the post-2000 Zimbabwean nation in 
Anderson’s definition of a nation as an imagined community. Nyambi posits that the 
Zimbabwean ‘family’ is strictly patriarchal, consisting of “fathers” (the ruling 
elite/the state) overseeing the rest of the family members (women, some men and 
children) – that is, the nation. The national family, then, is a community under 
surveillance and the community that is available and observable, not imagined. This is 
echoed by Annah-Leena Toivanen (2010) who says that post-independent Zimbabwe 
is problematic in the sense that while women carry the emblematic meaning of the 
violated motherland, Zimbabwean agency is defined and directed as distinctively 
masculine. This also applies to the Zimbabwean freedom fight where the war is 
represented mainly as a struggle by real men, ‘sons of the soil.’ 
 
The above speaks to what has been raised by Desiree Lewis and Patricia McFadden 
(n.d) that: 
Where communities perceive themselves to be under threat, ascendant 
manhood can come to signify the reclaimed pride of the entire community. 
Consequently, men and women can become complicit in venerating men’s 
preeminence in the household and the wider community. This explains the 
unwavering popular support for leaders whose actual contribution to 
nationalist or communal struggles may be far outweighed by evidence of their 
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abuse of power. The symbolic meaning of their authority may be perceived as 
being far more important than their unjust or exploitative uses of power. 
46
 
Although the above analysis has been made with reference to the South African 
situation with reference to Zuma’s power, the same can be said about Zimbabwe’s 
prominent leaders such as Mugabe and even Tsvangirai. 
 
Itai Muwati, Gift Mheta & Zifikile Gambahaya (2010) indicate that there is a 
recurring patriarchal model of nationalist history and therefore, of Zimbabwean 
nationalism and citizenship. This is expressed as amadoda sibili/varume chaivo (real 
men-meaning there are men who are not men) and ‘Father Zimbabwe’ with no 
corresponding ‘Mother Zimbabwe’ to proffer a matriarchal model. This gives sense to 
how some critiques allude to questions of Joice Mujuru as ‘father of the nation’ (Bull-
Christiansen, 2007) when she gets the post of Vice President. Her heroism is 
measured by how she has managed to join and do service to the masculine world. 
Although it has been recently contested, it should be noted that Joice Mujuru has been 
constructed as a fearless warrior famed for shooting down an enemy helicopter during 
the liberation struggle. Her recently alleged corruption reveals the masculine 
‘primitive accumulation’ and her public utterances that wives should be subservient to 
their husbands 
47
 are reflective of the re/invented African traditional ethos. 
Problematic is that her conceptualization of womanhood, motherhood and fecundity 
rests within the imbalanced patriarchal world tainted in the politics of dependence 
rather than on autonomy. I argue that Joice Mujuru’s rise and fall should be 
contextualized in the premises of masculine nationalism. To Muwati, Mheta & 
Gambahaya, the amadoda sibili model is premised on respectable, responsible and 
flawless males. I add here that the standard of behavior defined here does not refer 
merely to biological males, but to manliness in a behavioral gendered sense. Muwati, 
Mheta & Gambahaya (2010) however reflect how women historians in works such as 
Women of resilience: The voices of women ex-combatants, provide counter narratives 
which show patriarchs who have very little respect for tradition and culture, and 
violate the women and children they claim to protect. 
 
                                                          
46
 Desiree Lewis and Patricia McFadden’s unpublished work, ‘Beyond National Belonging: Re-
envisaging Citizenship and Justice in South Africa.’ 
47
 See Christiansen (2007).  
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It is evident that the most important role of the male rulers is projected as defending 
the country by any means possible as what has been historically done by earlier 
generations and in past wars. This narrative of justified defense asserts that men 
should be able to shed blood for the sake of the nation. In the song Muri Musoja (You 
are a Soldier/Warrior), 
48
 Mbare Chimurenga Choir sings of pools of blood (…pane 
dhamu reropa revana) at various places like Chimoio, Nyadzonya and Mboroma. It 
may be said therefore that the dead are taken as live texts where meaning is mediated 
at different time spaces. Those who sacrifice their lives for the country are connected 
to Nehanda, a symbol of colonial resistance and the margin for un/belonging. After 
the 13
th
 of September 2006 Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) nation-
wide strike, the then Secretary General, Wellington Chibebe claimed that during his 
beatings, the police proclaimed “This country came after a lot of people had died and 
for it to change hands, people had to die first.” 49 This means that loss of blood or war 
is the kind of ‘ritual’ needed for the change of governance, thereby making Zimbabwe 
a nation founded on blood. 
 
The Third Chimurenga era also witnessed the re-surfacing of the song: 
Zimbabwe ndeye ropa baba  
Zimbabwe ndeye ropa ramadzibaba  
[Zimbabwe came by blood-sacrifices, father; Zimbabwe came by the blood-sacrifices 
of fathers].  
The song deliberates not only that the nation has emerged as a result of the blood that 
was shed during the struggle, but also states that the blood that was shed was that of 
fathers. This denies femininity an active space in the liberation struggle and therefore 
makes matriarchal characteristics of nationalism and citizenship unthinkable. This 
denial of matriarchy and women’s agency is ironic in view of women’s well recorded 
participation in the liberation struggle, both in combat and at home. A similar trend is 
reflected in a number of Shona novels and narrated experiences of the Second 
Chimurenga where terms referring to freedom fighters such as, vana mukoma 
(brothers), vakomana (boys) and macomrades (comrades) more often than not, refer 
to men. What comes to mind with regard to this is Hondo YeChimurenga by the 
Literature Bureau (1984), which is a collection of twelve narrations of the Second 
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 See Song 1, Appendix A. 
49
 Documentary, A Patriotic Force, Solidarity Peace Trust, 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
Chimurenga by different authors. Here almost all the stories refer to freedom fighters 
coming into the villages or in the bush as vakomana or vana mukoma. Again, in 
almost all the stories the characters performing the role of freedom fighters are males. 
The fact that all the contributors won in the Hondo-Impi Experiences competitions 
marks the standards of their narrations as expected and acceptable, reflecting how the 
naturalization of Zimbabwe’s liberation war fighters as ‘male’ is deeply entrenched. 
 
Novels and plays such as Nguo Dzouswa (1985), Kuridza Ngoma nedemo (1983) by 
Aaron Chiundura-Moyo also exemplify many others that portray Second Chimurenga 
liberation fighters as male and therefore, war as a boys’ club. This positioning is 
cemented by the naming of heroes in Robert Mugabe’s Inside the Third Chimurenga 
(2001). The third part of the text is titled, ‘Remembering Our Fallen Heroes.’ In this 
part, Chapter 17: ‘Remembering our Fallen Heroes of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd 
Chimurenga,’ is followed by chapters for individual male heroes, without any for the 
heroines. The chapters are as follows; Chapter 18: ‘Cde Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo, An 
Illustrious Son of the Soil’ and Chapter 19: ‘A Nation in Morning’ focuses on Joshua 
Nkomo. Following are; Chapter 20: ‘The Story of a Gallant Fighter of the 3rd 
Chimurenga, Cde Border Gezi’; Chapter 21: ‘Cde Moven Mahachi, 50 A Gallant 
Hero’; Chapter 22: ‘The Story of a Dedicated War Veteran, Cde Chenjerayi Hunzvi’ 
and then the last chapter of the book, Chapter 23: ‘Our Achievements’ gives a 
conclusion to the text. Thus the only female hero who is named is Nehanda, whose 
interventions in the colonial set up are more spiritual than anything else. The rest of 
the heroes that Mugabe names and acknowledges are male. The given male narratives 
of heroism are based on the speeches made at their burials at the National Heroes 
Acre and are linked to the narratives of chimurenga. 
 
Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) argues that the ideology of Chimurenga situated the 
birth of the Zimbabwean nation within a series of nationalist revolutions. This adds to 
Mazarire’s interesting critique of the projection of Zimbabwean history as the rise and 
fall of empires which undermines the vital contributions of marginal settlements in 
shaping Zimbabwean history. A wide range of texts in Zimbabwe therefore indicate 
that Zimbabwean nationalism and the contestations around it draw richly on origin 
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stories. To that extent, they are usually turned to as mobilizing tools and ‘terrains’ of 
attachment by different groups during certain moments, and are also used as bench 
marks for those who belong as well as the unbelonging. 
 
However, the limitation of fighting to those who ‘crossed the border’ or were in 
combat after some military training is contested. Dread Reckless and Sister Fearless’s 
song ‘Hondo’ (War) 51 brings in the important roles played by non-combatant 
individuals and groups such as the cooking which was done by women. Dread 
Reckless and Sister Fearless go on to critique the sexual abuse of women and the 
assassination of fellow fighters as a result of power struggles during the liberation 
struggle. Raymond Majongwe, in his song ‘What is a Patriot?’ 52 also highlights the 
narrow and senseless definitions of fighting, patriotism, sellouts and citizenship that 
are contained in ZANU-PF narratives of the nation and used to benefit certain people 
at the expense of others. 
 
This narrow and senseless definition of fighting, patriotism, sellouts and citizenship is 
chronicled by the contradictions behind the characterization of Joshua Nkomo, 
Zimbabwe’s former Vice President. The name Chibwe chitedza (the stone that is 
slippery) that is coined on him may be used in relation to his well-known evasion of 
arrests by the colonial white regime, reflecting his invulnerability to the instruments 
of white rule. Such a notion may implicate the spiritual influence of Murenga, a 
Shona legendary figure said to have possessed and administered war medicine that 
made Ndebele and Shona fighters untouchable and immune to the colonialists’ 
weaponry. 
53
 However, the meaning of the name Chibwe Chitedza was reordered in 
the 1980s during the Gukurahundi period 
54
 when stories circulated that Nkomo had 
‘escaped’ the country putting on a petticoat, thus disguised as a woman. This kind of 
                                                          
51
 See Song 2, Appendix A. 
52
 See Song 3, Appendix A [Song transcribed from a Documentary, A Patriotic Force, Solidarity Peace 
Trust, 2006]. 
53
 This finds space in nationalist narratives that blur Nkomo’s Kalanga identity and his Matebeleland 
origin or Kalanga and Ndebele ethnicities in a bid to capture Ndebele-Shona unity during both the First 
and Second Chimurenga. Brian Raftopoulos (1999) posits that Ranger’s analysis of the 1896-97 up-
risings became dominant as it provided rich grounds from which to select usable moments and 
symbols, as well as heroes and heroines whom nationalists would emulate and make available during 
the struggle as well as in the post-colonial future. 
54
 Gukurahundi refers to the killing of suspected ‘dissidents’ in the Midlands and Matebeleland 
provinces by Zimbabwe National Army’s Fifth Brigade from 1983 to 1987, when the Government of 
National Unity was formed.  
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reconfiguration of the name reordered the world, moving Nkomo from an 
acknowledged nationalist to a feminized coward. It is important to reflect on some 
sentiments by one of Zimbabwe’s early nationalists Ndabalingi Sithole featuring as 
Obed Mutezo, who says: 
…clearly, the honourable choice is the life of hardship, even death, than to go 
down in the annals of a nation as a collaborator or indeed a woman. The 
choice before me is simple; am I a man or a woman? (Sithole, 1970: 144-145).  
 
Thus the depiction of Nkomo did not only mean that he was a collaborator and a 
coward, characteristics that are pathologized as feminine in patriarchal societies. It 
also communicated a strong message that in patriarchal polities, the feminine should 
be silenced, have no voice and remain silent in order for the masculine such as the 
voice of Robert Mugabe to be heard. This presentation of Nkomo may be seen as 
symptomatic of the Zimbabwean ruling regime’s chief ingenuity of nationalizing state 
lies through gendered discourses. This is done to construct a particularly resonant 
shared collective memory that glorifies patriarchal masculinity and takes femininity 
as suspect and a possible ‘pollutant’ of the nation. Nkomo’s feminization and 
depiction as a coward gradually changes after 1987 and reaches its climax in 
nationalist narratives post-humously when he is formally depicted as ‘Father 
Zimbabwe.’  
 
Glories and Re/presentations 
Most of the symbols and stories of origin reveal and glorify the military skills and 
nation-building abilities of pre-colonial figures that are obviously, even though 
sometimes implicitly masculinized (Ifi Amadiume, 1997, Lewis, 2002). Zimbabwe’s 
dominant narratives of the nation that sing-praises Murenga Sororenzou, Chaminuka, 
Mzilikazi, Lobengula and others fall into the same colonial and imperial trap that 
befall John Omer-Cooper (1966) who uses Zulu masculinities to parallel Western 
masculinities. Lewis (2002:270) argues that such a representation is a reproduction of 
Eurocentric notions of progress which adds to “…a gendered production which 
selectively celebrates particular subjects and processes with the aim of asserting 
masculinized African agency in the face of colonialist myth-making” that dismisses 
African heroes and ‘civilized’ structures. Thus Lewis diverges from Omer-Cooper’s 
historical analysis which proves African glories using autochthons and military glory. 
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She aligns herself with Amadiume (1997), and Cheikh Diop (1987), who see such 
historicization of Africa as a Western figment and universalization of civilizations 
since in pre-colonial African societies, militarized, masculinized and autochthons 
were not central. I find it prudent to bring in Mazarire (2009) who argues that the 
study of peoples, nations and civilizations should not be sacrificed for a monolithic 
study of grand kingdoms such as the Great Zimbabwe, Mutapa or Rozvi state as it 
simplifies notions of struggle. 
 
To problematize an attempt to limit the meaning, space and time of struggle to a 
single and linear version, Mtisi, Nyakudya and Barnes articulate: 
It is important to avoid a narrow definition of ‘fighting’ the struggle, which 
can privilege particular groups to the exclusion of the majority. Many ordinary 
people did not cross the border or ‘take up arms’ but made significant 
sacrifices for the liberation of the country (Brian Raftopoulos and Alois 
Mlambo, 2009:155). 
There is need to critique and complicate the dominant definitions, the interests of 
those who define and the purposes these definitions serve. This reconstitutes 
chimurenga as configured by different lived experiences across time and space, 
constitutions which themselves are temporal because of the shifting spaces, times, 
experiences and meanings. It is in this context that it is important to problematize 
chimurenga as the backdrop of Robert Mugabe’s ‘militancy’ and his idolization as the 
‘maker’ and ‘defender’ of Zimbabweaness. 
 
Numerous bottom-up versions have redefined chimurenga as an active and fluid 
struggle for human rights and justice and autonomy hence removing it from its 
‘boxed’ definitions that are narrowed to masculinized and militarized political 
struggles. This project of redefining chimurenga is characteristic of among others, 
literary works such as Yvonne Vera’s Nehanda, music and the everyday lives of 
ordinary people. As I shall show in the following chapter, the land question has been 
central to the dominant stories of origin and citizenship and belonging. However, it 
also offers a very different kind of fluid space for narrations of origin and 
consequently ways of thinking about struggle as well as belonging and citizenship. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ‘LAND QUESTION’ AND ITS SYMBOLIC MEANINGS 
Re/Scaping Zimbabwe: ‘Motherland,’ ‘Son of the Soil’ and ‘Sovereignty.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Dawa Norbu (1992) posits that colonialism evoked most of the nationalist movements 
witnessed in the Third World. In Southern Africa in particular, land dispossession 
became a very strong marker of colonialism, since apart from losing a vital means of 
production, Africans became vulnerable to labor exploitation as they were 
proletarianized. Francis Chitsike (2003) has a similar view as he argues that the issue 
of land ownership between blacks and colonialists was one of the prime issues that 
led to liberation struggles across colonized territories. The fact that in Southern 
Africa, land fell under the control of colonial powers meant that even the people 
formerly controlling the land became controlled subjects. The anti-colonial stance 
therefore needed to take land as an emotive and mobilizing instrument. Rather than 
being understood as a geographical and economic space, land became a powerful 
symbol of mobilization on which African nationalism began to be written. Talking 
about the significance of land to the nation, Robert Mugabe (2001) narrates how it has 
given rise to different chimurenga phases of struggle. In his book which was used as a 
primary text during the NYS training, he makes it clear that everyone should take 
inspiration from chimurenga heroes and heroines. 
 
Thus, Zimbabwean nation/alism is understood as contained in land-centric 
struggles/wars known by a Shona word as ‘zvimurenga’ as well as their narrations. 
The emotions generated around land ownership and rights formed group identity and 
 
Image 2: ZANU-PF Election Posters linked to Land 
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loyalty as well as the identity of the other. The colonialist came to be imagined as the 
other who had to be resisted through nationalist movements. This imaging of the 
colonized’s otherness made possible the primary goals of anti-colonial nationalist 
movements. These movements rejected the colonizer and established or re-
establishment a ‘sovereign’ nation-state with control over the territory and people 
within its national boundaries. Nevertheless, the struggles have not been smooth and 
their narrativization has been a complex and continuous process. 
 
Although I agree with Michael Neocosmos (2004) that African nationalism was not 
equal to agrarian revolts since there were other factors including loss of sovereignty 
and human rights issues, it is vital to realize that in dominant Zimbabwean narratives, 
land is not limited to agrarian spaces. Instead, land constitutes and is constituted in 
discourses of national sovereignty, (Our Land, Our Sovereignty), humanness (ivhu 
kuvanhu, vanhu kuvhu/land to the people, people to the land), identity (mwana 
wevhu/child of the soil), making it a space constituted by and constituting zvimurenga 
(struggles). The centrality of land both as a tangible and intangible space and 
attachment to it reflects the extent to which it has been a political aesthetic. 
 
While the previous chapter has dealt with origin stories of the nation, this chapter 
deals specifically with the land question and its symbolic meanings. Land, in its 
physical and symbolic sense, has, to a great extent, been galvanized in order to create 
national consciousness and consequently, craft nationalism in Southern Africa in 
general and Zimbabwe in particular. 
 
In Zimbabwe, land manifests as a major politico-aesthetic rather than simply 
something economic or a means to a just and equal society. The complexities of the 
land question in Zimbabwe have enabled converging and diverging versions of land 
narratives and their meanings. Although the state has, through nationalist narratives, 
disseminated certain meanings of land at specific moments, other narratives have 
emerged. In most cases, these narratives answer to certain individual and group 
identities that are often sidelined.  These narratives around land have been linked to 
struggles, which have given way to gendered discourses of nationalism which have 
given women bodies the very character that land has or is imagined to have. Thus 
land, despite it being a physical space, has garnered a significant deal of mythical 
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significance and political aesthetics. The tagging of Zimbabwe with familial notions, 
the evocation of the land takeovers and the violence associated with it as Third 
Chimurenga, give moral justification to ZANU-PF. As in war situations and family 
defense, ‘enemies’ have to be vanquished. Land narratives have been worked together 
with narratives of origin and stories of struggle to become ‘fields’ on which 
discourses of citizenship and belonging explode. The soil or land manifests as an 
active agent of identity. Kutoravhu/kutora minda (taking back soil/land) symbolically 
entails a re/negotiation of one’s place and one’s identity. To be with the soil is ‘equal’ 
to having an identity and belongingness. The soil/land is an identity, it is Zimbabwe. 
As echoed in Last ‘Tambaoga’ Chianga’s lyrics ‘Ivhu iri ramunoona ndiro rinonzi 
Zimbabwe’ (This land that you see is what is called Zimbabwe). 55 
 
In Zimbabwe, state narratives have linked the land issue to Robert Mugabe’s rule and 
ZANU-PF hegemony. 
56
 Thus, it has largely been in sync with stories of origins and 
struggle associated with Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s political dominance. The incessant 
presence of the land issue and its ‘synonyms’ (Mugabe’s rule and ZANU-PF 
dominance) has provided a persuasive discourse and mythology for a party 
encountering strong political competition. Through the media and popular culture, 
ZANU-PF has harnessed land to stories of origin and narratives of struggle, and 
consequently to ambiances of citizenship and belonging. The land issue has featured 
prominently in elections and election manifestos. In fact, all the ZANU-PF election 
manifestos from 2000 had an aspect of land. The presence of the land issue in the 
media and popular culture is significant as these avenues relate to people’s everyday 
lives and therefore, are crucial voices of dominant narratives. However, the chapter 
also raises the ways in which land has been a focus for voices from below or 
oppositions to state and Mugabe-driven discourses. 
 
Besides it being a physical resource, land has offered a symbolic language to talk 
about ownership, belonging and identities, hence its association with the bodies of 
women and the excessive popularization of mwana wevhu (son of the soil/land) 
claims. This makes land enter an intangible space where it is de/linked with certain 
‘realities’ and calls. Mugabe (2001:93) has this to say about land: 
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We knew and still know that land was the prime goal for King Lobengula as 
he fought the British encroachment in 1893; we knew and still know that land 
was the principal grievance for our heroes of the First Chimurenga, led by 
Nehanda and Kaguvi; we knew and still know it to be the fundamental 
premise of the Second Chimurenga and thus a principal definer of the 
succeeding new Nation State of Zimbabwe. Indeed we know it to be the core 
issue and imperative of the Third Chimurenga which you and me are fighting, 
and for which we continue to make such enormous sacrifices. 
 
As seen above, Mugabe draws a genealogy of land struggles that starts from the 
colonial encounter to the now availed Third Chimurenga. This follows Sam Moyo’s 
(2000) sentiments that the direction on land reform was and continues to be mystified 
by playing to the gallery of historical land injustice. In this sense, the land issue rests 
and is entwined within issues of socio-economy, power, justice and empowerment as 
well as issues of injustice, disempowerment and alienation (Kenneth Gora, 2008; 
Chitsike, 2003; Paul Gundani, 2002; Patrick Bond & Masimba Manyanya, 2002). 
However, this is mostly done in terms of colonizer-colonized relations and rarely 
across colonized relations. Referring to Zimbabwe, Chitsike (2003) and others 
correctly point out that land is central to the socio, economic and political lives of the 
majority of Zimbabweans. Land is therefore seen as a space for struggle – it is an 
incredibly charged political signifier. 
 
In Zimbabwe, tracing the primacy of land also involves considering a configuration of 
the female body politic in the founding of nations.  There are also connections about 
the symbolism of production and reproduction that are represented by land and 
women. This is especially significant in a context where women are the majority who 
work the land and make it productive. In Zimbabwe, dominant treatises on land and 
nationalism move around the feminized figure of Nehanda in a way that links 
femininity to land. For most African Zimbabweans, land was understood as tangled 
and mingled within their cosmology of cultural and traditional norms and values. 
Thus, before colonialism and land dispossession, land was regarded as an integral part 
of the African Zimbabwean culture. It was taken as the basis for sustenance of the 
entirety of one’s life, source of food and wealth, associated with security, identity and 
dignity and a link between ancestors and gods, as evidenced by the Africans’ intrinsic 
affection with their place of origin (Gora, 2008; Gundani, 2002). For Gundani (2002), 
the inalienable nature of land and its people could be evidenced by the fact that the 
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umbilical cords and those who passed on were buried on the land, libation was 
performed on the land and snuff was smeared on the land during traditional prayers. 
This rendered land as an inimitable sanctified space of colossal religious, social, 
economic, political and psychological value. Connections to land are therefore 
powerfully figured in terms of gendered, biological reproduction and the fecundity of 
the female body. 
 
In the light of this strongly gendered imagining, contests over land could not be 
reduced to a struggle over a physical place, but a special almost mystical affiliation to 
a space that inhibits history, identity and livelihood. Gora (2008) and Ikubolajeh 
Logan (2007) agree that Zimbabwe’s liberation war was primarily a war for land. 
Therefore, in the minds of most Zimbabweans, independence and control over land 
are inextricably linked. In many ways, alienating land is an ‘act’ of alienating 
Africans from their roots. Mugabe (2001) has a chapter focusing on the land question. 
The chapter ends with the slogan, “Forward with our independence! Forward with 
land reforms! The struggle continues! Aluta continua!” 
 
Gundani (2002) points to the central nature of the land issue as validated by the 
numerous wars that were fought to alienate the ‘native’ population, to protect land 
from colonial grabbing or recover lost land from settlers. This marks the land issue as 
principal to the socio-economic, political and cultural history and current 
Zimbabwean situation. This, however, does not take away the fact that the narrations 
of these wars and the character of the socio-economic, political and cultural facets are 
troubled. For example, Chitsike (2003), although stating the political and economic 
nature of land, admits that in Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF took advantage of its relevance 
and significance, claimed it as its own and used it for political expediency in the face 
of vibrant opposition. He explains that after evidence of diminishing support provided 
by the constitutional referendum defeat and: 
With parliamentary elections coming on later the same year the ruling party 
found itself increasingly under pressure to deliver on the land question. It was 
now twenty years since gaining independence and there was not much to show 
in terms of access to land for the majority of Zimbabweans residing in the 
communal areas. The ruling party adopted as its slogan “Land is the economy 
and the economy is land” (Chitsike, 2003:9). 
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The above is also echoed by Brian Raftopoulos (2002) who images how opposition to 
ZANU-PF was seen as similar to opposing land reform fast-tracking, which in turn 
was equated to being in support of Zimbabwe’s enemies and their agenda to destroy 
its national sovereignty. The post-2000 land reform appears to signify and reveal 
obscene abuses of historical issues by ZANU-PF as it tried to hide its post-
independence failures. Jens Andersson’s (1999) study of land disputes in the 
Murambinda area of Save Communal Land in Zimbabwe may be reflective of the 
political nature of struggles over land even at a national level. He argues: 
…land conflicts do not necessarily focus on the productive value of land for 
land has not only an economic meaning, but combines multiple meanings. 
Therefore, land disputes cannot be reduced to economically motivated 
struggles… (Andersson, 1999:555). 
 
Andersson (1999) shows that the litigation process in land disputes revolved around a 
struggle of diverging interpretations of historical events and circumstances. The 
conflicting parties referenced historical events such as past settlement patterns and the 
colonial conservationist land policies, without any consensus or clearly showing how 
the events occurred. He concludes that conflicts over land were mainly a political 
struggle among village heads as they negotiated their village powers. It is also 
possible to locate the Zimbabwean land struggles after 2000 in power politics. 
Raftopoulos (2002) argues that the use of the land issue to reclaim political support 
for ZANU-PF in the context of the breakdown of law and order ultimately shattered 
the link between the land question and the quest for a just, rights-based post-colonial 
society. 
 
The relationship between land ownership and power calls for a more careful 
deconstructive critique and analysis of land narratives in Zimbabwe.  The post-2000 
politics around land in Zimbabwe which emphasizes on individual land ownership 
and control is an elite construction and akin to an evolving political economy based 
on capitalist appropriation rather than a turn to the ‘pre-colonial’ polities. Equally 
important for the purposes of this study, the ways in which land has been configured 
in discourses of belonging and citizenship work powerfully to confirm feudalistic and 
patriarchal constructs of tradition and authenticity. 
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In Zimbabwe and most African countries, patriarchal fabrications characterizing a lot 
of the so-called traditional claims and reconstructions by those in power locate land as 
a key marker of identity and this is why Zimbabweans are referred to as vana vevhu 
(children of the soil) (Horace Campbell, 2003; Gundani, 2002). This suggests that 
‘Zimbabweans,’ defined in racial terms, can only gain a complete identity by being in 
touch with their land and so, vindicating the government’s efforts. In this logic, land 
marks statehood and to an extent nationhood, and its absence signifies the absence of 
both. 
57
 
 
Interestingly, in the above case, race is not defined simply in the biological or 
physical sense, but according to Ladelle McWhorter (2004), in the Foucauldian sense 
where it is seen as a social construct. This is done to distinguish between those who 
have to live (thus those supporting the state and ZANU-PF) and those who have to die 
(like all those opposed to the state and ZANU-PF). Following this logic, the MDC is 
figured as the alien appendage of ‘white race’ and an enemy of reform which, because 
of its ‘polluting’ nature, needs to be ‘flushed’ out from the land. 58 The powerful 
symbols of biological origin and natural families are closely associated with land and 
distinguish between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in the Zimbabwe national project. This 
brings to attention a ZANU-PF campaign poster which appeared in The Herald which 
praised Mugabe and linked the opposition party, MDC to the then British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair who is reduced to a toilet. 
59
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 Palestinians are stateless because they continuously lose land to Israel. 
58
 See Image 3. 
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 See Image 3. 
 
Image 3: Flush Them Down: The Only Good Blair is a Toilet 
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The above campaign message is linked to one of Tambaoga’s jingles called 
‘Agreement’ 60 where he sings: 
Musatinetse musatishupe maBhirishiti 
The Bhuleya that I know is a toileti 
[Do not irritate us, do not give us trouble you ‘Brishit,’ the Blair that I know is a toilet 
(pit latrine)].  
 
The message here, which attempt to bank on nasal sensory effects for feelings of 
disassociation, is that voting for ZANU-PF, thus voting against the MDC is seen as 
voting against the whites who are symbolized by Tony Blair who is a blair toilet (a 
pit-latrine common in rural areas). Linked to a well-known rural landscape, Tony 
Blair, the then Prime minister of Britain sensualizes a depository and sum-total of the 
‘shit’ that the West is. The ‘blair’ is a space for filth that is obviously full of stench. It 
is located at the margins of the African rural homestead where normal human beings 
do not play around. It is a place where only the ‘filthy,’ such as Tsvangirai, are 
deposited after being extracted from the process of national clean-up. 
 
However, the disposal of filth into the rural pit-latrine is coated with the imagery of 
the ‘urban’ flush toilet for an ‘acoustic’ sensual. The flush toilet is instrumentalized as 
a technology of violence to the rather ‘soft’ disposal of filth characterizing ‘blair’ 
toilets. Thus ‘flushing’ the MDC down is violently forcing them into a blair toilet, 
where they will not be seen or recognized. It is throwing them into a filth bank, 
registering them as politically irrelevant. The flushing ‘performance’ also means 
removing them from the land and driving them to the margins, to their ‘kith and kin,’ 
to Blair and the British. To ZANU-PF, this would bring back the ‘purity’ and 
freshness of the land which has been endangered by those who ‘prostitute’ with 
foreigners. In the case where land is politicized, a political defeat means that one’s 
claims to land rights are taken away also. More importantly, it means that one is 
alienated from all entitlements associated with belonging to the land, including 
citizenship and belonging within naturalized ‘families.’ The above points to 
naturalized ideas about those who legitimately belong and those who do not belong to 
the ‘biologically’ pure national body. 
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An Althusserian analysis would argue that the struggle history and the symbolism of 
land as enshrined in vana vevhu is a platform for giving and receiving normalized 
thoughts, actions and practices that create subjects of the nation who are distinct from 
the rest. Subjects are hailed or called upon to re-establish links with the soil/land for 
them to participate in the nation, something that is regarded as a necessity and their 
duty. This is well-articulated in the jingle, Rambai Makashinga (Remain Resolute) 
61
 
by Tambaoga. Some of the most revealing lyrics include: 
Ivhu nderako iri mwana wevhu 
Kohwa pakuru Zimbabwe 
[This is your land child of the soil, produce in abundance Zimbabwe] 
The singer identifies the land with ‘Zimbabwe’ and in a manner that motivates vana 
vevhu (reducing land politics to a familial trope) to take claim for it and make it 
productive. Considering how ivhu (soil/land) can be interchanged with nyika (nation), 
one notices how discourses of re/production conjure heterosexuality as Zimbabwean 
national identity. Tambaoga also links land re/possession to sovereignty and therefore 
marks the land issue as a national question through the lyrics: 
Shingirirai, gadzirirai, ivhu rava redu, zvino tava kutonga, Zimbabwe ndeyedu 
[Be resolute, get prepared, the land now belongs to us and we are now in control, 
Zimbabwe is ours]. 
 
Thus, land ownership is associated with sensual feelings of power in a way that 
parallels how women are controlled and ‘owned’ through a patriarchal hold that 
enables an ordered life. This obviously shows how ‘land’ is feminized. In precolonial 
societies, although it was vital to the economies, land ownership did not necessarily 
translate into masculinized but into non-gendered autonomy since it was divorced 
from masculine and patriarchal appropriation (Ifi Amadiume, 1997, Cheikh Diop, 
1987). Amadiume and Diop agree that pre-colonial rulers did not base their rule and 
authority on patriarchal or gendered land ownership and did not privatize land. 
62
 
Thus, when Zimbabwean authorities talk of the return to the land, they are actually 
making the entrenched coloniality naked rather than re/engaging with a Zimbabwean 
‘past.’ 
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In Zimbabwe, state narratives do not restrict the land issue to a Zimbabwean agenda, 
but an African agenda. This is because the narratives invite other southern African 
countries to take possession of their land as has been done in Zimbabwe. The message 
is explicitly articulated in Andy Brown’s song, ‘Uya uone kutapira kunoita kurima’ 63 
which is part of the popular Chave Chimurenga commercials around reform which 
frequented the state media in the post-2000 period. The message generated in the 
following commercial extract is that positive land reform in Zimbabwe can be 
contrasts with its absence in South Africa, with Mozambique being warned about its 
failure because of the promise of land to farmers dispossessed of their land in 
Zimbabwe. Part of the commercial goes: 
South Africa uchakamirirei kurima mumunda mako? 
Mozambique usambofa wakatengesa ivhu rako 
Namibia kutapira kunoita kurima 
Zambia kutapira kunoita manhanga 
Africa usafa wakanyengerwa 
[South Africa why are you waiting to farm your land, Mozambique never sell/betray 
your soil/land, Namibia, farming is sweet, Zambia pumpkins are sweet.] 
 
In Zimbabwe, land is viewed through the politics of reproduction. Since land is 
feminized, giving it away is as impermissible as giving away the nation’s women to 
foreigners. Other countries like Namibia and Zambia are also invited to witness the 
benefits of land ownership from the Zimbabwean case since Zimbabwe is now a land 
of ‘plenty’ as reflected by the lyrics: 
Tapi tapi tapi tapi 
Kubva kumabvazuva kumadokero 
Hapana kana chatinoshaya 
[Sweety, sweety, sweety sweety, from the North to the West, there is nothing we do 
not have] 
Other Africans are instructed to have trust in their land, get united and shun the 
negative theories postulated about Zimbabwe’s land reform. The idea of 
‘development’ in relation to land affiliation is given emotional meaning in the slogan, 
‘Our Land is our Prosperity.’ It is worth pointing how the land’s link to prosperity 
makes one recall how women are hailed as central to nation-craft and how women’s 
fecundity is glorified. The message of abundance and prosperity are obviously 
distorted considering how the majority could not ‘taste’ the sweetness because of 
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continuous years of poor rains, lack of agricultural inputs and the record breaking 
hyperinflation that had grounded almost everything in Zimbabwe. But the emotional 
underpinnings of this slogan give it a distinctive logic, one that often does appeal to 
many of Zimbabwe’s citizens. 
 
The timing of land repossession in Zimbabwe should not be simply seen as the 
repossession of lost ancestral lands. Jocelyn Alexander (2003) sees land as an 
outstanding political resource for the state and for different actors at different 
geographic levels. Around this resource, ideas of legitimacy and territoriality are 
always at interplay. This politically based approach has a purchase on abundant 
symbolisms in myths and origin stories so as to gain affect and ‘truth’ yet re-telling a 
naturalized order of power, gender and sexuality that propels belonging and 
citizenship. Beyond the materiality of land, deeper and affective symbolic discourses 
ensuring regime survival are capitalized. 
 
As indicated in the emotional meanings associated with feminized land in nationalist 
narratives, the issue of ‘attachment’ to ancestral land characterizing land reform 
discourses has been crucial. Among others, Tendai Murisa (2007) and Prosper 
Matondi (2005) reflect how chiefs and traditional leaders were at the fore-front in 
areas such as Chiweshe communal area in Mazowe district, in mobilising themselves 
into groups such as Hwata and Mbari clans for land occupations in the context of 
repossession of ancestral lands especially due to land shortages. In this case, their 
struggle was that of restitution, on the basis that they had been removed from such 
farms in the past, making land possession or its lack of, a writing of the past.  Bevlyne 
Sithole, Bruce Campbell, Dale Doré & Witness Kozanayi (2003) argue that in the 
post-2000 land occupations, the theory of attachment to ancestral lands is nothing but 
a dominant state narrative. This is because many of those people who have occupied 
land remain attached to their previous communal areas. Also, many of them did not 
abandon their communal homes but instead, left some family members to continue 
taking care of them. But seeing the notion of attachment purely as evidence of state 
manipulation means failing to acknowledge how powerfully land figures in 
Zimbabweans’ understandings of their belonging and social identification. This is 
revealed in Ancestors, where Chenjerai Hove (1996) chronicles the emptiness and 
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alienating nature of the new farm lands through the character Mucha, hence exposing 
the discourses of attachment that are associated with land re/possession. 
 
In post 2000 land occupations, not all who went for resettlement did so because they 
wanted to practice farming. Others took advantage of the opportunity to acquire land 
that they would later on sell to those who genuinely needed it or they would plunder 
the resources on the land. In a context where land and femininity are associated, this 
plundering is telling of how femininity and women are preyed on in patriarchal 
nationalisms. Phides Mazhawidza & Jeanette Manjengwa (2011) posit that some new 
occupants resorted to the sale of firewood, gold panning and poaching of wildlife 
instead of farming. In a context where land is feminized such plunder provides images 
of the ‘plundering’ of female bodies. 
 
It is also important to focus on the land issue in respect of the actual bodies of 
women, and the representation of women. This is very crucial considering the highly 
patriarchal society that Zimbabwe is. It is probable that where issues around land 
become central, issues around gender are also laid bare. Irene Mahamba (1984) in 
Woman in Struggle expresses that during the war, freeing the land or nation was also 
freeing all the oppressed including women who were oppressed by both the colonial 
system and some cultural elements. 
 
The post-2000 land reform programme appears to have made the situation of women 
land access even worse owing to its political nature and the Western model of land 
ownership that it took after. Considering the association of women bodies with land, 
one is persuaded to think of their control and ‘privatization’ under patriarchal power 
to such an extent that from the 2000s, more and more calls to control land are linked 
to  more and more calls to control certain gendered and sexualized bodies. The control 
of land is associated with plenty and therefore land emerges as a revered entity that is 
equated to the bodies of women, which are associated with respect, taboos, fecundity 
and the growth of nations. 
 
Thus, capitalist appropriation of land resembles the appropriation of women by the 
Western focused African patriarchy, reflecting the extent to which African women in 
general and Zimbabwean women in particular have been erased of autonomy and 
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colonized by patriarchy. When one talks of land in nationalist terms, one has a feel 
and passes on feelings of naturalized gender and sexual discourses, thus making 
patriarchal based relations ordained. Through the narrator’s father, Hove’s Ancestors 
(1996) interestingly reveals a patriarchal hold on the land, which ironically is aided by 
the Western culture (as symbolised by Western Agricultural interventions) and its 
resemblance to the father’s macho-hold on the family. 
 
It is important to underline that in former settler societies, Zimbabwe in particular, 
issues around land, especially those that are pro-state, have given rise to an overt 
pristine past that is free of ‘foreign’ impurities. This pastness is seen as the foundation 
for a new nation. The ‘newness’ of nationalism in the new millennium Zimbabwe has 
largely been fashioned around the charged significance of land ownership, with land 
ownership being an emphatically colonial capitalist manifestation. It is contradictory 
that although the spiritual significance and ‘past’ attachments to land are constantly 
invoked, by and large, land has taken on colonial tags related to ‘private ownership.’  
Thus, in many ways land has been located within a charged discursive context and the 
rhetoric and claims around it have provided the language with which to talk of 
securities, resistances and wars as well as the material and immaterial ground where 
these are played out. The discursive context has also provided symbolic resources for 
defining the self and morality. 
 
After the Litmus Test: Tightening the Leash and Loosening the Grip  
A number of events and developments from the start of 2000 testify to how official 
discourses in Zimbabwe have been enforcing nationalism. Zimbabwean nationalism 
has been marked as a cocoon that wards off division, imperial domination and 
pervasive Western immorality. It has also been conceptualized as a stepping-stone for 
the country’s development. Moreover, the ZANU-PF government has emphasized 
that people maintain and preserve what is termed ‘their culture,’ ‘nationhood’ and 
‘identity’ (Amy Tsanga, 2004; Bertha Chiroro, 1995). Interesting is that this thrust for 
nationhood bellies Eurocentric models and therefore produces colonial constructs, 
hence an antithesis of the nation-state’s claimed inward looking philosophy. The 
terms ‘culture’ ‘nationhood’ and ‘identity’ have been perceived as homogeneous, 
authentic, originary, clear and positive for everyone named as a citizen. This is 
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regardless of overwhelming evidence that the idea of ‘nation’ is very recent and part 
of the colonial package. 
 
The above sentiments do not also take into cognizance that culture and identity are 
dynamic and prone to displacement, and that what is generally regarded as 
Zimbabwe’s cultural identity is a concoction of Western and African patriarchal 
hegemonies rather than anything representative of a ‘purely’ African or Zimbabwean 
culture. Dissenting voices have gained labels as enemies and outsiders and the 
government has been able to rationalize its being and has been very firm and vicious 
towards perceived enemies and outsiders. This is evident in Mugabe’s public 
pronouncements that the police have the right to arrest and beat up those seen as 
militating against the state. 
64
 The heavy amourment and readiness to quash dissenting 
voices is exemplified in events of national consolidation such as the occasion of the 
‘Save Zimbabwe Campaign’ prayer meeting of 11 March 2007 where leaders of 
competing political parties and civic societies were arrested and ruthlessly assaulted. 
At this event, Gift Tandare (One of the participants in the Save Zimbabwe Campaign 
and arguably an MDC member) was shot and killed by security forces and mourners 
at his funeral were randomly shot at. It is crucial to read the above as state messages 
of readiness to control and discipline citizens and a display of state power meant for 
citizens’ sensual uptake. After the 11th  of March 2007 incident, Mugabe firmly 
asserts “We don’t want people to start, now provoking us into a situation where we 
would have to deal them…deal with them in a manner which they would regret.” 65 
The above vindicates Oliver Phillips (1997) who argues that in contrast with a post-
apartheid South Africa that institutes the accommodation of difference and an open, 
heterogeneous society in the form of a rainbow nation, Zimbabwe is imaged as a 
homogeneous community whose existence is threatened by diversity and disunity. 
 
The arrival of the MDC into Zimbabwe’s political arena marked a serious turning 
point with regard to the relations between the state and its subjects (Lloyd 
Sachikonye, 2011). The situation provided a fertile ground for the assertion and re-
assertion of both aggressive and persuasive nationalism by the state. According to 
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Raftopoulos (2003), beginning with ZANU-PF’s defeat in the 2000 constitutional 
referendum, the era also saw violent farm takeovers, unprecedented inflation, 
economic collapse, industrial closures, and rampant unemployment inter-alia. This 
caused further discontentment on a people who had already been impoverished 
through a plethora of unfavorable economic policies, corruption and general neglect. 
It is this robust discontent that largely became a litmus test of ZANU-PF’s political 
dominance since the advent of Zimbabwe’s independence from settler rule. On the 
one hand, a number of opposition parties and civic organizations have interpreted 
Zimbabwe’s dire situation as a reflection of ZANU-PF’s dismal failure in governance. 
On the other, the ZANU-PF party and its loyalists implicate some punishment 
orchestrated by Britain and its allies on the ZANU-PF led government for its stance 
on economic reforms and rejection of imperial subjugation. 
 
More importantly, this period has witnessed increased pro-state machinations and 
discourses on nationalism as ZANU-PF fights tooth and nail for political survival as it 
faces the MDC, its greatest challenge since independence. ZANU-PF has labeled the 
MDC an imperial instrument. Mugabe rhetorically questions “Saka tosapota MDC 
muine ruzivo rwekuti MDC yakarongwa nemabhunu, nemaSelous Scouts, 
maRhodesians, vasingade kuti vanzi maZimbabweans vachibatsirwa nemaBritish 
kukanganisa matongerwo enyika?” [How can we support the MDC when you know 
that the MDC was formed by Boers, Selous Scouts and Rhodesians who do not want 
to be called Zimbabweans? They are aided by the British to disrupt the politics of our 
people]. 
66
 Mugabe’s use of terms such as ‘mabhunu,’ ‘maSelous Scouts,’ 
‘maRhodesians’ and ‘nemaBritish’ is well calculated. The terms are charged with 
affective displeasures that make the past a present whose harshness can be felt, smelt, 
heard, tasted and seen. The purpose is to transport the present into the past war zone 
where the above terms are derogatory and used to curse enemies and where one 
‘experiences’ the enemy’s tormenting presence. The objective of such a recall of the 
past is to re-establish territorial politics and reconnect with origin stories and 
narratives of struggle and thereby motivating ZANU-PF’s relevance. 
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Inter-alia, in this period, the media has been increasingly hegemonic. Moreover, 
security organs have become highly partisan as evidenced in 2002 when security 
chiefs led by General Vitalis Zvinavashe announced that they would not support and 
salute a president without liberation war credentials (Sachikonye, 2011). The service 
chiefs under General Constantine Chiwenga 
67
 repeated this in the run-up to the 2008 
elections (Martin Rupiya, 2009).  Added to this, there has been training for a semi-
military brigade under the auspices of the NYS and the graduates are unleashed on the 
population to disseminate their acquired ‘patriotic’ knowledge and practices. 
 
All of these instruments or technologies of new millennial nationalism have been 
highly masculinized and militarized. Interestingly, the NYS training manual titled 
“Inside the Third Chimurenga” was authored by Robert Mugabe. The text gives a 
‘patriotic’ history of Zimbabwe, the progress that has been made, challenging 
moments and future aspirations. The text also names Zimbabwean heroes of the First 
Chimurenga, the Second Chimurenga as well as the heroes of the ‘Third Chimurenga’ 
and justifies the government’s land reform. The NYS graduates, largely male, have 
taken first employment preference in government-controlled institutions. While in 
these institutions, they pay back the favor by spreading nationalist dogma and 
mobilizing support for the so called authentic, liberationist and nationalist party, 
ZANU-PF. In addition, parallel workers, students and other organizations aligned to 
ZANU-PF mushroomed. Evident is the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions 
(ZFTU) and Zimbabwe Congress of Students Union (ZICOSU), which emerged to 
counter the ZCTU and the Zimbabwe National Student Union (ZINASU) 
respectively. More striking even, has been the role of security forces in civilian 
spheres. There was also the introduction of National Strategic Studies as a subject in 
technical and teachers’ colleges to foster ‘patriotic’ history. All this has been done in 
defense of the land. 
 
Of particular interest also, is the structure of the war veterans’ organization and its 
close linkages with ZANU-PF and government, as well as to the security and military 
organs of the state. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, war veterans were reportedly 
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given Z$20 million to campaign for ZANU-PF (Norma Kriger, 2003). Also, the 
President, Robert Mugabe, who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Zimbabwe Defense 
Forces (ZDF), is the patron of the Zimbabwe National War Veterans Association 
(ZNLWVA) (Tapera Chitiyo & Martin Rupiya, 2005). They go on to argue that the 
link between war veterans and the army again lies in that senior army personnel are 
largely war veterans of the Second Chimurenga and are members of the ZANU-PF 
politburo, central committee and other structures. Besides, from 2001 war veterans 
have been made a reserve army of the state under the direct command of the 
Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) structures (Rupiya, 2005). The war veterans’ 
involvement is strategic and central to thinking through what land has meant and 
continues to mean in Zimbabwe. Their presence is important to the politics around 
land. They provide physical evidence of past and present struggles and have been 
instrumental in the jambanja (forceful) occupation of land in the 2000s. Narrating the 
story of the nation and of land from the point of view of those who had ‘performed’ in 
its becoming is crucial and the veterans’ individual narrations are extensions of 
national birth. I argue that the war-veterans have been instrumental in producing 
attitudes that are intended by ‘patriotic’ history. 
 
In this tirade of what James Muzondidya names ‘grotesque nationalism’ (Sabelo 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni & James Muzondidya, 2011), the government has claimed to be 
safeguarding independence, sovereignty and national interests – seen to be achievable 
only through the repossession of land and then ensuring its security. Thus, 
‘nationalism’ has been put at the center of everything, marginalizing and sacrificing 
the other multiple and diverse identities, narratives and struggles that Zimbabweans 
have. In this kind of nationalism, land and its symbolic meanings as enshrined in 
dominant discourses has emerged as one of the primary reference points and a means 
for justification. Muzondidya (2009) advances that the prerequisite and urgency to 
emasculate the organizations and support of the opposition largely influenced and 
controlled the politics of land from 2000 and a pivotal element of this process was 
state restructuring as noted above. This supports Alexander’s (2005:152) argument 
that nationalism is “…about the establishment of a bureaucratic state able to 
discipline its citizens, both through technocratic prescription and state backed 
custom.” 
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Hailing Subjects: Public Enactments of Reform and National Control 
As reflected earlier since the 2000s, the state has been calling for and instituting 
reform and national control through a total control of institutions and the economy. 
According to Logan (2007), the land issue was repackaged and resold as the core of 
Zimbabwean nationalism. 
68
 This meant that all institutions and policies had to be 
aligned to this core issue. To ensure this, there was need to rid institutions of all 
elements that militate against reform and put in place those that work towards 
‘meaningful’ reforms. Parallel to the above developments and actual or direct 
processes, cultural texts around land re-surfaced to articulate Zimbabwean 
nationalism. These texts have been diverse and carrying a range of shifting meanings 
that either imbibe or subvert state narratives of the land question and Zimbabwean 
nationalism. 
 
These texts and their circulation have been evident from the 2000s, with the measures 
that were directed towards land reform and control summed up as the ‘Third 
Chimurenga.’ Reflecting on the incessant presence of land related slogans Chitando 
(2002) brings forward the slogan: 
Ivhu (land) 
Kuvanhu (To the people) 
Kuvanhu (To the people) 
Ivhu (land) 
In this case, there is a forceful call that the land should be given to the people, here 
referred to as vanhu. It should be noted that in this context, vanhu (people) does not 
simply mean people in the conventional sense of humanness. Here, it refers to those 
who are regarded citizens in the context of the Third Chimurenga. This articulates the 
inseparable relationship or loyalty between land and the people and land and 
Zimbabwean citizenship. Those people without such a relationship with the land bear 
no claim to citizenship and therefore, do not belong to the Zimbabwean nation. It 
should be noted that this slogan has been used a lot during ZANU-PF campaigns, 
showing how vanhu (people) is re/defined in line with political affiliation. This kind 
of position, however, is countered in some circles. In their album, Nharembozha, at 
times the artists, who are sympathetic to the MDC sometimes feature putting on T-
shirts inscribed, ‘Handinete! 100% Zimbabwean. Angikhathali!’ (I will never 
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give/tire-up! 100% Zimbabwean. I will never give/tire-up!), expressing full 
Zimbabwean citizenship despite ZANU-PF denial and militantly indicating their 
determination to fight for a better life. 
 
The ZANU-PF slogan above has also been appropriated in Christian circles. The 
land/ivhu has been replaced with heaven/denga. However, even here the meaning 
remains unstable. It may mean that the church has embraced ZANU-PF’s land reform 
by equating land to heaven, meaning that the land is very important and that owning 
land ensures happiness and a life free of suffering for citizens. A different meaning 
nonetheless, would be that churches are refusing ZANU-PF’s idea that sets what is 
material as supreme and instead, urging people to work towards heavenly happiness 
instead of earthly possessions such as land. In this logic, the church’s position is that 
Zimbabwean citizenship and belonging is not as important as being a member in 
heaven. 
 
The 2000s also saw the emergence of the slogan ‘Zimbabwe will never be a colony 
again.’ 69 Implied is that the national body shall not be ‘penetrated’ by foreigners. 
Maurice Vambe (2006) argues that such slogans became the guiding ideological 
discourse to alienate those Zimbabweans who fail to admit the threats posed by the 
former colonialists to the territorial integrity of Zimbabwe. However, Vambe 
(2006:266) disputes that Zimbabwe will never be a colony again and advances that 
literary works such as Solomon Mutswairo’s Feso, Raymond Choto’s Vavariro and 
David Mutasa’s Sekai Minda Tave Nayo “…in some ways confirm that ‘Zimbabwe 
can be a colony again,’ but this time of the nationalist elites who have grabbed most 
of the productive land.” Vambe brings to attention a wealth of literature on the land 
question that is present in some Shona novels. He argues that although this literature 
advocates land redistribution to benefit the black majority as promised during 
mobilizations and the war, it also glares upon land appropriation and booty by those 
in powerful positions. To Vambe, land is used both as a political signifier and a 
physical space where violence is performed. 
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This slogan, however, is sometimes contested or twisted in a number of spheres. Paul 
Madzore’s song ‘Gumbazvose’ (One who takes everything) 70 reflects the plight of the 
poor as new ‘colonialists’ in the name of ZANU-PF amass wealth for self-
aggrandizement. To do this, they use the language of reform and indigenization. This 
kind of view resists the temptation to think of colonizers only from the 
insider/outsider distinctions. Madzore argues that there are colonizers within the 
messianically propelled nationalist party. This is supported by the track, ‘Mitsetse’ 
(Ques) which is on the same album. The song features video footages taken at a 
number of rallies. One of the footages shows a poster reading ‘Mbare will never be 
ZANU-PF,’ 71 again collapsing ZANU-PF’s above slogan. The promise made is that 
Mbare, one of Harare’s oldest suburbs will not succumb to ZANU-PF machinations. 
There is a way in which other parties see ZANU-PF as having colonialist mentality 
and practices that forestall people’s freedom. There are therefore resistances from 
other spheres, against ZANU-PF’s colonialist dominance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another poster which appears on the song ‘VeZANU’ (ZANU-PF Stewards) by 
Happison Mabika and Patience Takaona, is inscribed ‘Zimbabwe shall never be a 
Chinese colony again.’ 72 This mocks ZANU-PF’s ‘Look East Policy’ that gives for 
example, the Chinese some kind of unchecked economic dominance in Zimbabwe. 
This kind of discourse offers some questioning on the definition of colonisers and 
imperialists that is directed only towards the British and opens up for new colonisers 
                                                          
70
 See Song 8, Appendix A, watch https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kzaw0PmSLVw.  
71
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Image 4: ‘Mbare Will Never Be ZANU-PF’ 
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who are also amassing national resources and causing impoverishment on the people. 
The above modifications of slogans shows how the state’s instruments of repression 
and confinement are turned against the state itself, attesting to the subversive ways 
that people deal with state ideology. Revealed here is that in the midst of repression 
passed through the media and popular culture, germinates interesting and forceful 
voices of resistance and subversion. Thus audiences have the capacity to read and 
refine given texts to suit their changing and lived experiences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In qualifying an understanding of the use and effects of slogans, it is important to 
acknowledge that what people say or do in public may not be an expression of what 
they say or do in their private spaces. Instead, it may simply be the performance of a 
‘script’ that has already been written and is expected by the dominant. Partaking in 
the slogan therefore, might be a way of fooling ZANU-PF into believing that they are 
loyal rather than being an actual echo of loyalty. James Scott (1990, 1987) argues that 
the public script that both the dominated and the dominant groups perform in the 
presence of one another is different from the text that each produces in the absence of 
the other. This is because the presence of each part has an influence on the 
performativity since each part is conscious of both itself and of the other. The 
meanings of the above public pronouncements and displays of national loyalty may 
not necessarily be reflective of interpellated subjects. Instead, they could reflect a 
form of ‘trickster’ politics, which involves doing the expected in order to evade any 
suspicion of the subversion that they put in motion in the absence of the public eye of 
the dominant. 
 
 
Image 5: ‘Zimbabwe Shall Never Be A Chinese Colony Again’ 
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To substantiate the above, I draw on Kelly Askew’s (2002) narrative on the politics of 
performance in Tanzania. Upon approaching a roadblock, passengers aboard a lorry 
travelling at night in an area under curfew spontaneously take on different roles in a 
funeral ‘script’ meant to outwit an extractive and disciplinarian state instrument. 
Askew’s (2002) narrative of a performative act vividly explains the Zimbabwean 
context during the post-2000 crisis. Living in an environment characterized by 
scarcity, corruption and violence, the ordinary people came up with ‘performative’ 
acts to ensure survival. These included the use of empty coffins to obtain fuel and 
acting disabilities to jump long queues and get preferences to access basic 
commodities. In the case of Zimbabwe where certain acts/inactions may be regarded 
as politically wrong, people are conscious of issues about discipline and punishment. 
Similarly, in a situation where participation determines the distribution of resources, 
the participation of subjects might not be reflective of interpellated subjects, but a 
survival tactic benefiting the subjects while giving the dominion wrong perceptions. 
 
In many ways, land ownership has been drawn in as an act of reform and national 
control. More strikingly, subjects’ reaction to hailing has at times been mis-
understood especially by failing to read ‘public’ texts and at times resistances have 
opened up even where subject control was thought to have been total. I argue that the 
identity of land as a political signifier and a space where violence is performed has 
been, to a great extent, ‘acted’ out through gendered and sexualized national bodies. 
Thus, the discourse around land ‘performs’ surveillance and discipline on the genders 
and sexualities of national bodies.  
 
Femininity, Land and Nationalism 
In her provocative study of post-apartheid nation building in South Africa, Meg 
Samuelson (2007) discusses the ‘remembering’ of the South African past and the 
‘membering’ of the post-apartheid nation through new myths, symbols and political 
structures. She explores how this is done through the ‘disremembering’ of historical 
women’s experiences and at the expense of ‘dismembering’ their bodies in the 
construction of the modern South African nation. Thus the re/construction of the 
South African nation is done through twisting women’s contributions and 
experiences. Samuelson examines the extent to which current representations of 
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women in post-apartheid South Africa subvert or reproduce the apartheid and colonial 
pasts. 
 
Using the present figuring of the historical women like Krotoa-Eva, Nongqawuse and 
Sarah Bartmann, through ‘performances’ of the nation including literary works, 
Samuelson delves into the ways in which the South African past is tied to its present 
interests of nation/al construction. After re/crafting their identities and experiences, 
the afore-mentioned women are cast into idealized forms that symbolize the imagined 
national body (Samuelson, 2007). 
 
Samuelson explores interesting ways in which Krotoa-Eva, a Khoisan woman 
interpreter is robbed of her ‘past’ voice and power, which manifested among others, 
through her linguistic abilities. She is then reproduced in terms of a gendered 
emphasis on her intermarriage. This has been done to biologically and nationally 
identify her as ‘rainbow Mother.’ 73 Interesting also, is Samuelson’s exploration of the 
‘sacrificial-redemptive’ narrative characterising the Xhosa prophet Nongqawuse and 
also, Sarah Bartmann’s burial which was an ‘emotive spectacle of nation building’ 
giving images of a mother’s return to the ‘family.’ For Samuelson, the above cases 
articulate how the South African nation building project domesticates women, 
especially black women by reproducing them as passive embodied subjects. This is 
done by an erasure of their complexities and experiences, the foundations of their 
agency, in favour of the domesticating identities positioning them as ‘wombs’ that 
give birth to citizens, bearers of redemption, unifiers and mothers that nurture the 
nation (Samuelson, 2007). Samuelson reflects the diverging re/presentations of 
historical women in both historical and literary texts. The fragmented stories 
destabilize the teleological nationalist narratives and works against the unitary 
narratives favoured by nationalist narratives (Samuelson, 2007). 
 
The nationalist representation of the above figures is reflective of the gendered nature 
of national imaginaries and opens up the complex nature of the relationship between 
gendered symbolism and nationalism. This fits in well in a context where land has 
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been feminized. It is imperative to explore ways in which the bodies of women have 
been symbolised in relation to land. This has a long colonial legacy, but as Samuelson 
(2007), Desiree Lewis (2002) and others have shown, it is continued in liberationist 
and postcolonial nation-building and nationalist discourses. It is crucial here, to talk 
of the reproductive nature of the land as enshrined in the ‘vana vevhu’ (children of the 
soil/land) concept that identifies those who are citizens. This gives sense to how lands 
and nations have been feminized. The point is that land is reproductive but also 
attractive to outsiders, yet very sacred to an extent that it needs to be guarded and 
protected at all costs. In a situation mediated by the ZANU-PF idea of ‘Land to the 
People and People to the Land,’ there will be ‘100% Total Control’ which would 
ensure that ‘Zimbabwe Will Never be a Colony Again,’ 74 ensuring autonomy since 
‘Our Land is Our Sovereignty,’ 75 leading to full belonging and citizen benefits 
because ‘Our Land is Our Prosperity’ since ‘The Land is the Economy and the 
Economy is the Land,’ making it imperative to mark land as reproductive. Implied is 
that there is no belonging and citizenship when people are alienated from the 
‘motherland,’ at once a figure of reproduction, heterosexual penetration and nurturing. 
 
Men and women are hailed differently as subjects in the body politic of nations. In 
Zimbabwe, men are basically hailed as ‘sons of the soil.’ This locates men in the 
politics of belonging since they are ‘sons of…’ and in stories of resistance since as 
sons, they are called upon to defend or protect where they come from. They are 
positioned in a masculine discourse and are supposed to perform masculine roles. On 
the other hand, the soil or land that gives birth to the sons is naturalized in the 
discourses of motherhood. The feminization of land and the depiction of the 
Zimbabwean nation as a female body characterize people’s everyday language, 
literary works and even songs. In Zimbabwe, it is common to hear some women 
saying “…uya murume anoda kurima mapurazi evamwe!!” [That man likes farming 
other people’s lands] when referring to men who are unashamed to seek sexual 
relationships from women who are already married. In this case, mapurazi (plaas) or 
land refers to women who already ‘belong’ to other men. Thus the character of land is 
stamped on to the feminine figure, which already has been characterized as pure, 
private, sacred, productive and needing protection. This means that land attains the 
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same standard characteristics that are inscribed on women’s bodies. Thus, the land or 
the nation should be pure, sacred, revered and protected. The land’s production 
becomes positive if it is ‘cultivated’ only by those who rightly own it. This is why in 
the song ‘Sendekera’ Tambaoga associates land repossession with plenty. 76 If the 
land is cultivated by ‘aliens,’ it becomes an invasion; similar to a sexual assault on 
another person’s wife. Thus considering how the plough reaps through the soil during 
kurima (ploughing) and how seed is buried inside, kurima metaphorically shows how 
the penis goes through mapurazi (female bodies) in an act of symbolic territorial 
invasion. 
 
In Patrick Chakaipa’s Shona novel, Pfumo Reropa (1961) which is set in the pre-
colonial era, despite evidencing the sexual commodification of women by patriarchy, 
Mambo Ndyire, also illustrates the depiction of land as woman. Reflecting his 
uncontrollable lust for women, the reigning king asserts “Pane munhu ane munda 
kana gombo zvaro zvisiri zvangu muno munyika here? Ndiani ane simba 
rokundirambidza kurima pandinenge ndichida? Gombo iri ndarida ndinoririma chete 
ndione chinouya? [Is there anyone who has a field or even virgin land that is not mine 
in this territory? Who has the power to stop me from ploughing anywhere I choose to? 
I have been attracted to this land, and I will plough it and await the consequences!!] 
(Chakaipa, 1961:1). The literary meaning is that the king is attracted to Shizha’s wife, 
Munhamo and that he would make sure he satisfies his sexual appetite and also that 
all the women in the territory are his. Munhamo’s body is viewed as one with 
Ndyire’s possessed land. 77 Interesting is that the King has seen the woman while she 
is in the fields. This gives a visual imagery that sees the land as one with her. 
 
In the eyes of the King, the land that Munhamo is standing on is an extension of her 
own being; hence the king likens the gombo to her. Lewis (2004) has also observed 
how Nehanda is presented as an extension of her physical environment in Yvonne 
Vera’s Nehanda (1993). However, unlike in Pfumo Reropa (1961) where the woman, 
Munhamo is a ‘passive’ victim of patriarchal excesses, in Vera’s Nehanda, women’s 
agency is not erased as “Nehanda possesses extraordinary powers and autonomy” 
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from her connectedness to land (Lewis, 2004:198). Noting the missionary influence 
on most of the early Zimbabwean novelists who attained missionary education, one 
may argue that the story line in the novel has been influenced by the biblical story of 
King David and Uriah’s wife, Bathsheba. 78 
 
However, one does not fail to notice how language has been used to reveal the way 
land is symbolic of women bodies. Gombo, which is land that is already in ownership 
but has been left to rest, and therefore not currently being cultivated, is 
interchangeably used with woman. The occupation of ‘claimed’ land equates to a 
takeover of another man’s wife. Such kinds of images achieve significant impacts 
when it comes to struggles over land. Indeed, the powerful King invades his targeted 
village, kills all the men and grabs the gombo. 
 
The abuse of power and authority shown in Pfumo Reropa is also illustrated in Clive 
Malunga’s song, Sabhuku (Headman). 79 Malunga displays powerful lyrics 
questioning obscene power as he says; 
Ndakarima munda wangu, ukadyiwa nemombe, mombe dzacho ndedzamambo, 
ndichaita seiko? Tine mutemo mumusha uno, tine mitemo mumuusha uno. 
Mutemo wokutanga mambo haatongwe, mutemo wechipiri mambo haaripe, 
ndichaita Seiko? 
[I cultivated my land, it was invaded by cattle, and the cattle belong to the headman, 
what then is my recourse? We have rules in this village; the first one is that the 
headman is immune to prosecution, the second is that the headman is immune to 
compensatory justice, what options therefore do I have?] 
In the song, Malunga seems to suggest that his only option is to fight the king since he 
can never get justice from the prevailing system. Noting how the land is likened to a 
woman, the excessiveness of the king becomes evident and they warrant a violent 
repossession. 
 
The above cases do not necessarily take the struggles over land as an insider-outsider 
dichotomy, but in actual fact, as people’s ordinary struggles as they experience life. It 
is in this sense that limiting nationalism to anti-colonial repertoires distorts people’s 
actual struggles. It seems the above narratives on struggles over land are more 
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sensible if they are read as struggles for justice and fairness in any unjust and unfair 
system. The obsession with ploughing other people’s land is a sign of greed, 
selfishness and lack of satisfaction. In Pfumo Reropa, there is evidence that greed, 
selfishness and despotic power and authority do not last forever and that even the 
most powerful can fall.  Interestingly also, Clive Malunga’s song reveals that 
struggles are not just about the insider and outsider, but are also fought within. The 
song reveals a society untouched by the Ubuntu philosophy 
80
 where people have 
power, where leaders observe what is expected to be observed by any other person, 
where human security and justice is for everyone. The common village dispute is used 
to mark national disputes where ordinary people are at the mercy of the powerful 
leaders who are immune to prosecution. 
 
Zimbabwean laws and courts have been implicated in being ineffective to the 
excesses of the powerful leaders, yet very harsh on the people from the margins. In 
typical traditional systems where rulers were uncouth and their power untamed, 
dispossessions were common as the situation created room for subversion and 
resistance. Considering that land is feminized, and a social context pervaded by 
rumors of high ranking officials snatching women from the ordinary, Malunga’s 
munda may be referring to the ladies who are snatched by the powerful from the less 
powerful. Land and women become similar in that they are feminized, they are 
embodied spaces for masculine penetration, they are regarded sacred, protected and 
contested spaces, and they are symbolic of masculine victory, honor and power. 
 
Land and its Mythical Resonance 
There is no doubt that land is a crucial issue in Southern Africa in general and 
Zimbabwe in particular since it is central to historical commonalities, identities, 
sovereignty, well-being, religion and world view. In Zimbabwe, land has been 
signified and linked to echoes of precolonial cosmology in ways that makes it 
affective and appealing to people. However, it is crucial to underline how such an 
important resource may be used as a divisible tool especially if it is creatively linked 
to selective historical moments that are in turn linked to a selected religious and 
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spiritual cosmology. As has been shown earlier, land is believed to link the living 
dead (ancestors) and those living and thus making it a strong sacred space of 
enormous spiritual significance (Gundani, 2002) and therefore, its ownership arguably 
determines the proximity between ancestors and the living. The Zimbabwean state has 
banked on the religious cosmology that the control of land gives rest to all who died 
in the revolutions and brings a form of closure and ease to those who have suffered 
because of the revolutions. This kind of religious argument is strongly founded on the 
iconography of Nehanda and her prophetic words (Tabona Shoko, 2006; Ezra 
Chitando, 2005). Nehanda’s prophecy that her bones would rise from the soil and 
defeat the whites needed to be fulfilled. In the 2000s, it has been emphasized that 
colonialism could only be dispensed of if the black majority get land ownership, and 
so the relevance of the Third Chimurenga. 
 
In Zimbabwean particularly, and most African cultures, a person’s last words before 
death are highly valued and have lasting effects on the memory of the living (Shoko, 
2006). As such, what the person says before death has to be taken seriously and 
accorded meaning by the living, otherwise the living would experience the anger of 
the dead person’s spirit. The myth about Nehanda’s last words played a central role in 
the Second Chimurenga as they encouraged the colonized people to rise against the 
settler regime. Banking on the popularity of the prophecy, and knowing the ‘magic’ it 
had played in mobilizing support for the Second Chimurenga, ZANU-PF appropriated 
it in the 2000s. Its appropriation was meant to produce a continuum of zvimurenga 
(revolutions) to the extent that the controversial land reform was both inevitable and 
justified. It has been professed as influenced by ancestral spirits who would not rest 
until the land is restored to the black majority. In this sense, the front-runners of the 
Third Chimurenga have been seen as instruments in the hands of the ancestral powers 
of Nehanda, Kaguvi, Chaminuka and others. 
 
Arguments are also raised that even those who lost their lives during the Second 
Chimurenga would not rest if what cost them their lives, which is land, was still in the 
hands of the whites. Fear and responsibility to the ‘irrational’ supernatural are crucial 
in the creation of disciplined subjects of the nation. According to Chitando (2005), 
ZANU-PF portrayed Mugabe as fulfilling ancestral demands. In this case, individual 
actions and bodies are seen as functional parts of larger actions and a larger national 
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body. This means that thoughts, actions, practices and functions contribute to the 
shaping of the larger processes at play, failure of which affects the whole well-being. 
 
Chitando looks at how in the 2000s, the nationalists even appropriates the Christian 
religion to show the centrality of land. This has been largely due to the fact that 
Christianity has become a popular religion in the country. Chitando provides an 
interesting account of how the land issue is theologized by linking it to the 
Deuteronomic history, giving Mugabe a prophetic role that entails adhering to God’s 
plans and leading his people to their promised land in a ‘Mosaic’ way while enduring 
suffering for the sake of his people in a way synonymous to ‘The Suffering 
Servant.’81 He also mentions the drawing of biblical verses on land, wealth and 
possession, turning of popular church songs to political songs and having a big wave 
of gospel musicians composing songs on hope, patience, accepting suffering and 
urging perseverance and hope for the future, all of which were based on certain 
biblical verses. 
 
It can be argued that there has been a grand effort to locate Zimbabwe’s land issue 
within the universal and popular narratives of land dispossession and suffering. This 
justifies any means possibly used to repossess land. This kind of discourse is sensible 
in Zimbabwe where Christian fundamentalism has established itself as the last straw 
of hope in a nation whose people have experienced prolonged suffering to the point of 
seeing no logic in ‘formal’ politics. ZANU-PF has capitalized on a religiously   
knowledgeable population to drive its politics. Drawing parallels between religion and 
ZANU-PF themes on land enables an intersection between ZANU-PF and religion. 
This marshals a spiritual sense that equates loyalty to ZANU-PF to loyalty to a deity.  
Zimbabwean politics is constructed on the polarities of righteous/evil, God/ungodly, 
heaven/hell, free citizens/slaves, ZANU-PF/Anti-ZANU-PF, powerfully influencing 
political allegiances. 
 
Land has become the material, psycho-religious and social space of national reform 
and control moving from the colonial legacy to sovereignty. This is clearly articulated 
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in ZANU-PF campaign posters that associate land, sovereignty and ZANU-PF. 
82
 
What is reflected is some kind of ‘holy trinity’ of the land, sovereignty and ZANU-
PF. A ZANU-PF vote is seen as a defense and claim to land that ultimately installs 
national sovereignty. Both the Zimbabwean ancestral tradition and Christianity have 
provided theological foundations and justifications to land reform and defined it as a 
divine will that could not be avoided and meant to empower black people. Chitando 
claims that this has given Mugabe’s pronouncements on land reform a popular appeal. 
 
Such popular appeal is evinced by the once prominent figure, Tony Gara’s 83 claims 
that Mugabe is ‘the other son of God’ (Chitando, 2005). This equates Mugabe to the 
biblical Jesus Christ who came to save humankind, but only through suffering and 
unjustifiable blame which nevertheless, failed to shake him. This locates the anti-
Mugabe and anti-ZANU-PF campaigns as part of the tribulations and perils that ‘the 
son’ should experience and endure to the end so as to accomplish his mission. Similar 
utterances have also come from another prominent ZANU-PF figure, Emmerson 
Mnangagwa 
84
 who says, “I want to tell you that President Mugabe is Devine. He is 
our Moses from the bible who salvaged Israelites from captivity in Egypt.” 85 An 
equally divine eulogy has also come from the leader of the Apostolic Christian 
Council of Zimbabwe (ACCZ), Bishop Johanness Nyamwa Ndanga who declares, 
“Mugabe is our king and kings are not elected, they are installed by God.” 86 Praises 
on Mugabe have also been sung by Simon Khaya Moyo 
87
 and Absolom Sikhosana 
88
 
who respectively say, “His Excellency you are a liberator of unparalleled audacity. 
You are a useful and amazing leader” 89 and “…we celebrate the birthday of the 
genuine conqueror of the British Empire.” 90 Mugabe also takes himself as one who 
continues to make huge sacrifices and suffer at the hands of the West and their 
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 Tony Gara was the Harare mayor from 1995to 1996. 
84
 Emmerson Mnangagwa is on of Zimbabwe’s current vice presidents. He attained the position in 
2014. He has held various influential positions in the government and in ZANU-PF. 
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 See http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2013/07/mnangagwa-praise-worships-mugabe/.  
86
 See http://nehandaradio.com/2013/10/07/top-8-mugabe-bootlickers-in-zimbabwe/.  
87
 Simon Khaya Moyo is the current ZANU-PF chairperson. 
88
 Absolom Sikhosana was ZANU-PF secretary for youth for more than 15 with his age way above the 
35years limit for the position. 
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 See http://nehandaradio.com/2013/10/07/top-8-mugabe-bootlickers-in-zimbabwe/.   
90
 See http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2014/02/28/mugabe-birthday-celebrations-show-opulence-
praise-singing/.   
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sympathizers because of his unwavering dedication to retrieve the land and save his 
people (Mugabe, 2001). 
 
The jingle, ‘Muri Musoja’ (You are a Soldier/Warrior) 91 by Mbare Chimurenga 
Choir appropriates a poetic form and praise sings Mugabe as the only one who has 
supported land reform and offers unequivocal support to him for giving people the 
land that had cost a lot of lives during the struggle: 
VaMugabe, murimusoja, 
Musambotya, 
Ndimwi chete makagona kutsigira, kutorwa kweivhu, 
Saka isu vana veZimbabwe, 
Takakutsigirai, 
Ivhu rakafirwa nevana 
[Honorable Mugabe, fear not, you are the one and only who supported the 
repossession of land, the land that cost the lives of children, so we the children of 
Zimbabwe, are in full support for you]. 
Thus land is considered as very essential especially because some people have 
suffered for it. Mugabe is seen as a unique person, a gallant warrior who has stood up 
to address the land issue when others have faltered. In a way, this portrayal of 
Mugabe fulfills the doctrine of land repossession that characterizes the Second 
Chimurenga. President Robert Mugabe is therefore seen as masculine and one who 
protects the land and the nation in the same way that women are alleged to be 
protected by patriarchy. 
Tambaoga, in the song, ‘Agreement’ 92 utters: 
Patakavhota takasainirana agirimende 
Kuti mutungamiri weZimbabwe ndi Gabhurieri  
[Our vote was a signed agreement that Zimbabwe is led by Gabriel] 
The lyrics herald an ‘angelic’ nature of Mugabe’s leadership as there is a deliberate 
choice of his second name. The choice of Gabriel over Robert, his first name fits in 
well with attempts to give him a divine identity that links him with the head angel 
Gabriel, a biblical character bearing positive and important news as well as 
symbolizing the existence of God. 
93
 The use of this ‘spiritual-scape’ ‘authenticates’ 
Mugabe as chosen by a divine will, and locates his past, presence and future as a 
‘spiritual journey’ which mortals cannot change. Mugabe’s land articulations on land 
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have been rendered a symbolic manifestation of God’s presence. How this is effective 
to the largely Christianized Zimbabwean population is self-telling. However, the very 
fact that Tambaoga brings in the vote as a mandate given by the people reflects his 
recognition of democratic means to power. This makes him divert from Mugabe and 
other high ranking officials who claim that the vote can only be recognized if people 
vote ‘correctly.’ 
 
Without land in the hands of the black majority, it is argued that Zimbabwe would 
always have a moral debt to the ancestors and all those who have passed on in the 
name of the land. Richard Werbner (1995:116) considers a moral debt as “...a ritual 
debt offending the dead and God.” On its campaign literature, 94 the land issue 
became ZANU-PF’s trump card owing to its traditional religious significance. In his 
speech, on the return of part of the Zimbabwe bird carving, which was covered by The 
Herald on the 15
th
 of May 2003 Mugabe says: 
The Great Zimbabwe Birds are our nation’s prized cultural treasures, a symbol 
of our nation whose meaning defies time and place. The return of the pedestal 
of this national symbol is, therefore, cause for celebration because it fits into 
our ongoing programme of national identity and restoration. Like our Land 
Reform Programme today’s ceremony allows us to assert ownership over our 
national resources and treasures (Edward Matenga, 2011:161). 
The same sentiments were echoed by Alois Mangwende, the then president of the 
Chiefs’ Council who expressed gratitude that the return of the bird fragment 
coincided with land repossession allowing the bird to land on a freed space (Matenga, 
2011). Matenga claims that Chief Jonathan Mangwende 
95
 links the return of the 
sacred bird fragment to the vindication of the bird’s aggrieved spirit, which had been 
restless in foreign lands and had troubled its abductors until they surrendered it to its 
land. In this sense, Mangwende personifies the bird and reads its return as symbolic of 
ancestral support for Mugabe’s land acquisition and national independence (Chitando, 
2005). This is supported by the popular slogan, ‘Forward with our Independence! 
Forward with Land Reform!’ There is a physical, historical and spiritual connection 
between the ‘flight’ of the bird fragment from Germany and land reform that is drawn 
by the state and is negotiated through time and space. It would seem that the return of 
the bird portion to its land and its other half is symbolic of the return of the people to 
their land and also their ancestors. This is because land is taken to be the umbilical 
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cord tying the living and the living dead, hence marking land reform as unavoidable 
and the only possible form of justice. In this context, Matenga points to the impact 
that heritage may exhibit on state politics and how state politics paradoxically affect 
the meanings and uses of that heritage in a way that shows the uses and abuses of 
history and heritage. 
 
The Chave Chimurenga (It’s now War time/The War/Revolution has taken off) 
advertisements or jingles which became frequent on both radio and television 
therefore have become summaries of performances of reform and national control in 
the post-2000. These commercials have been featuring state sponsored musicians such 
as Last ‘Tambaoga’ Chianga, Andy Brown and Tendai Masunda, aka ‘Nonsikelelo.’ 
Maxwell Sibanda (2004) posits that by 2004, there were nine advertisements related 
to reform which were produced and released under the series Chave Chimurenga. 
Namely, these are; Chave Chimurenga (Its now War time/The Revolution/War has 
taken off), Kwedu kumachembere (Our Traditional Wisdom), Sisonke (We are a 
United Force/We are Together), Our Future, Siyalima (We will Engage in 
Agriculture/Farming), Mombe Mbiri nemadhongi mashanu (Two Oxen and Five 
Donkeys), Uya Uone Kutapira Kunoita Kurima (Come and Witness how 
Exiting/Enjoyable/Beneficial Farming is), Rambai Makashinga (Remain Resilient), 
and Sendekera Mwana Wevhu (Hold on, Child of the Soil/Keep on 
Fighting/Struggling Child of the Soil). These advertisements were given excessive air 
play on both television and radio and presenters and disc jockeys played them during 
certain time intervals. For example, in 2003 Rambai Makashinga 
96
 was aired about 
288 times a day on radio (8 640 times per month) and 72 times (2 160 times) on 
television (Sibanda, 2004). 
 
Taking into cognizance that the themes of these jingles oscillate around issues of 
reform and national control, in a country where colonial structures and machinery still 
exists and in which the resources of the nation are owned and enjoyed by a few, one 
may argue that they achieved some degree of appeal to certain audiences at particular 
moments. This is because a significant number of the population still relies on radio 
and television for entertainment and information. In a situation where the air waves 
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are largely monopolized and censored, the effects of the jingles have been significant. 
Since the jingles were worked between programs on Ztv programming, they took the 
nature of and served the functions of advertisements. In the context of their poetic 
nature and their positioning as traditionally persuasive discourses, the jingles have 
been very powerful and promoted, persuaded and emphasized ‘patriotic’ identities 
and loyalties to ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe. Whanda Wallace (1991: 239) 
acknowledges the effect of the jingles as he argues:  
First, consider how difficult it can be to get a jingle out of your head when you 
have heard it several times. Whether or not you like the jingle is irrelevant; 
you just can’t seem to stop humming it […] Second, jingles seem to be easily 
recalled even if they have not been heard for years. 
Thus there is a significant degree of attachment to state texts and state meanings of 
land that have been fostered by the use of jingles to narrate the subject of land in 
Zimbabwe. Mikhail Bakhtin (1981) places meaning-making within the context of the 
multitude of ‘voices’ or texts on the same subject in a way that plays around with 
attitudes, emotions and opinions. However, the fact that the jingles reached people 
experiencing the realities of life means that receptions of these texts have been 
complex, diverse and vulnerable to various alterations at different moments. In some 
ways, Wallace’s (1991) effects of jingles overlook the audience’s potential to 
vulgarize the jingles in ways that subvert initial meanings and ‘perform’ people’s 
lived experiences. 
 
Important to note is that in Zimbabwe, land is not something that became an issue in 
the 2000s. Land has always been a contentious issue as reflected by actual events such 
as ‘invasions,’ as well as through being a topical issue in music. Prior to 2000, a 
number of musicians had composed and performed songs expressing dismay over 
how ordinary people got almost nothing out of the liberation struggle. Examples 
include Thomas Mapfumo, Simon Chimbetu, Leonard Zhakata, Hosiah Chipanga and 
Oliver Mtukudzi. The discourse of land in the 2000s therefore may be seen not as an 
effort to redress the suffering of the landless, nor as answering to the call of ancestors 
and or God. On the contrary, the land discourse may be taken as the only available 
resource for the state to create a new flair of revolutionaries and rejuvenate its 
paralyzed nationalism. To do this, land, not only as a tangible resource, but also as an 
intangible and symbolic resource became very handy in ‘hailing’ subjects. Thus land 
became a useful tool in guarding power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
Interestingly, in her novel Without a Name, Vera (1994) reflects that the violent effort 
to gain the ancestral lands is similar to the violence directed on a woman’s body. This 
is based on how the woman’s body signifies land or territories. Vera, therefore, shows 
that the struggle for land is attached to the rape of women. This is especially so if we 
consider that the land and indeed, countries and lands are feminized in discourses of 
nationalism, thus they are referred to as ‘she,’ ‘her,’ ‘mother land,’ ‘mother country’ 
and so on. This is true to the Zimbabwean case, but it is also vital to note that 
patriarchy is in control of this feminized land. In the Zimbabwean case, in the post-
2000, Joshua Nkomo is posthumously named ‘Father of the nation’ and Muzenda 
‘Soul of the nation.’ It is Nehanda, a female figure though, who represents land. 
Vera’s overtones make sense in the post-2000 Zimbabwe. The term jambanja, which 
means violent force, has been used as the process of land occupation. With the land 
imaged as female, this visualizes the ‘raping’ of the land in a ‘game’ of power. This 
phenomenal approach by Vera therefore, confronts nationalists narratives that locate 
Zimbabweans on the same space when discussing the benefits of the liberation 
struggle and the relationships that people have with land. To those who have been 
pawns in the struggle, the land discourse as a performance of reform and national 
control leaves them as outsiders and victims. This denial of citizenship and belonging 
has led to contested stories of origin and contested narratives of land and its 
significance. Thus, post-2000 Zimbabwe is characterized by problematized narratives 
and performances of struggle in the making of the Zimbabwean nation. 
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CHAPTER 4: NARRATIVES AND PERFORMANCES OF STRUGGLE IN 
THE ZIMBABWEAN NATION 
Struggle and Space 
The post-2000 era has been phenomenal with regards to the various ways in which 
subjects are inscribed in Zimbabwe’s stories of origin, the politics of land and how 
this has allowed them to make or be given claims to citizenship and belonging. 
However, this inscription has often been possible only within the discourses or 
narratives of struggle in terms of particular connotations of chimurenga. The 
contested origins of the Zimbabwean nation have given rise to competing narratives 
and performances of struggle. 
 
Innumerable narratives of struggle have emerged as individuals and groups seek to 
position themselves and others in Zimbabwe’s socio-political and cultural life. From 
time to time, these narratives and performances of struggle have been contested and 
recycled so as to answer to contingent calls for gendered, ethnic class or other forms 
of belonging. In this chapter, I deal not only with a single, uniform, unitary or 
complete narrative and performance of struggle. Instead, I deal with multiple-
narratives and performances of struggles that continuously fragment and coalesce as 
enabled by situations and strategies.  
 
The Dead, Burials, Bones and Retrievals 
In Southern Africa in general, struggle histories and discourses on ancestors, graves, 
dead bodies, blood, bones, burials, shrines and the territorial space/land/soil offer 
profound sites for the imaginations of the nation. 
97
  In South Africa, for example, the 
remains of figures such as Sarah Baartman, have been brought back to the South 
African soil after years of dislocation and have garnered considerable national and 
international significance (Clifton Crais & Pamela Scully, 2009; Zola Maseko, 2003). 
Baartman was a Khoisan woman who was taken from South Africa and displayed as 
‘the Hottentot Venus’ in England and posthumously made an object of science in 
laboratories as well as a museum object (Crais & Scully, 2009; Scully & Crais, 2008). 
                                                          
97
 See works such as, Heike Becker (2011), Kizito Muchemwa (2010), Joost Fontein (2010, 2009), 
Clifton Crais & Pamela Scully (2009) and Sabine Marschall (2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
Today, Sarah Baartman has become symbolic in various struggles nationally and 
internationally. 
 
Baartman has taken on a gender/sexual, national, Pan African, cultural, racial and 
human rights centered identity. This is regardless of the fact that in her life, she 
belonged to a specific collectivity, came from a specific region and had not previously 
been imagined in terms of the identities she is currently associated with. She has been 
claimed by different groups who have named themselves differently, for example, 
‘colored,’ Khoisan, feminists, women, blacks, South Africans and has been invoked 
in the legal fraternity with regards to issues of democracy and identity, ethnicity, 
citizenship and a whole corpus of human rights (Crais & Scully, 2009). Although she 
or her contemporaries probably had no imaginations in relation to the ‘political,’ after 
her death and ‘discovery,’ she has been thrust into national, regional and international 
political spaces in a manner that registers her strong presence in the political, not only 
in her after life, but even during her life time. One can argue that her current identity 
is tailor-made to fit into some of the current stories of the South African nation, 
Africa and the international world. In this way, therefore, the writing of her past, and 
the reclamation of her remains has served the needs of the present. 
 
Similar examples of the ‘politics of return’ or the repatriation or burial of symbolic 
national ‘subjects’ include the return of cultural-spiritual and personified artefacts like 
the Vigango in Kenya (Monica Udvardy & Linda Giles, 2007; Monica Udvardy, 
Linda Giles & John Mitsanze, 2003). Another example is the return of the lower part 
of one of the Great Zimbabwe soapstone bird carvings in Zimbabwe 
98
 (Edward 
Matenga, 2011; Dawson Munjeri, 2009; William Dewey, 2006; Ezra Chitando, 2005). 
These ‘returns’ have been catapulted to national significance. As these examples 
reveal, the dislocation of venerated artefacts and or persons is equated to the 
dislocation of African people from their resources such as land. As such, the artefacts 
and remains of people are personified and given life during the whole process that 
takes them back to the land of ‘origin.’ 
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The bones and the cultural symbols, their return to the geographical spaces of ‘origin,’ 
their burials or preservation and the grandiose events associated with their travel to 
spaces of origin deserve attention. The whole ‘episode’ should not be narrowed to an 
‘act’ of giving decent burials and humanizing the formerly dehumanized or preserving 
mere artefacts. Instead, this should be seen as pervaded by multiple and complex 
discourses around the nation. These include discourses of origin, identity formations 
and reformations and imaginations of nations. As such, they should be looked at in 
the context of a people’s histories, presences and futures. In studies centring on 
Namibia, Heike Becker (2011) shows how master narratives, through the 
visualization and iconography of the Heroes Acre, locate Namibian nationhood in the 
struggle history that privileges the revolutionary movement South-West Africa 
People’s Organization (SWAPO). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Zimbabwe, the National Heroes Acre 
99
 has also been extravagantly used as a 
performance of Zimbabwean nationalism. Since 2000, the National Heroes Acre has 
featured in a number of televised productions and songs, in addition to the numerous 
references to it that have been made. In Mbare Chimurenga Choir songs, the national 
shrine features in almost all the songs. It is essential here, to reflect more on the 
Zimbabwean National Heroes Acre as a struggle narrative and a site where the dead 
find symbolic expressions. Since the ideology of nationalism was, by and large, used 
to topple colonialism and bring independence, the National Heroes Acre as well as 
those buried there has been turned into symbols of Zimbabwean nationalism. 
Following this, Zimbabwean nationalism is defined in terms of ‘self-determination’ 
and freedom from ‘colonial influence.’ 
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Image 6: Part of Soapstone bird curving returned from Germany 
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The burial of a national hero/ine is turned into a major national event. On this day, the 
national flag is lowered, the day is declared a public holiday and citizens are given 
free transport and encouraged to attend. The funerals are also given an exclusive 
coverage especially by the ZBC, the national broadcaster and The Herald, a state 
newspaper. In addition to this, the dead body is taken to different locations of 
symbolic significance before it is finally taken to the National Heroes Acre. More 
often than not, President Mugabe gives a speech exalting the hero/ine and situating 
him/her in a struggle narrative that responds to and appeases prevailing ZANU-PF 
themes and strategies. For example, the death of Joshua Nkomo has focused much on 
the theme of unity and commitment to the struggle. This relates well to ZANU-PF’s 
identification of the MDC as divisive, a traitor party and an antithesis of Nkomo’s 
legacy. Border Gezi’s death at the peak of the ‘Third Chimurenga’ has been made 
useful in showing how resistance is a continuous process since Gezi, who did not 
participate in the Second Chimurenga represents the ‘post-independence’ struggles. 
Chenjerai Hunzvi’s death has been largely used to speak to the land issue. 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the surface, texts about the death and burials of national hero/ines seem to be an 
acknowledgement of certain individuals’ contributions to and definition of 
chimurenga. At a deeper level, however, they are actually used to ‘perform’ the 
relationship between the subjects of the state and the nation-state. For example, the 
increasing number of heroines at the National Heroes Acre from the year 2000 
coincides with the state’s lectures on loyalty, commitment and sacrifice. To ‘act out’ 
such discourses, the spouses or wives of high profile nationalists have been providing 
the available fit. One can think of the presentation of Johanna Nkomo, the wife of 
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Image 7: National Heroes Acre (Zimbabwe) 
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Joshua Nkomo, the late Zimbabwe’s Vice-President. Johanna Nkomo’s marriage to 
Joshua Nkomo is taken as symmetrical to the relationship between an individual and 
the nation. The nation is seen as a living body that enters into marital relationships 
and obviously desires qualities such as commitment, chastity, obedience and sacrifice 
(Michel Foucault’s discipline and self-surveillance), without which the marital 
relationship becomes strained or collapses. When Mugabe refers so much to qualities 
displayed by Johanna Nkomo and other heroines in their marriages, inter-alia, 
commitment, sacrifice, loyalty, resilience, quietness and dignity, he means much more 
than this. The issue goes beyond individuals or personal marital relationships to 
become the micro of the macrocosm. The bigger picture here is how individuals and 
groups are ‘hailed’ and should commit themselves to the fundamental ideals of 
chimurenga and live within them without any blemish, especially in the post-2000 
period where those who oppose ZANU-PF are seen as traitors. 
 
In Zimbabwe, the deaths and burials of hero/ines are texts written into ‘national 
history,’ current themes and the future of the nation. They are texts ‘performing’ state 
politics of the day. A funeral is turned into and rehearses a grand narration of 
Zimbabwe’s origins and nationhood because in addition to the eulogy, the ‘patriotic 
history’ of the nation is retold. The funerals collapse time, space and memory and 
bring Zimbabwe’s past into a narrated present and future. Zimbabwean nationhood is 
perceived and imprinted in a past struggle, with present and future struggles being 
interconnected. In this way, the First, Second and Third Chimurenga feed into and 
become continuous with one another. This constructs an image of a struggle-nation 
that is triumphant because it gains victory against otherness and outside forces 
through the spiritedness and perseverance of its nature. The National Heroes Acre and 
those buried on the site therefore, have been turned into cultural texts that are 
products of, as well as producers of Zimbabwean nationalism. This is why, during the 
period from when a hero or heroine dies till burial and thereafter, the nation is usually 
taken back to the contributions not only of the fallen hero/ine, but to all the 
Zimbabwean hero/ines and the liberation struggle in general. In addition, the 11
th
 of 
August has been set aside to commemorate and appreciate Zimbabwe’s fallen 
hero/ines. The death and burial of an individual hero/ine therefore, is always an 
evocation and commemoration and ritual appreciation and celebration of all hero/ines. 
Congruently, it is a celebration, an enactment and a commemoration of a particular 
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kind of Zimbabwean story of origin, the build-up to the moment of its birth following 
decolonization. It also marks an association with the land which guarantees 
citizenship and belonging. 
 
Added to the above, a considerable amount of anthropological work exists on the 
nationalization of and contestations over dead bodies in Southern Africa. This 
includes Becker (2011), Ian Fairweather (2001), Sabine Marschall (2008), Richard 
Werbner (1998), Terence Ranger (2009), Fontein (2010, 2009). Anthropologists 
contend that a commemorated dead body has much more power and influence than a 
dead corpse since it is a material symbol of history with a capacity to re-order the 
world of meaning and establish cosmic order (Tabona Shoko, 2006). Katherine 
Verdery (1990) postulates that dead bodies have certain properties that make them 
symbols and since they are not verbal, words can be put into their mouths or what 
they would have said prior to death may either be misinterpreted or interpreted out of 
context. 
 
Notably, contestations over dead bodies are rife in Zimbabwe. These include dead 
bodies of the First Chimurenga and Second Chimurenga as well as the dead bodies of 
specific figures who have died in the post-independence era. It is significant that the 
value accorded to the dead body in Zimbabwean culture rests largely on the belief that 
the dead body can influence, define and interpret the living and their world as well as 
direct their future. 
 
What is obvious here is that the meanings of dead bodies are complex and fluid. The 
meanings depend on the prevailing politics and therefore are subject to power-
politics. It is not surprising that Verdery points out that in politics, what gives a dead 
body effectiveness is ambiguity. This is because as possible political symbols, they 
are spaces of very diverse and contradictory meanings. For example, in Zimbabwe, 
after his death, Joshua Nkomo’s body has been turned into a symbolic site for 
struggles around national identity by different people. His post-humus presence in 
Zimbabwe’s body-politics has generated conflicting meanings among different 
people.  
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In Zimbabwe, especially from the start of the current century dead bodies that have 
been elevated as heroes are taken as texts defining Zimbabwe’s origin in struggle and 
its ‘centeredness’ on land. In a number of nationalist narratives, for example in those 
conveyed during funerals and national functions as well as in songs, liberation war 
heroes are referred to. As such, the said aspirations and messages of the dead have a 
considerable impact on the thoughts and actions of the living. Dani Nabudere (n.d) 
101
 
brings in the concept of transformative ubuntu (humanness) where African 
philosophy organizes life from birth, the living and the living dead narration and the 
relationship between the stages. The living dead are both feared and respected. This 
makes them a formidable instrument for mobilization. When for instance, there is 
mentioning of the bones of ancestors, the dead bodies, national shrines, and when 
there is live coverage of exhumations and re/burials of dead bodies, something else is 
taking place. Issues of morality, suffering, blame and justice arise but interwoven with 
that, some discourses of power and authority are being un/written. At certain times, 
burials, dead bodies, bones, blood and shrines have been directly and indirectly used 
to inculcate a common history, a national consciousness, a national identity and a kind 
of uniqueness that calls for some form of sovereignty. 
 
At the same time, they create fissures and shake the very foundations of nationalist 
sentiments. As studies have shown, 
102
 certain dead bodies and the burial, 
heritagization and memorization of particular dead bodies build into certain narratives 
of the nation which tally with particular spaces and times. The narration of all this 
transcends individual lives to the narration of the story of a group. The bones that 
were disinterred in Chibondo/Monkey William Mine, Shamva in the Mt Darwin 
district of Zimbabwe 
103
 in early March 2011 reflects how ZANU-PF has tried to fit in 
dead bodies into its own political agenda. Nevertheless, this also carried subversive 
messages as the way the bones were treated differed from earlier human methods that 
had been used in other cases as well as from international protocols.  
 
In early March 2011, the ZBC-TV reported the exhumations of hundreds of bodies 
from a site in Chibondo Mine and claimed the bodies were those of people killed by 
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Rhodesian forces during the country’s war of independence. The country’s sole 
broadcaster, in news bulletins and repeated interruptions to regular programs, 
persuaded ordinary citizens to visit the site to observe colonial atrocities. School 
children were also bussed to the mine. Exhumations were initially carried out by 
members of the Fallen Heroes Trust, a group linked to ZANU-PF, before government 
officials took over. During the exhumations, militants sang chimurenga songs, 
shouted ZANU-PF slogans and denounced whites and the then Prime Minister and 
leader of the MDC party, Morgan Tsvangirai. This connected the occasion to the 
prevailing politics of the country. The association of Tsvangirai with both the ‘whites’ 
and the emotional ‘spectacle’ of bones is very compelling. This overtone turns 
Tsvangirai into an ‘object’ of hate through the mobilization of ‘whiteness’ as a source 
of ‘national’ pain. Morgan Tsvangirai’s ‘invasion’ into Zimbabwean politics is 
conceptualized as symbolic of the ‘penetration’ of the national body. The 
consequence of the ‘invasion’ is national ‘death’ as signified by the ‘drama’ of the 
Chobondo bones. 
104
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 See Ahmed (2004) for a discussion on the role of emotions in the creation of collective bodies.  
 
 
Image 8: Chibondo/Monkey William Mine Bones 
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Saviour Kasukuwere, the then Minister of Black Empowerment announced that no 
forensic tests and DNA analysis of the remains would be done and instead, rituals 
would be carried out by traditional African religious figures. In line with 
Kasukuwere’s utterances, it is essential to think of the implications of a shift from the 
‘rationality’ of DNA analysis to the ‘irrational’ traditional African rituals in this 
narrative of bones. However, Morgan Tsvangirai criticized the exhumations for 
bringing hatred during a time of national healing and bringing sad memories to those 
people who had lost relatives during the Gukurahundi massacres and political 
violence since independence. 
105
 
 
There were some claims that some of the bones could have been buried there after 
independence in the 1980s. These claims have been supported by the likes of Maryna 
Steyn, a forensic anthropologist at the University of Pretoria, South Africa, who 
argues that human remains should not retain a strong stench after 30 years. 
106
 Steve 
Naidoo, a pathologist at South Africa’s University of KwaZulu-Natal adds, “Bearing 
in mind that the bodies are exposed to an open environment, albeit in a mine shaft, 
scavengers can access them quite easily. In 30 years, one would expect complete and 
advanced skeletonization.” 107 However, Shari Eppel an expert in exhumations, 
explains that the presence of soft tissues “is not necessarily an indicator that these 
bones entered the grave more recently, although it could be” because when bodies are 
piled on top of each other in large numbers, the process of mummification can occur 
and mummified flesh is alike rotting soft tissues on a recent dead body, showing the 
need for experts to do the exhumations. 
108
 
 
While this could be used as campaign material by both ZANU-PF and opposition 
parties, experts have pointed to how exhumations done by unskilled people and for 
the wrong reasons, defy the rights of the dead. Such exhumations destroy the 
necessary information contained in the bodies, leaving a lot of questions unanswered. 
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 This brings subversions to the state and ZANU-PF centric version of suffering that is linked to the 
grand liberation war against the colonial regime. There is a move towards marginalized forms of 
suffering that are part of the neglected narratives of the nation. 
106 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1372034/Zimbabwes-killing-fields-Mass-grave-600-
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Shari Eppel argues “What is happening ... is a travesty. Bones speak quietly and in a 
language only an expert can hear. Let’s not silence them forever, but bring them the 
help they need to be heard.” 109 The court order by the ZIPRA Trust, which was 
granted by Judge Nicholas Mathonsi, finally stopped the exhumations as it pointed 
out that they violated all international protocols on investigating suspected human 
rights violations and was therefore an interference with crime scenes. 
110
 This has 
been supported by Michelle Kagari, Amnesty International’s deputy director for 
Africa who points out, “This is a crime scene and exhumations require professional 
forensic expertise to enable adequate identification, determination of cause of death 
and criminal investigations.” 111 The Chibondo case, therefore, reflects how the dead 
can be referred to in the ‘performance’ of nationalism and the inherent contradictions 
and messages that arise out of their use. 
 
The literal ‘mining’ and re/covering of the Chibondo bones exemplifies a charged 
‘spectacle’ of Zimbabwean nation construction. It demonstrates the ‘mining’ of 
particular ‘past’ stories to shape ‘present’ stories as the hi/story of the bones has been 
linked to hi/stories of colonial dispossession and brutality by ZANU-PF and to 
ZANU-PF brutality by the MDC. For ZANU-PF, re/covering the bones marks a point 
of national recovery, which associate well with its current theme of land repossession. 
The fact that the bones have been found in a mine, both a ‘spectacle’ of Western 
extraction and exploitation of black bodies also build into ZANU-PF’s prevailing 
anti-West discourses and struggle over citizenship and belonging. 
 
However, Chenjerai Hove’s Bones (1988) describes a subversive national 
consciousness around bones, one that complicates the war of liberation and its gains. 
The experiences of war, dispossession and oppression of ‘subject’ classes take a 
bottom-up narrative form as reflected by Marita, a poor village woman and farm 
worker who has experienced many loses because of the liberation war. As such, the 
‘pasts’ and the intertwined struggles do not simply romanticize the grand liberation 
war, but question its achievements from the point of view of the ‘ordinary’ people. 
This leads to a deeper interrogation of the war and key events in a way that produces 
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multiple and diverse narratives from the often glorified linear and ‘complete’ 
trajectory favored by ‘nationalist’ narratives. 
 
Zimbabwe’s signified dead bodies and retrieved bones are buried at national 
monuments in a spectacular style that ‘scripts’ and ‘performs’ Zimbabwean 
nationhood. The monuments are rendered into visible physical hi/stories of the 
valorized dead bodies. In this regard, there is reason to assert that monuments play an 
important role that shows the indebtedness of the people to the spirits (Paul Gough, 
2000). They serve as a spiritual link with the fallen heroes. However, in the case of 
Zimbabwe, the shrines have been tainted by controversy. As some groups argue, a 
number of people who have been buried at the National Heroes Acre are not worth it 
and cannot stand as icons of Zimbabwean nationalism. 
112
 One may argue that the 
presence of certain figures is reflective of the forceful, militaristic, masculinist and 
dichotomized identity of Zimbabwean nationalism. However, the state, through its 
invention of the Third Chimurenga (the third war), locates them in the context of its 
specific war heroes, the Third Chimurenga heroes (who had to continue the struggle 
from where the Second Chimurenga had left). The state blesses the Third Chimurenga 
heroes as vana vevhu (true sons and daughters of the soil) with Zimbabwean/African 
indigeneity, who defend territorial sovereignty and struggle for indigenization. 
 
Still, others argue that some people deserving burial at the shrines, such as 
Ndabaningi Sithole 
113
 have been sidelined. The state, however, argues that the likes 
of Ndabalingi Sithole did not struggle to the end, but turned sell-outs and so do not 
deserve any honor. This reflects that Morgan Tsvagirai’s identity as a sell-out has a 
long genealogy that includes Ndabaningi Sithole. Also, some prominent people have 
publicly or through relatives, made clear disinterestedness to burial at the shrines. In a 
number of cases, the state has either fought with or persuaded relatives over bodies 
accorded space at the shrines. 
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 Examples which can be given are Chenjerai Hunzvi, Border Gezi, Sabina Mugabe and Elliot 
Manyika, who have been accused of mobilizing terror groups to attack those opposed to the state and 
ZANU-PF. 
113
 Ndabaningi Sithole was one of the leading figures of Zimbabwean nationalism who has been denied 
the hero status by Robert Mugabe’s government after being labelled a sell-out. 
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In the context of the above cases, the monuments, dead bodies and burials become 
contested spaces that offer multiple meanings. Theories of resistance challenge 
theories of reproduction for supposing that meaning is always singular and consensus 
and instead, reflect on complex processes that are behind and involved in meaning 
making and therefore, refuting the singleness and fixity of meaning. Problematized 
here is the extent to which discourses of sacrifice and heroism ‘perform’ Zimbabwe’s 
struggles. 
 
Heroes, Performativity and Chimurenga   
Zimbabwe’s state-driven narratives of the nation make frequent reference to patriotic 
ancestors of the First Chimurenga, who sacrificed themselves and faced death in 
defense of land and people. The narratives also make reference to patriotic Second 
Chimurenga heroes, who have shed their blood for the nation. The figures of 
Nehanda, Chaminuka and Kaguvi, who were active in the First Chimurenga, feature 
prominently in nationalist discourses and have become very central in the 
construction of the Zimbabwean nation. They have been made a template on which 
the Second Chimurenga has been crafted. The popular narratives around these figures 
have also generated ideological, psychological, physical and material resources for 
earlier, current and future struggle narratives in Zimbabwe. Their recognition 
chronicles a patriotic element and a spiritual realm that is central to Zimbabwean 
nationalist history, and this often plays both political and psycho-social roles for 
citizens who are encouraged to emulate them. 
 
Also central to the imagining of the nation in Zimbabwe, are heroes and heroines of 
the Second Chimurenga who are laid to rest at district, provincial or national shrines, 
depending on their accorded status (Dorothy Goredema & Percyslage Chigora, 2009). 
Many African states, emerging from a protracted struggle against colonialism, have 
built shrines in honour of those who participated in the liberation struggles. In 
Zimbabwe, shrines have been constructed at the district, provincial and national level. 
 
The National Heroes Acre is where those conferred with the highest honour and 
named national heroes/heroines are laid to rest. Mandima clarifies, “National heroes 
or heroines are those that led the national liberation struggle” (Goredema & Chigora, 
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2009:77). The hero status is determined on a case by case basis, which perhaps 
reflects inconsistency in the criteria employed. However in the article “President 
Mugabe clarifies hero status” (The Herald 1 October, 2010) Mugabe makes it clear 
that the National Heroes Acre is a preserve for those who fought the liberation 
struggle. However, credentials of being a combatant have not been used as a 
consistent criterion since a number of well-known liberation war fighters have been 
excluded. When he was still in ZANU-PF, Didymus Mutasa claimed that this is 
because they lacked consistency as reflected by their desertion of ZANU-PF and 
joining other parties (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, n.d). 
114
 This questions the distinction 
between ZANU-PF and the state, and also illustrates the blatant fictionalization of the 
process of hero construction. What is clear is that the conferring of hero status hinges 
on whether ‘heroes’ remain loyal to ZANU-PF and Mugabe in particular. 
 
As significant as the question of which heroes are included in the National Heroes’ 
Acre, is the symbolism associated with its placement and architecture. 
115
 The 
national monument stands on 57-acres (230,000 m2) of land and is situated on a hill. 
An aerial view of the monument reflects a design akin an AK-47 rifle which is split in 
two along its length from the barrel to the butt. This is the rifle which was very 
popular with the liberation fighters. The terraces which people sit on resemble the butt 
of the gun. The murals resemble the handle and the terraced graves resemble the 
magazine. The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier stands for the trigger, while the steps to 
the tower are the nozzle barrel and the tower pictures the bayonet or the knife. The 
visuality of the National Heroes’ Acre manifests as symbolic of resistance against 
colonialism and ‘undisputed’ heroism. A look at the National Heroes’ Acre visualizes 
loyalty, sacrifice, struggle, suffering, death and victory. However, it is also a strong 
public ‘spectacle’ of a national identity constructed on militarized masculinities. This 
‘sensual’ experience feeds into certain knowledge/s that may hinder a dialogic 
exchange between the shrine, its audience and context in favour of a tabula rasa kind 
of knowledge transfer where the gaze is one that aligns with the dominant narrative. 
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Such a vastly militaristic architecture mirrors the significance of struggle in 
Zimbabwean nationalism and may also be read as emblematic of the militaristic state-
craft characterizing Zimbabwean nationalism. Heroism is reduced to militaristic 
prowess that is overtly masculinized and combative, signifying how militancy is 
inscribed on Zimbabwean nationhood. There is a way in which visualizing the shrine 
invites symbolic actions of respect and loyalty to the status quo. The materiality of the 
National Heroes Acre enables a transportation of subjects to a world of struggle and 
sacrifice, hence partaking in the burial ceremonies induces affective feelings. 
 
On the day of burial, the national flag is lowered. Late heroes are frequently referred 
to as symbols of nationalism and are commemorated annually on Heroes Day. Here, 
patriotic history and the memorization of the struggle become useful everyday 
instruments for the creation of knowledgeable national subjects. Fontein (2010, 2009) 
argues how state burials and the memorialization and heritagization of heroes are 
texts that narrate the nation. The same is echoed by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (n.d) who 
reflects, as said earlier, how Joshua Nkomo, Zimbabwe’s former Vice President was 
posthumously constructed as the father of Zimbabwean nationalism even though in 
the 1980s, he had been named father of dissidents. This is reflective of the shaky and 
negotiated processes of hero, victim, villain discourses. 
 
Posthumously, Muzenda, who had been the country’s second Vice President, has been 
constructed as the soul of the nation. It is important to note that the ‘soul’ represents 
something inner and distinctive and therefore is a place where nationalism claims 
superiority and autonomy to ‘others’ (Partha Chatterjee, 1993). Thus, a turn to figures 
like Muzenda is a ‘performance’ of Zimbabwe’s imagined inner identity where its 
autonomy and sovereignty is located. This is to say without the soul, without figures 
like Muzenda, the nation cannot survive. The nation is therefore imagined as alive 
through certain figures. I find it interesting that numerous jokes in Zimbabwe have 
caricatured Muzenda as far off from Western ‘civilization.’ Ironically, this presents 
him as a ‘pure past’ that is uncontaminated by some threatening ‘poison.’ This is 
further buttressed by his association with Nehanda, Zimbabwe’s valorized spirit 
medium through his popular narration of Solomon Mutsvairo’s poem centering on 
Nehanda.  
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Both the First and Second Chimurenga figures have featured in artistic compositions 
such as songs, poems, plays and novels (Chitando, 2005). To provide some kind of 
continuity to heroism, there is an invention of the Third Chimurenga heroes such as 
Chenjerai Hunzvi and Border Gezi who were accorded national hero statuses. Robert 
Mugabe (2001) talks of the militant nature of the Third Chimurenga heroes as 
enabling national reform and control and reflects on the centrality of resource 
re/possession. The land becomes one of the most physical, economical, psychological 
and spiritual resource which has to be re/possessed. 
 
The physical and sensual presence of origin stories and struggles over land can 
inculcate forms of consciousness that very powerfully position subjects in national 
imaginations. It is in this sense that history and culture are instrumentalized in the 
shaping of consciousness. The depiction of Joshua Nkomo as ‘Father Zimbabwe’ 
situates the origin of Zimbabwe in the struggle narratives, where Nkomo is said to 
have been instrumental and a leading figure in the Second Chimurenga revolt against 
the colonial regime in the 1960s. From the start of the 21
st
 century, some years after 
Nkomo’s death, Zimbabwe has been commemorating his life in what became known 
as the Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo Gala or simply the Umdala Wethu Gala. This gala has 
been meant to mirror a nation unified by struggles against colonialism and 
imperialism. However, in other cases, a retrogressive consciousness is set as a result 
of these performances of rememberance. For example attempts to honor Joshua 
Nkomo and marking him as an icon of the nation, by putting his statue for public 
visualization at Karigamombe center in Harare were resisted. 
116
 
 
Having Nkomo’s statue at Karigamombe can be ‘dramatizing’ that Nkomo as the 
Matabeleland ‘bull’ 117 had been subdued by Mugabe’s army. Considering the 
patriarchal underpinnings of Zimbabwean culture, kuriga mombe which entails the 
removal of one’s manhood to ensure loyalty is catastrophic to the masculinized 
identity of a collective whose leader has been ‘emasculated.’ Arising here are multiple 
readings of this act of honor which may include honoring him as a national symbol, 
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 Resistances were associated with the link that the Karigamombe Centre has to the Gukurahundi 
massacres that occurred in Zimbabwe’s Matabeleland and Midlands provinces in the 1980s. The 
military strategies were done at Karigamombe centre. See http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-2940-
Anger+rises+over+Nkomo+statue/news.aspx.  
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 A bull was the ZAPU party symbol, see image 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
111 
 
using him to preserve the unity accord and undermining him politically. Again, the 
redeeming invention of ZAPU leaders as heroes from their villain status of the early 
1980s reflects the slippage of both heroism and nationalism. For example, Joshua 
Nkomo has moved from the identity of ‘Father of dissidents’ requiring purging from 
the land hence the jingles such as Huya uone zvaita Nkomo, warembera 
pamuchinjikwa [Come and witness what has happened to Nkomo, he is hanging on 
the cross], 
118
 to being ‘Father Zimbabwe’ requiring great national honor and 
deserving a yearly commemoration gala. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Realizing the disillusionment of the post-colonial Zimbabwean era, a current struggle, 
which has a link with the struggles in the past focuses on Ndebele particularities. 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (n.d.) attributes such resentments to the formation of some Ndebele 
pressure groups and political parties like Vukani Mahlabezulu, Imbovane 
Yamahlabezulu, ZAPU 2000, Mthwakazi Action Group on Genocide and Ethnic 
Cleansing in Matabeleland and Midlands and Mthwakazi People’s Congress (MPC), 
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 See Image 10 [A screen shot from Panorama BBC Video on Gukurahundi].  
 
Image 10: Anti-Joshua Nkomo Poster 
 
Image 9: ZAPU Party Symbol 
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the Matebeleland Liberation Front (MLF), and the Dumiso Dabengwa led ZAPU. 
These formations undermine the construction of a nationalism based on a pro-Shona 
national inclusiveness.  
 
An example of a dispersed oppositional group beyond Zimbabwe is the MPC which 
has utilized its diasporan base to evade censorship in Zimbabwe. Based in the United 
Kingdom, the group has established an imagined-independent United Mthwakazi 
Republic (UMR), complete with its own national flag, 
119
 radio station and other 
ceremonial symbols to contest the Zimbabwean state’s construction of nation 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, n.d). Interestingly, the flag has black, white, blue and red colors as 
well as a shield, spear and knobkerrie. The black color represents all black people and 
hence inclusiveness and hybridity which stands contrary to the Zimbabwean state’s 
formation which is inward-looking and based on separateness. In this mixture, 
authority, fairness, equality and justice are valued. The white color tells the 
integration of white people and therefore racial inclusiveness and humanity. This 
contradicts the dominant nationalist narrative where ‘whites’ are non-belonging and 
Zimbabwe is constructed as a ‘black’ nation. The blue color which resembles the sky 
reflects peace, life and stability. The red color is symbolic of sacrifices made and lives 
lost not only during struggles against colonial oppression, but also during Mugabe’s 
oppressive government. Thus, the construction of nation is not based only on 
discourses of colonialism but all forms of oppression and injustice. The shield stands 
for defense, hence reflecting not a struggle for existence, but a struggle for the 
survival of an established nation. Lastly, the spear and knobkerrie narrates the extra-
ordinary militancy of the Ndebele army, especially in the context that they fought 
equally well against those with advanced weaponry. The symbolism attempts 
diversity and integration rather than the singleness and inward focus of ZANU-PF. 
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Image 11: The Mthwakazi People’s Congress (MPC) Flag 
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Some sections in Matebeleland have re-conceptualized the identities of the so called 
dissidents of the 1980s, such as Gwasela and Gaigusvu. In the midst of direct and 
indirect exclusions, these figures have been re-invented, based on the current lived 
experiences and are now seen as heroic figures. They are now conceptualized as 
continuous with the struggle against Matabeleland domination by any other people, 
including the Mugabe-led government. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (n.d.) notes how in 2009, 
Ibhetshu LikaZulu, a Matabeleland based organization, attempted celebrations of the 
controversial figures, Gwasela and Gayigusvu as regional heroes during the National 
Heroes Holidays. This destabilizes the Zimbabwean state’s ‘formal’ heroes, heroic 
monuments and heroic stories. 
 
The performative form and impact of alternative bottom-up narratives of chimurenga 
is also evident in contestations with the ruling party from 2000. From this time, 
ZANU-PF conflicted with relatives of some deceased figures over bodies that the 
state wanted buried at national shrines, with the relatives saying that they had 
received instructions from the deceased rejecting burial at the shrines. Since people’s 
last words are respected and taken to be mediated by ancestral spirits, refusals to 
burial at the national shrines offer alternative voices to the meaning of national 
shrines and heroism. This caricatures dominant nationalist figures like Robert Mugabe 
who venerate national shrines. As discussed earlier, some well-known figures who 
contributed to the Second Chimurenga have openly announced that they do not want 
to be buried at any of the national shrines when they die. Another interesting way in 
which dominant narratives of heroism have been destabilized is when certain groups 
of people declare their own dead members real heroes worth remembering while 
castigating the national shrines as full of murderers and thieves. 
 
The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) has offered its own heroes. Sam 
Wilkins (2012) explores the heroism of Tonderai Ndira among the MDC youths to 
make an interesting analysis of how heroism is imagined differently even among 
people regarding the same person as a hero. In his analysis, the features making Ndira 
a hero are situated within individual life experiences and struggles, personalities and 
philosophies of those who project him as a hero. During his funeral and during the 
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local narrations of his stories, Ndira is unequivocally an MDC hero, 
120
 but what 
makes him one is contestable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This shows the complex way in which people receive the hero status and reflects that 
people do not just accept dominant meanings that make no sense in their lives. 
Tonderai Ndira’s funeral is turned into a ‘spectacle’ of heroism that destabilizes the 
dominant one associated with the national shrines. As the image below reflects, Ndira 
is a Zimbabwean hero.  Ndira’s funeral invites the audience’s gaze to turn away from 
grand sites such as the National Heroes Acre where those with ‘big’ names are buried, 
to simple grave-yards where the ordinary people are laid to rest. Also important is a 
location of heroism that goes beyond the liberation struggle to the everyday struggles 
of people.  
 
Popular repudiations of state-driven representations and performances of heroism are 
reflected in the popular mockery of Gideon Gono, the former Zimbabwe Reserve 
Bank Governor (RBZ)’s intervention measure to fight inflation in Zimbabwe. As part 
of RBZ’s 2006 intervention to curb hyperinflation, which then was at over 1000%, 
Gono popularized the ‘Zero to Hero’ advertising campaign. The ‘Zero to Hero’ 
campaign accompanied ‘Operation Sunrise’ 121 which was established to restore the 
value of the Zimbabwean currency and therefore ‘empower’ it. This project led to the 
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 See Image 12 [A screen shot taken from documentary, State sponsored violence against MDC 
Members.  
121
 See Image 13. 
 
Image 12: Tonderai Ndira: A Zimbabwean Hero 
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removal of three zeros from the Zimbabwean dollar denominations. Visualized in this 
case was the Zimbabwean currency’s chimurenga against the ‘enemy’ propelled 
weakness. The fact that the new denominations were effected on the first of August is 
not accidental. In Zimbabwe, the month of August is generally regarded as the month 
of heroes since Heroes Day is on the 11
th
 of August. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above is an indication of how currency is a charged symbol and how in 
Zimbabwe, the control of currency is an expression of anti-imperialism. The initiative 
therefore, was not only related to the ‘masculinization’ or strengthening of the dollar, 
but was also a sensual appeal and effort to ‘restore’ the ‘value’ and superiority of 
national heroes and state narratives of nationalism in a situation pervaded by 
disillusionment. Restoring the value of money became an affective and insidious 
reorientation on the ‘value’ and masculinity of national heroes and Zimbabwe’s 
‘past.’ This was seen as urgent in a context where their relevance has been 
increasingly ‘threatened’ by the ‘scourge’ of colonial and imperial forces whose 
‘running dogs’ were seen in the MDC in general and Morgan Tsvangirai in particular. 
 
Following this simplistic measure against inflation and the erosion of the presumed 
Zimbabwean heroism, some people satirically called Gideon Gono Giden Gn, after 
removing the three Os (the likeness of zeroes) on his names. This iconoclastic humor 
(analogous to Bakhtin’s Rabelaisian laughter) 122 ‘visualizes’ how the ordinary people 
see the glaring irrationality, preposterousness and vulgarity of their ‘leadership.’ 
Ideally, this demystifies the leadership’s power and authority. The ordinary people 
make efforts to undress the government’s simplistic economic control measures 
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 See Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1994) Rabelais and his World. 
 
Image 13: ‘Zero to Hero’ Advert 
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which also parallel the lack of complexity in defining heroism and narratives of the 
nation. 
 
In addition to this satire, ‘From Zero to Hero’ may also mirror the ‘fictitious’ way 
some individuals have risen from nothing to become national icons just like how the 
weak Zimbabwean dollar ‘gained’ value. Names that would come to mind include 
Joseph Chinotimba, Chenjerai Hunzvi and Border Gezi, whose contributions or levels 
of contribution to the liberation struggle are controversial even within ZANU-PF. 
This mocks and destabilizes dominant and narrow meanings of struggle and heroism, 
especially if we consider how the RBZ’s initiative dismally failed to deal with 
inflation. Such a failure ‘dramatizes’ the ordinary people’s rejection of heroism as 
defined by dominant narratives. 
 
In some of their songs, musicians like Oliver Mtukudzi have lamented why the hero 
status is accorded after death. One may refer to Mtukudzi’s song ‘Andinzwi’ (I do not 
get it) 
123
 where he critiques the association of heroism with death and the war against 
colonialism. He mentions a multi-disciplinary artist, Safirio Madzikatire aka 
Mukadota, a singer, song writer and actor specializing in comedy as a national heroic 
figure. One may consider Oliver Mtukudzi himself as one who has created his own 
national heroic status through music. Mtukudzi’s lyrics in ‘Andinzwi’ as well as his 
usual rupturing of masculine authoritative figures characteristic of most of his songs 
and his own legacy as an international icon represent alternative heroism. 
 
Subversive and dissenting bottom-up heroism has also accrued around the 
philanthropist Jairos Jiri, whose representation diverts from the masculinist and 
militarist one associated with the Zimbabwean state. Thomas Mapfumo, in an 
interview with Moses Chikowero bemoans how he had been seen as a national hero 
when his songs tended to ‘support’ ZANU-PF ideology during the struggle against 
colonialism, but stripped of the status when his songs became critical of Mugabe and 
ZANU-PF. 
124
 In the interview, Mapfumo maintains he is still up to date with 
people’s struggles and that it is ZANU-PF that has diverted from people’s struggles. 
                                                          
123
 See Song 10, Appendix A. 
124
 http://www.afropop.org/6938/mhoze-chikowero-a-historians-take-on-thomas-mapfumo-and-robert-
mugabe/.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
117 
 
Linked to that, Hosiah Chipanga in the song ‘Baba Nkomo,’ (Father Nkomo) 125 has 
questioned the criteria for conferring hero status. He claims that some of the figures 
accorded the heroes’ status such as Joshua Nkomo, Herbert Chitepo, and Chief 
Tangwena had asked him why figures such as Ndabalingi Sithole, James Chikerema 
and Canaan Banana are not at the National Heroes Acre. It is interesting that 
Chipanga considers himself a prophet who sees what the authoritative state and 
ordinary people do not see. In a way, this undermines the limited ‘political’ 
constructions of heroism by the state. One is made to suspect that above all issues, 
ZANU-PF patronage is used to determine hero status and certain dead bodies are used 
to show what is acceptable while others are used to show what is unacceptable in 
thinking of national belonging and citizenship. 
 
Another example of how the heroic nature of national heroes is undressed is reflected 
in Petina Gappah’s short story, ‘At the Sound of the Last Post’ in Petina Gappah’s An 
Elegy for Easterly (2009) which mirrors how the burial of a national hero is simply a 
performance of the dominant meaning of nationalism rather than the life that he really 
lived. What is remembered about the deceased is a selected and ‘rehearsed’ material 
that fits into the dominant ‘script’ of heroism and constructions of nationalism. The 
meaning of struggle emerges as very narrow to bring completeness to his life. 
 
The declaration of the hero status in Zimbabwe therefore, has always been highly 
problematized (Goredema & Chigora, 2009; Werbner, 1998; Norma Kriger, 1995) in 
the public domain, in the sphere of popular culture through jokes and music. The 
above discussion reflects how heroes have been constructed around notions of 
chimurenga. Notions of chimurenga have however, greatly ‘acted’ and favoured a 
patriarchal ‘script’ to mark citizenship and belonging. 
 
‘Jenderized’ Performances of Citizenship and National Belonging 
Defensive, commandist, selective and militarized masculinities became the definer for 
amadoda sibili/varume chaivo-chaivo (real men) and only those men characterized as 
such could stand for the nation. After losing popular support in the first round of the 
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2008 elections and ahead of the June 2008 presidential run-off, Robert Mugabe 
expressed his unwillingness to leave office even if he were to lose. Addressing a rally 
in Silobela which is in the Midlands province, he argues, “We fought for this country 
and a lot of blood was shed. We are not going to give up our country because of a 
mere X. How can a ballpoint fight with a gun?” 126 The pen/democracy/ballot 
represents the feminine while the gun/war/struggle history represents the masculine 
that will not yield to the feminine. It is important to underline that war is 
exaggeratedly associated with the masculine as well as a demonstration of masculine 
power. This is a crucial element of the political as understood in Schmitt’s sense of 
the political being marked by the distinction between friend and enemy, life or death, 
whereas democracy is seen to lie outside the political (Charles Frye, 1966). In this 
sense, one understands the deep symbolism in reference to Tsvangirai as a coward, 
one who has run away from being trained to fight, as a tea boy, as a gay and as being 
prostituted by the West. It is clearly a way of emasculating and feminizing him and 
pointing out that his democracy discourses, which are outside the discourse of war 
and the political, will never lead him to head the Zimbabwean state. This is because 
the state’s interests can only be protected by masculine figures, the ones who are men 
enough (amadoda sibili). ‘True’ subjects of the nation therefore, tend to turn 
themselves to submissive and loyal citizens – they define themselves as weak and 
needing the guidance and blessings of the great leaders, they feminize themselves as 
reflected earlier by those who build personality cults around leaders. It is in this sense 
that Margaret Dongo 
127
 refers, pejoratively, to the spineless politicians in Zanu PF as 
Mugabe’s ‘wives,’ 128 indicating also Dongo’s own internalization of the patriarchal 
model. These become the influential models for particular kinds of national belonging 
and citizenship. 
 
Although Itai Muwati, Gift Mheta & Zifikile Gambahaya (2010) have argued that 
Mugabe’s amadoda sibili narrative refers to respectable and responsible males, it is 
crucial to problematize how respectability and responsibility is constituted in the post-
2000 period. I agree with Kudakwashe Manganga (2011) that according to ZANU-PF, 
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 http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2032314/posts.  
127
 Margaret Dongo is a war veteran, a former parliamentarian and current critic of Mugabe and 
ZANU-PF. In 1999 she was nearly beaten by Solomon Mujuru, the late former General of the 
Zimbabwe National Army during a parliamentary argument when she shouted ‘muri vakadzi 
vaMugabe’ (You are Mugabe’s wives) to the male members of parliament who were present.  
128
 http://allafrica.com/stories/199902190212.html. 
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in a new millennium Zimbabwe, male respectability and responsibility is enshrined in 
protecting ‘national interests’ by any means necessary and it would mean eliminating 
enemies. This makes sense in a situation where the nation has been feminized, and 
therefore needing masculine protection since it is under attack. It is crucial here to 
think of the amadoda sibili narrative as a redefinition of femininities and 
masculinities. After Tsvangirai got more votes than Mugabe in the 2008 elections one 
ZANU-PF youth who was leading a pro-Mugabe campaign team was assertive that 
Mugabe did not need the vote to govern Zimbabwe. He bulldozed into a bar where I 
was among some patrons and wielding a big Okapi knife declared “Mugabe panyanga 
zvejende!!” 129 The declaration, which borders on ‘jenderized’ politics (politics of the 
balls), meant use of violent masculinity to ensure Mugabe presidency. This kind of 
politics is reinforced through the techno-politics of ZANU-PF jingles such as ‘Tinoda 
kudeleta Machinja ose’ (We want to wipe off all MDC members). 130 The highly 
technical term ‘delete’ offers visual images of violent annihilation of people 
supporting the MDC as one can easily relate the act to how one gets rid of unwanted 
texts from the popular mobile cellphones. 
131
 
 
Pro-Mugabe narrations present him as the Zimbabwean jongwe, 
132
 which is always in 
control and whose position cannot be taken by any small chicken because of its 
‘maturity, experience and wisdom’ 133 as articulated in some of ZANU-PF’s 
campaign literature. This is why post-2000 ZANU-PF electoral campaigns have been 
demanding jongwe mudanga (Mugabe should remain in power). Zimbabwean 
nationalism is therefore premised on fowl-run politics where a single male dominates 
and crushes dissent and threats whenever that appears. In most rural households in 
Zimbabwe, the dominance of a single rooster is common. Usually, rural families keep 
a single mature rooster to avoid some vicious fighting for supremacy in a situation 
                                                          
129
 Panyanga literally means at the horns. In the Zimbabwean everyday language it means being at the 
top/helm and zvejende literally means using testicles but in the Zimbabwean everyday language it 
means use of brute and masculine force to demonstrate one’s manhood.   
130
 See Song 12, Appendix A, Watch https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1_mMYWsz_mE.  
131
 This is closely related to images of ‘flush them down,’ see Image 3. 
132
 Jongwe is a Shona name for a rooster chicken which was Mugabe’s and ZANU-PF’s political 
symbol before the current image of Great Zimbabwe. Although the rooster chicken was replaced by the 
magnificent Great Zimbabwe structures its politics strongly re-emerged after MDC supporters had 
suggested that an old and weak rooster should be killed and eaten to allow another one to succeed it 
and therefore, allowing the succession of roosters (succession of masculine leaders). Even the new 
official symbol, the Great Zimbabwe structures still visualize Zimbabwe as a Kingdom with 
magnificence and masculine power.  
133
 See Image 3. 
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where there are many roosters. Thus if such cases arise; power and dominance are 
earned through fighting and bullying. The other roosters are forced into silence if they 
do not match the dominant one. Their masculinity is erased and they are relegated to 
the status occupied by the rest of the fowls and they cannot mate with the females 
especially in the presence of the dominant rooster. What is figured here is the 
‘naturalization’ of Mugage’s power. However, African families do not keep a 
dominant rooster forever, but replace it when the time is convenient and therefore 
erasing notions of absolute power. 
 
Absolute power is also emptied by the Shona idiom, kubata jongwe muromo 
(Silencing the rooster/cock) which has been popular in MDC’s political discourses. 
The idiom means waking up very early even before the cock crows. By urging people 
to wake up early and register to vote as well as to vote during 2013 elections, the 
MDC, was also talking of silencing Mugabe, who in Zimbabwe’s political sphere has 
been crowned a noisy and bully rooster. Apparent is how Robert Mugabe has been 
using fowl-run politics to naturalize his hegemony. Fowl-run politics emanate as the 
microcosm of the patrilineal and masculinized Zimbabwean state. 
 
To counter those who had ideas about the replacement of the rooster, during some 
political campaigns, Mugabe’s supporters would question people about what would 
be done with an old jongwe (rooster/cockerel at an African homestead). In Shona, the 
rooster chicken is traditionally the most respected domestic animal at any household. 
Those who answered that it gets killed and cooked were subjected to beatings or death 
as they were associated with MDC supporters who had popularized kubata jongwe 
muromo and jongwe mupoto 
134
 discourses. This was ZANU-PF’s way of disordering 
village life. 
 
Interestingly, when the jongwe was officially replaced by the Great Zimbabwe as the 
ZANU-PF party symbol, after casting their votes during elections, some voters 
jokingly said that they had not seen the jongwe 
135
 which they were used to, and 
therefore had cast their votes on its footprint (jongwe hatina kuriona, saka taisa X 
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 Jongwe mupoto literally means putting the rooster in the pot or cooking the rooster. Literary, it 
refers to getting rid of Robert Mugabe.  
135
 See Image 14. 
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paratsika). 
136
 The message was that they had voted for the MDC whose political 
symbol, the open palm 
137
 looks similar to a chicken footprint. This joke exemplifies 
the ambivalences of political texts and the abilities of ‘dominated’ groups to convert 
the elite’s instruments to their own use. Also, Sebastian Nyamhangambiri 138 reports 
that on 3 February 2011 at a funeral ceremony at Tsvingwe cemetery, in Penhalonga, 
three residents, Patrick Chikoti, Faith Mudiwa and Phillip Dowera craftily turned the 
Mbare Chimurenga Choir song, ‘Nyatsoteerera’ (Listen carefully/Pay great attention) 
139
 that praises Robert Mugabe into a slanderous funeral hymn. Some of the 
‘slanderous’ material included; ‘Nyatsoterera unzwe kupenga muhofisi mune mboko 
nyatsoterera unzwe kupenga’ [Listen carefully to the madness coming from Mugabe’s 
office]. In the Shona ‘street’ language, the word mboko, which in this case refers to 
Mugabe or Bob denotes someone who is useless, stupid, out-dated, tired and insane. 
People can therefore expect to hear nothing less than craziness from such an 
individual]. This idea of subversion is buttressed by Susann Baller & Martha 
Saavedra’s (2010) assertion that although sport and football can be instrumentalized 
by politicians, parties and governments for self-benefit, the results of this use is 
unpredictable and control is slippery. Humor and the ‘everyday life’ are part of the 
marginalized’s constituencies of subversion and resistance (Willems, 2010; Achille 
Mbembe, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
136
 A similar joke relating to the subversion of ZANU-PF’s notion of ‘team’ and ‘scoring the ball’ was 
‘I looked for the ball on the ballot papers and couldn’t see it. Looked for the goal posts and could not 
see them again. I therefore had to choose goalkeepers’ gloves which I found. The team has been 
beaten’ (Ncube, 2014:14).  
137
 See Image 15. 
138
 http://freemuse.org/archives/1691.  
139
 See Song 13, Appendix A. 
 
Image 14: The Jongwe (Rooster chicken/Cockerel) ZANU-PF Symbol 
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The song, ‘Ndimi Mega’ (You are the One/You are the Only One) 140 by Mbare 
Chimurenga Choir makes it crystal clear that Zimbabwe is under the rule of one great, 
magnificent and ‘able’ patriarchal figure. The noun baba [father] conjures a national 
disciplinarian and authority figure, hence speaking of the nation is also a way of 
speaking of the family. One’s senses are drawn to a phallic family order that should 
replicate the national order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mbare Chimurenga Choir’s song, ‘Changamukai’ (Awaken/Be Vigilant) 141 affirms 
that Mugabe is the one who is ruling the country, as indicated by ‘VaMugabe 
varikutongawo…’ (Mr. Mugabe is the one ruling/in power). The same affirmation is 
made in the songs ‘MuZimbabwe’ (In Zimbabwe),142 ‘Nyika Yedu’ (Our 
country/Land)  
143
 and ‘Timhu’ (Team),144 which are on the same album. The song 
‘Nyatsoteerera’ 145 supposes that if one listens, one can actually hear Mugabe’s rule. 
The song is a repetition of the lyrics: 
Nyatsoteerera unzwe kutonga 
Aaah muhofisi, muna Bhobho nyatsoteerera unzwe kutonga 
Unzwe kutonga nyatsoteerera unzwe kutonga 
Aaah muhofisi, muna Bhobho nyatsoteerera unzwe kutonga 
[Listen carefully and hear Bob/Mugabe’s rule/power while he is in his office/on his 
throne]. 
                                                          
140
 See Song 14, Appendix A. 
141
 See Song 15, Appendix A. 
142
 See Song 16, Appendix A. 
143
 See Song 17, Appendix A. 
144
 See Song 18, Appendix A. 
145
 See Song 13, Appendix A. 
 
Image 15: MDC Open Palm Symbol 
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Suggested here is a firm kind of rule which can be felt by everyone and cannot be 
interrupted. Reference to Mugabe as Bhobho, among others, is also noted in Last 
‘Tambaoga’ Chianga’s song ‘Agreement.’ 146 Tambaoga says: 
Patakavhota takasainirana agirimende 
Kuti mutungamiriri weZimbabwe ndiBhobho  
[Our vote was a signed agreement that Bhobho (Bob/Robert Mugabe) is the 
Zimbabwean leader]. 
In the above cases, Bhobho may be taken to be a Shona version for Bob, which 
familiarly refers to Robert Mugabe but also cordially refers to Robert Nesta Marley. 
The song links Robert Mugabe to the popular Reggie legend, Robert Nesta Marley 
who graced Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980. The iconography of Bob Marley 
strongly invites one to love and appreciate Mugabe in the manner that approximates 
the love, appreciation and affection one has for Marley. Also, since Marley made a 
performance at Zimbabwe’s independence celebrations, remembering ‘Bob’ Marley 
‘enforces’ a re/memberance of Robert Mugabe as a ‘legendary figure’ inseparable 
from Zimbabwean independence. However, it is also possible to see this ‘diffusion’ of 
affect in a negative sense. One may think of a possibility where hatred for ‘Bob’ 
Mugabe diffuses to one’s hatred of ‘Bob’ Marley and or Reggie music. 
 
On a different note, bhobho may sensualize the most powerful piece on a game of 
draught (tsoro), which is common among Zimbabweans. The game shares some 
eliminatory features with games such as chess. This game is based on eliminating the 
opponent’s pieces. The bhobho is vested with more power and space to maneuver 
than any other piece. While bhobho might be used to ‘visualize’ or showcase 
Mugabe’s invincibility, it also identifies him as a bully and a cruel ‘leader’ who uses 
his power and space to eliminate those who challenge him. The fact that the singer 
calls for one to attentively listen (nyatsoteerera) may suggest that Mugabe’s rule is far 
off from the people. This means that it is something that is limited to the office and is 
alienated from the people. The signed agreement in Tambaoga’s song may be used to 
authorize his despotism and cruelty. The above songs have extensive video footage 
and pictures steeped in the Chimurenga wars, land and national iconography. The 
songs contain lyrics revealing a cultic worship of Mugabe’s rule despite the fact that 
the album was released after Mugabe had lost the first round of the 2008 elections 
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which led to power-sharing with the ‘opposition’ parties, popularly known as the 
Government of National Unity (GNU). 
 
The aim of the Mbare Chimurenga Choir songs is clearly to invisibilize other parties 
and visualize Mugabe’s power. The song, ‘Changamukai’ 147 goes on to address 
Mugabe as baba (father) which in the Shona context, positions him as both the father 
and the husband who is the family’s central figure. As the father, he protects and 
provides for his children as enunciated in Mbare Chimurenga Choir songs that he is 
the only one who has dealt with the land issue, hence playing a father figure. As the 
husband, he always voices how ready he is to protect his territory. Mugabe as baba 
(father/husband) is also reverberated by the song ‘Timhu.’ 148 
 
The choreography of both lyrics and visuals in the above song is very interesting and 
highly spectacular. There is a way in which the song stresses the presence of a single 
baba (father/husband) who is the head of the family. What is interesting is that 
Mugabe is referred to as baba Mugabe, reflective of a patriarchal head, while another 
male figure, John Nkomo 
149
 is simply called VaNkomo (Mr Nkomo). The song has 
audio-visuals of Mugabe, Mujuru and Nkomo on a football pitch. 
150
 Mugabe receives 
a ball from an invisible character, probably a divine one. When he skillfully receives 
the ball, he holds it and does not pass it on to his team mates, showing how the baba 
(father/husband) title cannot be shared. Mugabe is positioned as strong, active and 
‘ballness’ while Nkomo’s image appears weak, passive and ‘ball-less.’ The idea of 
team work, which is associated with combined efforts, is disfigured. In this team, only 
one player is visible and holding the ball, the others are invisible since they occupy a 
passive presence. While one may argue that the singers wanted to position Mugabe as 
the head of the state, the metaphor of a football team which they use produces a 
counter discourse that positions him as very selfish, a characteristic that is intolerable 
where team work is emphasized such as in a game of football. The major irony is that 
in professional teams, team members retire and get replaced. In this team, however, 
replacements have largely been possible only in the event of death. This explains why 
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 See Song 15, Appendix A. 
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 See Song 18, Appendix A. 
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 John Nkomo was one of Zimbabwe’s vice presidents from 2009 to 2013 when he died. 
150
 See Image 16, watch https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aKCxy7at4L4.  
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Mugabe is still the central and masculine player in the team. His team mates have 
come as replacements not for those who had retired, but for those who had died. 
 
Mugabe’s powerful position is further stressed in the song ‘Makorokoto’ 
(Congratulations) 
151
 which articulates that Mugabe, both in his capacity as mwana 
waBona (Bona’s son) and baba vaBona (Bona’s father) has the prerogative to rule 
from the ancestors and the people of Zimbabwe, which is a way of naturalizing 
Mugabe’s power along a patriarchal monogenesis. On another level, it points to 
women as mothers to the sons who become the expected rulers. Zimbabwe’s 
masculine nationalism has been factionalized in sports, especially through the use of 
football imagery. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is essential to mention here that in Zimbabwe, sport is increasingly used as a 
political aesthetics demonstrating the hyper masculinities characterizing Zimbabwean 
state-building. ZANU-PF adopted football treatises and constructed its political 
narratives around the image and imaginations of ‘the game’ in an effort to make its 
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Image 16: ZANU-PF ‘Team’ (Mugabe, Mujuru and Nkomo) 
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Image 17: ‘Bhora Mugedhi’ 
 
 
 
 
Image 12 
‘brand’ affectionate and appealing to Zimbabweans. 152 One can site the use of 
phrases such as Bhora musango (kick the ball off the pitch) or bhora mugedhi/ibola 
egedhini (score the ball). 
153
  
 
Drawing on the violence that followed Mugabe’s 2008 defeat, I find it prudent to 
think of bhora musango as a symbolic call for war. In the narratives of the 
Zimbabwean war of liberation, musango (bush/forest) is basically the space from 
where the liberation war was operated. Kicking the ball off the field (not voting for 
Mugabe and ZANU-PF) is entrance into the bush, a masculinized space of war. With 
its ‘bush’ experience and history, ZANU-PF is prepared to extend the ‘game’ into the 
bush if any team member or opposing team decides to play bhora musango. 
 
On the other hand, bhora mugedhi is a desperate attempt to win a game by ignoring 
all other aesthetics, fairness and skills of football and concentrating on winning by 
any means. The bhora mugedhi tactic became a very popular ZANU-PF slogan during 
the 2013 elections. Even the ‘Gushungo gonyet’ (Mugabe’s big haulage truck) 154 
which frequented Mugabe’s rallies had very big inscriptions of the bhora mugedhi 
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 The obvious association of national football and national politics can be exemplified by the former 
Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah’s rule and the exploits of the Ghanaian national football team 
during his rule (Pannenborg, 2010). 
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 See Image 17, watch https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J5s0Vd4Wi7g.  
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 See Image 17, watch https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TfUF-Mry7UA.  
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slogan and always carried along goal posts for ‘performing’ bhora mugedhi. All 
efforts have been focused on scoring and it has been a ‘make sure’ kind of situation 
associated with other phrases like bhora mberi (kick the ball forward). As such, the 
emphasis put by bhora musango/bhora mugedhi’ is on ensuring either losing or 
getting eliminated or winning and eliminating. The contest is very masculine, 
especially if one takes into cognizance how instructive and commandeering the phrase 
‘bhora mugedhi/bola egedini’ is, and thus demonstrating the masculine nature of 
Zimbabwean nationalism. Anyone who plays an individual game instead of having 
the ‘team spirit’ or the ‘family’ at heart is seen as reactionary and deserving some 
form of punishment. 
 
During elections, ZANU-PF and MDC candidates have been presented as ‘Teams.’ 155 
It is important to associate notions such as ‘team’ and ‘bhora mugedhi’ with powerful 
controls that are meant to ensure that human bodies are disciplined and obedient in a 
certain way that guaranties team survival. Taking into consideration “the effects of 
fandom, for example, the violence and aggression, which may result from being a 
fan” (Manase Chiweshe, 2011:174) and which characterize Zimbabwean soccer, it 
would be interesting to imagine a national project that adopts such characteristics. 
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Image 18: MDC and ZANU-PF Football Metaphors 
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It is also important to mention the red cards as part of MDC symbols which have been 
raised during party rallies, printed on regalia, on pamphlets, raised during musical 
shows, for example during Oliver Mtukudzi’s shows especially during the 
performance of his song ‘Wasakara.’ 156 On a similar note, Robert Muponde & Kizito 
Muchemwa (2011) give reflections on how, during the colonial period, Africans used 
football stadiums as political ‘fields’ on which they ‘performed’ their disgruntlements 
through protest songs, symbols and gestures deriding the colonial and racist regime.  
 
The whistle also became symbolic of the perceived ZANU-PF and Mugabe’s rough 
play in managing the nation as well as during electoral participation. This rough play 
warranted not only a warning, but total removal. During one of his rallies, after the 
first round of the 2008 elections which he had won, Morgan Tsvangirai is said to have 
dismissed the possibility of winning a return league after being defeated in one’s own 
home ground, further reflecting the relation between politics and sport. 
157
 Tsvangirai, 
however, was proven wrong as Mugabe won the second round of the elections by 
making use of ‘rough’ play, resulting in a lot of ‘injuries’ on the side of the opposition 
team and its supporters. 
158
 
 
Knowing the love that Zimbabweans have for sports, the loyalties that they have for 
certain teams and the sacrifices that they make in the name of their teams, sport 
becomes a very useful political aesthetic that nurtures affective ‘diffusions’ across 
‘teams.’ 159 Through sport, Zimbabweans are persuaded to relate to a particular 
political party as they would relate to a club of their choice. It is difficult to 
disassociate sport from rivalry, a sense of national belonging and masculinity.  
 
In Zimbabwe, throughout the years, stadiums, which are basically built as sport-fields 
for sporting activities have been used as political-fields for political performances. 
160
 
One is tempted to probe if Zimbabwe’s first independence ceremony held at the 
Zimbabwe Grounds foretold the politico-aesthetics of sport in Zimbabwe. Sport and 
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 See Song 20, Appendix A. 
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 http://maravi.blogspot.com/2008/05/tsvangirai-vows-to-defeat-mugabe.html.   
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 Documentaries, A Criminal State, A Patriotic Force, Fighting for Rights. Zimbabwe before the 2000 
Election Pre-poll, Documentary On State Sponsored Violence Against MDC Members. 
159
 The relationship between individuals and groups and the teams or clubs they support ‘scripts’ the 
relationship between individuals or groups with particular political parties.  
160
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J5s0Vd4Wi7g.  
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politics are imagined and ‘performed’ as aggressive, masculine pre-occupations 
defined by wins and defeats, where ‘team members’ are supposedly guided not by 
rationality, but by affective feelings for their ‘teams.’ Metaphorically, Zimbabwe is a 
‘stadium’ in which intense ‘political games’ ensuring victors and losers are ‘played.’ 
It is worthwhile to imagine what it would mean for political parties, especially 
ZANU-PF, to position as soccer teams in a context where soccer administrators, fans, 
spectators, players and even the language/s of soccer are masculine. Sport metaphors 
invite team fans or members to see and ‘act’ themselves as extensions of their teams; 
hence they may invest a lot of emotions into them and be flexible to team ‘discipline.’ 
In line with the above, Noam Chomsky (1988) points to sport as a major hegemonic 
instrument in the hands of elite classes. Chien-Yu Lin, Ping-Chao Lee & Hui-Fang 
Nai (2008) shares the same sentiments and pictures a contiguous relationship between 
sport and politics. I argue that sport, and football in particular, has been made use of 
as a ‘political language,’ a conduit for politically charged and robustly masculinized 
discourses, especially in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Arguably, the resonance of this 
political aesthetic has a lot to do with the ‘ordinary’ people’s affinity to sport and their 
‘popular knowledge’ of the ‘landscape’ of sport. In this sense, the ability of sport, 
especially football to ‘carry’ sensual effects makes it useful to the political 
‘landscape’ in general and issues of power and struggle in particular, especially in this 
case when the language of sport is very forceful. However, as the above discussion 
reflects, sport, like any other site of popular culture, is not a space monopolized by 
‘dominant’ groups. Instead, it is a complicated space for both reproduction and 
subversion. 
 
It is not only ZANU-PF that has resorted to violent and militarized masculinities and 
the re/definition of politics as war or the association of heroism with war/struggle. At 
Tonderai Ndira’s funeral, almost all the funeral songs are buried in war discourses 
and profoundly offer a militarized definition of heroism. What is evoked during the 
funeral ceremony is a war situation which has already started claiming the lives of 
some of the renowned combatants. The song ‘Tipeiwo nguva yokuchema gamba redu’ 
(Give us time/space to mourn our hero) 
161
 locates Ndira as heroic. Although it 
contests the conferring of the hero status to ZANU-PF loyalists by articulating the 
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 See Song 21, Appendix A, Watch Documentary On State Sponsored Violence Against MDC 
Members, Movement for Democratic Change Information and Publicity Department, 2008. 
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heroism of Ndira, 
162
 there is a way in which both the song and the poster maintain the 
ZANU-PF discourse that Zimbabwe is at war and that heroism is associated with war. 
Narrations about Tonderai Ndira show that he fearlessly defended his party against 
ZANU-PF ‘thuggery’ (Wilkins, 2012). Ndira was nick-named ‘Serge’ (Sergeant) and 
was seen as a soldier and commander as reflected by another song ‘Anga ari 
Commander’ (He was an army commander) 163 and a militaristic and political term 
‘assassinated’ rather than murdered is chosen to describe his death. The song Iva 
Gamba (Be a Hero/Warrior) 
164
 is also a popular one that calls for people to be 
resolute, brave warriors who are on the lookout for enemies. The strong military 
terminology inherent in these songs is self-telling and this is evident that the MDC 
has failed to move out of the militarized and war ethic in naming heroes and in 
defining politics as well as in imagining citizenship. Removed from the privileged 
position associated with the war that ushered in the black ruling elite, it sets its own 
war zone, recruits its own combatants and crowns its own heroes as evidenced by the 
image below. 
165
 This shows that the MDC has continued with the grandeur narratives 
of heroism and nationalism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the same funeral ceremony, an army structure which is disciplined enough to 
consult with its leadership for the action to take, yet ready for war is mirrored by the 
lyrics: 
Tonobvunza kuvakuru veChinja 
Tonobvunza tochibvondora here 
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 See Image 12 and 19. 
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 See Song 22, Appendix A. 
164
 See Song 23, Appendix A. 
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 See Image 19. 
 
Image 19: MDC Heroes 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 10 
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Tonobvunza kuvakuru veChinja 
[We are going to inquire from the leaders of change whether or not to retaliate].  
In Zimbabwe’s street language which is popular with the youth, although kubvondora 
(ripping open) may refer to unexpectedly and publicly exposing the whole truth, it 
usually refers to an unexpected and immense violent action. Even in cases where it 
refers to the revelation of the hidden truth. Such exposition of the truth is usually 
meant to initiate or is followed by, very violent action against one side by another. 
This kind of language is used as part of the evidence by ZANU-PF to reveal the 
violent nature of the MDC. Locating the MDC as a violent party, Mugabe says, “The 
nonsense that the MDC has resorted to; the acts of violence, can be brought to a 
sudden end.” 166 
 
The MDC slogan, which in many ways is similar to the ZANU-PF Pamberi/Pasi 
na/ne (Forward/Down with) slogan in terms of violent exclusion, also situates the 
MDC in a space of violence. The slogan goes: 
Mugabe mudenga 
Uyoo 
Mudenga mudenga 
Uyoo 
Tenderedza 
Uyoo 
Rovera Pasi 
Pwaaaaa 
[Lift Mugabe up very high, turn him round and round, throw him heavily on the 
ground] 
It is clear that the slogan is a merciless ‘act’ of totally breaking one’s enemy with no 
hope of the enemy rising again. The enemy is raised high up so as to be brought down 
to the hard ground with a fatal thud since pwaaa is a sound that is produced if 
something shatters. The same is also expressed by the party’s red card symbol, which 
is an adoption of sport jargon. In sports, a red card is a rare and harsh punishment 
symbolizing a player’s total exclusion from the game. There is no room for 
negotiations and the decision cannot be revoked. It also makes sense to associate 
MDC’s ‘Final Push’ 167 within the same language of total force and violence, which is 
very much masculine and linked to war. The MDC has managed to problematize 
ZANU-PF’s concept of the enemy as an outsider. It has also managed to play around 
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 Documentary, Fighting for Rights. Zimbabwe before the 2002 Election Pre-poll, DANIDA, 2002. 
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 http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2005/02/04/mdc-botched-final-push-civic-groups/.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
132 
 
on the space that has given ZANU-PF a claim to rule, which is the struggle space. 
However, the MDC has also appropriated ‘going to fight’ as the basis for heroism, 
thus the focus is on those who leave for war, those who are masculine. This simply 
becomes a displacement rather than a change. 
 
The foregoing demonstrates how citizenship is mediated in the Zimbabwean nation. 
Notions of citizenship strongly resonate with a naturalized patriarchy that is 
defensive, commandist and militarized. This kind of locus answers to the war 
situation that has been created. Participation in this war is rendered a citizen’s 
obligation. Kizito Muchemwa & Robert Muponde (2007) point to the above phallic-
centered model of Zimbabwean nationhood and citizenship by clearly averring that 
their book, Manning the Nation: Father figures in Zimbabwean Literature and 
Society traces the dominant cultures of violence to the devious ways in which super-
phallicism grounded on physical power, has colonized Zimbabwe’s spheres of life, 
implanting fear in women, children, and subordinate masculinities. This has shaped 
Zimbabwean citizenship as premised on a naturalized black patriarchy responsible for 
state functionaries and naturalized femininities that construct the nation.  
 
For Muchemwa & Muponde (2007:2), in the post-2000 epoch, “…outside the war 
ethic, driven by an excess of masculinity, individuals whose gender does not 
contribute to the war economy are under threat.” This is because they do not serve the 
projected image of the Zimbabwean nation which needs masculine figures. This is 
backed by Sachikonye (2011) and Horace Campbell (2003) who relate how in post-
2000, even some men were feminized and brutalized if they lacked the masculinities 
that matched those defined by the regime in power. I argue that Morgan Tsvangirai is 
one such character whose masculinity has been under erasure in dominant nationalist 
narratives. 
 
The feminization of certain men, however, is not new in Zimbabwean politics. In the 
mid-1980s, Joshua Nkomo was feminized, labeled a coward and was satirized as 
having escaped Zimbabwe to Botswana disguised as a woman (Joshua Nkomo, 2001). 
People may be given certain available genders not because they are ‘real,’ but because 
doing so meet certain projects. Gendered behavior, in an obvious sense that seems 
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more exaggerated than Judith Butler’s explanation, 168 becomes ‘acted’ scripts that are 
from time to time rehearsed rather than something seemingly ‘natural.’ In the above 
case, a dramatic effect that genders Nkomo, proving his weakness and feminineness 
in the face of his adversaries is created through ‘dressing’ him as a woman. While 
during the liberation struggle, pasi ne/na… was mostly used against the oppressive 
white regime and ‘sell-outs,’ from the 2000s, it has been used interchangeably to refer 
to Tsvangirai/Britain/the opposition parties and all those critical of ZANU-PF. Sell-
outs like Tsvangirai are regarded as very weak, cowards and therefore unmanly. They 
are accused of ‘selling’ national bodies to foreigners in a manner that calls one to 
think of ‘prostitutes.’ In the same way that certain ‘polluters’ of the body politic have 
been excluded because of the ‘dirtiness’ of their feminized bodies, so have certain 
political ‘traitors’ been excluded in gendered terms because of the polluting effect  of 
their ‘presence.’ 
 
It is in the above sense that Zimbabwean nationhood requires amadoda sibili who are 
prepared to get the land, a symbol of nationhood by any means possible. In this case, 
violence is rendered a measure of manhood. This may explain why the likes of 
Chenjerai Hunzvi, Joseph Chinotimba and Border Gezi have earned respectability and 
responsibility from the state. These are the amadoda sibili required in the post-2000 
where citizenship is seen in one’s relationship with the land, a relationship which is 
only possible through violence.   
 
Beyond Patriarchy and Imperial Hegemony 
In pursuing the story of origins and struggle and the constructions of citizenship and 
belonging in literary works, one finds intricate patterns of subversions and 
contestations. For example, in Nehanda, Vera contests and re-constructs the figure of 
Nehanda and her socio, religious, economic and political milieu in a manner that 
deconstructs and discontinues the official narrative that limits her to the spiritual 
realm while speech and political action are given to Kaguvi, a male medium. To this 
extent, Vera’s narration of Nehanda revises ‘patriarchal nationalism’ by reflecting on 
the central, active and leadership roles played by a woman in the nationalist struggle. 
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This subverts dominant nationalist narrations that peripherize and domesticate 
women’s participation in the struggle. 169 Nehanda’s heroism has remained 
inspirational especially among local black women and those in the diaspora (Desiree 
Lewis, 2004). Lewis argues that Vera’s positioning of Nehanda and the Nehanda 
myth demean “norms of aggressiveness, conquest, and domination, and instead 
celebrate values and experiences that are usually marginalized and inferior” (Lewis, 
2004:193). In The Stone Virgins (2002), she mirrors how the hyper-masculinities 
‘instrumental’ to nationalism lead a veteran liberation war cadre to rape. This subverts 
the iconography of the nation enshrined in dominant narratives. 
 
Both Vera’s literary texts, and indeed many popularized and trivial texts in the public 
domain such as songs and jokes explicitly reveal how dominant narratives of struggle 
in the Zimbabwean nation – which are conventionally political – lean towards and 
mask the national elite and Western pretentions with their highly militarized and 
macho-forms. However, these narrow narratives of struggle are subverted by 
numerous other struggles that are waged at the so-called apolitical spheres, widening 
notions of struggle and re/thinking and re/locating the a/political and problematizing 
citizenship and belonging. 
 
It has been shown how often chimurenga discourses have been premised on combat 
and have been narrowed to a racial and colonial/imperial issue rather than people’s 
struggle against prevailing forms of oppression. In addition, the grand narrations of 
chimurenga have and are largely imperial and masculinist and premised on power in 
the colonial sense rather than on autonomy. Commenting specifically on the 
Zimbabwean Second Chimurenga, Joseph Mtisi, Munyaradzi Nyakudya & Teresa 
Barnes warns us to:  
…avoid a narrow definition of ‘fighting’ the struggle, which can privilege 
particular groups to the exclusion of the majority. Many ordinary people did 
not cross the border or ‘take up arms’ but made significant sacrifices for the 
liberation of the country. A broader definition is consistent with the 
philosophy of the nationalist armies that recognized the importance of the 
‘masses’ in the struggle, aptly captured in the Marxist analogy of combatant 
fish swimming in the water of the people (Brian Raftopoulos & Alois 
Mlambo, 2009:155). 
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Chapter 2 and 3 have discussed how the definition of struggle or fighting in ‘military’ 
terms has produced militarized politics in Zimbabwe. The definition of ‘politics as 
war’ in some sense helps to create a relatively affective discourse deeply rooted in the 
past. Paradoxically however, the feelings generated by this have possibilities to ignite 
dissenting voices: since even the past is not pure and people were affected differently 
and showed diverging loyalties. Very different memories and solutions can be 
imagined through ‘the politics of war.’ There is, however, evidence that ZANU-PF 
was banking on the discourses of insider/outsider, with insiders including all those 
loyal and sympathetic to ZANU-PF while outsiders referred to all those in opposition 
of ZANU-PF. With the notions of ‘whiteness’ and ‘blackness’ often being redefined, 
to symbolically mark all those opposing ZANU-PF as white, some blacks became 
outsiders. 
 
The above limitation of fighting to the military world fails to make sense in the 
Zimbabwean case where the war was not limited to the bush, but extended to the 
common people who had remained home. During the First Chimurenga, the figure of 
Nehanda showed that the struggle is not limited to combat, since those in combat need 
the support of non-combatant members in many ways. It is Nehanda, a non-combatant 
in nationalist narratives, who is accused of rebellion and sentenced to death by the 
colonialists. It is also Nehanda, rather than those who were in combat who became a 
very useful figure in the narratives of colonial resistance. Attempts to limit 
chimurenga to combat, or to the struggle against colonialism therefore, fails to 
express people’s actual experiences. In addition, it takes a Eurocentric, male-centred 
and violent formulation of origin and struggle, one that benefits ‘power’ rather than 
autonomy and being in sync with the everyday. Central to the above is how politics as 
war takes different forms for different groups and also how the politics of war is 
transcended. 
 
The above is further illustrated by the current generation of Zimbabwean musicians 
who have defied state narratives that disassociates them with the struggle simply 
because they are ‘maborn free.’ 170 To the youths, chimurenga is significant but they 
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 A term used to refer to those born after the country’s independence in 1980 who are accused of 
lacking the past experiences and knowledge about Zimbabwe’s past which makes them possible 
betrayers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
136 
 
give it new meanings and come up with their own heroism. Their passion for 
recognition and visibility in a world that often de-links them from the second war of 
liberation because of being ‘born-frees’ pushes them to locate and claim heroism in a 
different space although without putting away the warrior-jacket that under-writes 
chimurenga. This relates to Jacklyn Cock’s (1989) study of militarism and military 
culture in South Africa. She argues that militarism pervades all spheres of life. Cock 
reflects on how social relations have been shaped around discourses of war and 
armies, how war is valued and legitimized in a manner that naturalize violence as a 
solution to conflict, and militarism as foundational to  society. In her studies on 
militarism in Post-apartheid South Africa, Cock (2004) suggests rising levels of 
highly organized criminal violence, the growth of armed, private security firms and 
vigilante groupings, and individual reliance on instruments of violence as evidence of 
a highly militarized society. In Zimbabwe, the sense of this military warfare is 
expressed in songs by the youth. The military language that constructs the songs 
testifies the extent to which militarism and violence have been naturalized in 
Zimbabwe. The militarism is also expressed in the pseudo names that the young 
musicians give themselves. 
 
Young musicians in Zimbabwe have appropriated struggle related names for 
themselves or their groups and the language of struggle is very common in their 
music. The likes of Maskiri (Alishias Musimbe), Nox (Enock Guni), Trinta (Freddy 
Mazivanjira) have taken on the name ‘Mhondoro’ for themselves. In Shona culture 
mhondoro, refers to a powerful ancestral medium or spirit. This is a different 
trajectory of associating with ancestors, spirit mediums and the Zimbabwean past that 
goes beyond the linear patriotic history. The likes of Jah Prayzah (Mukudzei 
Mukombe) and Sniper (Donald Chirisa) have made themselves known as ‘Masoja’ 
(Soldiers) while the likes of Guspy Warrior (Emmanuel Manyeruke) have taken the 
‘warrior’ identity. There is also a group led by Winky D/Bigman (Wallace 
Chirumiko), that has taken the ‘Ninja’ (maninja) identity and the other led by Stunner 
(Desmond Chideme), which has taken the name mashark (sharks) which again are 
militaristic and macho. We also have others who have taken monarchical identities 
such as ‘King Shaddy’ (Shadreck Kwirire) and others which express invincibility like 
‘Danger Zone.’ Names such as Sniper are highly militaristic and masculinist, while 
many others invoke the gladiatorial iconography of unvented constructs of ‘traditional 
 
 
 
 
 
 
137 
 
African masculinity.’ The above names are highly loaded with militarism and 
masochism, it is clear that they point to a passion for recognition and inclusion in the 
chimurenga narrative, where they have been excluded because of their generation. 
171
 
 
To the above young musicians, masculinity and one’s place in the ‘struggle’ is 
measured by the number of fans one has and the ability to pull crowds during shows. 
Nevertheless, the use of these ‘military’ forms in the entertainment industry is a 
theatrical expression of other ways of ‘living’ chimurenga. It is a way of 
demonstrating the possibilities of redefining technologies of violence in a way that 
challenges the dominant linear forms and uses of chimurenga. The young 
generation’s ‘militarism’ ruptures the dominant and state-centric one circulated in 
Zimbabwean nation-building. 
 
Interestingly, women also feature in some of these ‘warrior’ groups and so defy 
scripts that restrict the space to men. The late Chiwoniso Maraire, one of the finest 
Mbira musicians Zimbabwe has produced, has generally been regarded as being 
alienated from patriarchal Zimbabwean ‘traditions’ and ‘moral’ codes. Having 
popularized the mbira music instrument, which was traditionally used by male 
musicians, one of her songs, ‘Rebel Woman’ might be telling of her struggle to 
escape from confined identities of domesticity. Noting the controversy regarding her 
death and burial, 
172
 one suspects that her life was at loggerheads with authoritative 
patriarchal family heads. Chiwoniso’s corpse was denied entry into the Bluffhill 
family home in Harare; it was not allowed entry into the family rural homestead at 
Chakohwa village in Chimanimani. There was no body-viewing and speeches at the 
graveyard. Although stories of a highly contagious disease were given, these seem to 
be fictitious and cover-ups for the existing family squabbles and hostilities towards 
her. 
 
I argue that what was feared was the contagious possibility of her ‘rebellious’ body. It 
can therefore be argued that the entire ‘episode’ around  Chiwoniso’s death and burial 
was a high level ‘performance’ of both the Maraire family and the Zimbabwean 
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 The names reminds one of the liberation war period when nom de guerres were prominent. These 
war names were compulsory to hide the true identities of soldiers as well as to portray certain war 
themes. 
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 https://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/07/30/drama-at-chiwoniso-funeral/. 
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nation’s patriarchal control of women, something which Chiwoniso had rejected up to 
her death. Chiwoniso Maraire was regarded as a rebel in the family and was accused 
of lacking morals. Restricting her body to certain places and disallowing certain 
processes is a powerful dramatic and embodied demonstration of punishment meted 
out at those who refuse to conform to the embodied prescribed roles. Avoiding body 
viewing and the body’s entrance into family spaces was de-linking Chiwoniso from 
her family so that her ‘contagious’ nature would not ‘pollute’ the living and 
‘disciplined’ bodies within the family. The punishment even undermines the ‘Shona’ 
belief that wafa wanaka 
173
 which entails giving respect to dead bodies. However, 
with the ‘imprisoning’ characteristics of ‘home’ and ‘family,’ refusing Chiwoniso’s 
body entry is ironically freeing bodies from liminal spaces, making her dead body 
continue to ‘live’ freely without limiting familial ‘ties,’ just as her living body had 
done. 
 
Chiwoniso Maraire’s case is reminiscent of the circumstances surrounding the 
popular pole dancer and musician Junior Lizzy Zinhu who is well known as Beverly 
Sibanda or simply Bev. 
174
 Her erotic and raunchy dance routines and strip teasing 
have made her defy the official Zimbabwean imperative to privatize women’s 
sexuality as a means of protecting male honor and the nation’s honor. Beverly’s 
shows have attracted multitudes of spectators, yet they have also attracted the 
policing-authoritative criticism because of breaking national ‘morality.’ This is 
especially so in the context where Zimbabwean ‘black’ women symbolize “an 
uncontaminated essence, the custodian of ancestral traditions” that co-exists with 
them being symbolically coded with land and its ‘purity’ (Lewis, 2004:198). Thus 
despite earning herself a name as an entertainer, Bev has also earned an identity as a 
rebel against the Zimbabwean state’s patriarchal authority – a national ‘pollutant.’  
 
It is interesting that sexually provocative dances which ‘state-craft’ is uncomfortable 
with are actually part of Zimbabwe’s ‘past’ instruments of attacking colonial 
authority. 
175
 To the state, public figures like Beverly embody all social ills; they 
symbolize the cosmopolitan/westernized women who are vehicles through which the 
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 A Shona saying imploring that once one dies, s/he becomes faultless.  
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 http://www.pindula.co.zw/Beverly_Sibanda.             
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 The Jerusarema dance for example which was popular during the colonial period and involving 
some sexually provocative body movements was used to insult colonial authorities. 
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West ‘penetrates’ Zimbabwe. Failing to ‘police’ such women, especially by removing 
them from the public arena is read as a weakness of the state and a symbolic 
‘invasion’ of the national body. This is why Beverly is frequently arrested by the 
police. The state’s suppression and distortion of the erotic as one of the most 
important sources of power for women is instrumental to the reproduction of 
patriarchal systems (Audre Lorde, 1982: 88). 
 
Controlling women’s bodies and sexualities through public ‘acts’ that other citizens 
can witness is a very powerful metaphor of cultural surveillance and state control. It is 
also interesting that attempts to control Beverly have also been done by ‘powerful 
religious’ masculinities like Walter Magaya, the Prophetic Healing and Deliverance 
(PHD) ministries founder. Magaya made failed attempts using his financial and 
religious power to ‘tame’ Beverly’s sexuality by ‘boxing’ her in a clothing shop. 176 
The policing of Beverly and moves to remove her from the ‘public eyes’ demonstrates 
a “systematic suppression of women’s sexual and erotic inclinations [and seeks] the 
conflation of sexuality and reproduction within a hetero-normative cultural and social 
matrix” (Patricia McFadden). 177 I argue that these masculine reactions to Beverly’s 
performances provide rich texts on Zimbabwe’s macho state-building projects and the 
symbolic configuration of womanhood for masculine political projects. 
 
In  many ways, the above case resonates with Tsitsi Dangarembga’s Nervous 
Conditions (1988) where one notices the ‘nervous’ conditions around Sacred Heart, a 
prestigious girls only Catholic mission. The presence of this institution is highly 
‘performative.’ It is to make sure that girls are kept within the boundaries and 
confinements of an authoritative religious, colonial and patriarchal order so that they 
grow into ‘respectful’ white and black women. Nyasha warns Tambu not to go to 
Sacred Heart, as the nuns would break her autonomy. 
 
Just as Dangarembga presents Tambu’s possible escape from Sacred Heart’s glaring 
authority, I argue that Beverly’s erotic dances represent subversions and resistances to 
a nationalism that imposes limitations to the freedoms of women in a bid to maintain 
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 https://www.newsday.co.zw/2014/01/28/prophet-magaya-transform-bevs-life/.  
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 http://agi.ac.za/sites/agi.ac.za/files/fa_2_standpoint_1.pdf.  
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their symbolic identities in state-craft. 
178
 As McFadden argues, such limitations are 
made possible by re/producing and enforcing hegemonic ideas of sexuality and 
heterosexist expectations. McFadden goes on to say that cultural taboos and claims 
that view sexual pleasure and freedom as dangerous and irresponsible womanhood are 
buttressed. Following this line of thought, the surveillance on Bev’s performances by 
state authorities relates to the fear of the political significance of the performances. 
There are close ties between sexuality and power, making sexual pleasure and 
eroticism fields of political significance. 
179
 Therefore, controlling her sexuality and 
policing her public performances and public life extends to the control of women so 
that they fit into a patriarchal frame of what they should be. It is essential to think of 
how McFadden’s work on sexual pleasure as feminist choice broadens 
conceptualizations of chimurenga. McFadden hints on the connections between 
women’s sexual agency and meaningful liberation, an attempt that can be seen as a 
feminist re/construction of chimurenga. Beverly Sibanda’s efforts to underwrite and 
take charge of her own sexuality in the midst of state restrictions and prescriptions 
demonstrate an everyday ‘script’ of chimurenga, one that deviates from the 
‘formalized’ version and vision. 
 
Thus chimurenga is a narrative of people’s everyday struggles and how they are 
invoked, remembered, waged or narrated is conditioned by the competing currents of 
the day both within individuals and in the broader society. This is in line with Thomas 
Turino (1993) who avows that chimurenga is expressed through numerous histories 
that are based on the subject positions and diverse experiences of the people involved. 
The title She-murenga, which Shereen Essof (2013) has used for her work on the 
Zimbabwe Women’s Movement from 1995 to 2000 is also a move towards a broader 
and complex struggle in Zimbabwe that has points of convergence and divergence.  In 
her acknowledgement to the text, Essof (2013: ii) claims; 
The title of the book She-murenga is an attempt to extend and reclaim the 
word from its dominant meanings. It captures the spirit of struggle against 
                                                          
178
 Beverly’s resistance to the patriarchal control of her body reminds one of the characterizations of 
Lucia, in Tsitsi Dangarembga’s Nervous Conditions (1988) and Shug and the later Celie in Alice 
Walker’s The Color Purple (1985). Lucia, Shug and later on Celie’s control of their sexualities defy 
patriarchal authoritative figures and restrictions and register the ‘provocative force’ of the erotic in 
Audre Lorde’s (1982) sense.  Just like Beverly, Lucia and Shug are regarded as social ‘pollutants.’ 
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 See McFadden’s Stand point, sexual pleasure as Feminist choice 
(http://agi.ac.za/sites/agi.ac.za/files/fa_2_standpoint_1.pdf) and Lorde (1982). Uses of the erotic: The 
erotic as power. 
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oppressive forces be it for independence, democracy, gender equality, 
economic justice and ultimately in the context of this book making visible 
Zimbabwean women’s struggles for rights, equality and lives free from 
violence. 
The text inserts the various struggles waged by women in the national and citizenship 
struggles that are narrated by the concept of chimurenga. It also reflects how these 
struggles have been shaped by momentous engagements and disengagements with 
various parties. 
 
The many subversive messages (often associated with radical women) that include 
popular song, erotic dances, feminist intellectual activism and autobiographical 
writing on embodiment point to the multiple ways of redefining chimurenga. They 
show that a conception of chimurenga that maps out a pure and uncontested struggle 
boldly standing free of battles within, battles after battles and appearing to portray 
some kind of society without struggles is fallacious. This is because it “fails to 
recognize that social conflicts mark the lives of African masses and are often played 
out in contexts that are not distinctly political but have political connotations” 
(Vambe, 2011:4). However, it is important to note that ‘she-murenga’ does not give 
rise to the likes of “Mrs Margaret Thatcher ‘The best man in the job’” (Ifi Amadiume, 
1997) or in the Zimbabwean case “Joice Mujuru, ‘Father of the nation’” (Lene Bull-
Christiansen, 2007), cases where women struggles are confused with certain women 
who enter into the male power-centered world through masculinization. 
 
Vambe argues that a more realistic picture of struggle is evident in Oliver Mtukudzi’s 
music, which is known as Tuku music rather than Chimurenga music. The distinctive 
naming of a genre in terms of a musician who has consistently refused to kowtow to 
the state is significant. This indicates that freedom music should not only be 
associated with predicable and politically overt understandings of chimurenga. This is 
especially possible with Mtukudzi’s songs as the “…inherent and yet deliberate 
ambiguity and instability in his songs also enables the interpreter of his music to 
generate a subversive narrative of chimurenga that is constantly aware of the 
transgressive nature of the meanings it authorizes” (Vambe, 2011:20-21). Vambe 
goes on to point that Mtukudzi’s songs show that there are deep-seated contradictions 
[and gaps] that need to be exposed within the struggles of the ordinary people. These 
contradictions are mostly felt at the level of the unevenness of political consciousness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
142 
 
among the masses. In this regard, Mtukudzi’s songs construct discourses of 
chimurenga that critique previous and static ways of thinking about and narrating the 
struggle. Thus the questioning of unitary ways of conceiving chimurenga and his 
open ended rhetoric which offers no closure allows the audience to question how they 
constitute and are constituted in the chimurenga narratives as a way of assigning local 
truths and experiences and thus completing the social and political examination of 
current situations. 
 
In Zimbabwe, as is the case in many other countries, the home and family are usually 
used in national myth-making to depict the structure of the nation-state. Thus the 
home and family are microcosms of the nation-state. Although the family and home 
are usually sited as zones of normalcy, where everything goes on smoothly, 
Mtukudzi’s music reflects how the family and home are mutating and no longer living 
up to the previous expectations as comfort zones and havens for family members. 
Figured as such, the family and home mirrors a nation-state that is dysfunctional 
because of its hyper-masculinities and lack of love and care. Vambe (2011) notes that 
the song Yave Mbodza’ (The pap/sadza has been undercooked), where parents are 
supposed to take care of and feed the children but instead, eat all the food while the 
children remain hungry has a political significance. 
 
The song acts out the post-independence betrayal of the masses which is characterized 
by obscene economic and power disparities where the new class of the rich and 
powerful ‘eats’ alone what it is supposed to give to the people in whose name 
struggles are fought. The swallowing of the medicine meant for the child alludes to 
the older generation’s refusal to pass on power, life, and knowledge to the younger 
generation, and therefore problematizing generational continuity under such an order. 
Although his discourse involves the family, what is considered a private space, 
Mtukudzi manages to use that same private space to engage the public space which is 
political. Thus, in the comfort zone of the private family affair, he manages to join 
Zimbabwe’s succession debate which is highly political. The rigid distinctions 
between the private and the public thus become very slippery. It is vital to note how 
the family, a symbolic site of Zimbabwean nation-building is seen as an unsafe space 
by Mtukudzi, bringing questions to the meanings of nationalism. 
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Although Vambe suggests that Ndakuvara (I have been hurt) points to the possibility 
of the opposition party (MDC) defeating ZANU-PF in the 2001 and 2002 elections, it 
is also possible to think of it as reflective of ZANU-PF’s growing irrelevance and 
tactlessness to the current challenges and struggles, making kupingudza mombe 
[taming the young bulls] a very challenging task. Thus the young bulls resisting 
toeing the line represent dissenting voices both within and outside ZANU-PF. Thus 
dissent becomes another version of struggle, a chimurenga relational to current 
contexts, showing that people do not just make a blind acceptance of a single version 
of chimurenga. 
 
The implicit disorder in the African family that is repeatedly described in Mtukudzi’s 
song meditates on the disfiguring and erasure of matriarchal values which used to 
characterize African families and social systems. The crucial matriarchal-motherhood 
based characteristics of love, care and harmony have been sacrificed by an invented 
and naturalized order that leaves the debaucheries of patriarchy unchecked. 
 
Looking at the foregoing, an inversion of gender in African families is connected to a 
critique of authoritarianism and state hegemony and ZANU-PF aggression. The 
ability of Mtukudzi and others to complicate politics and ‘perform’ the political on the 
‘everyday,’ away from explicit political spaces is important. The use of the 
‘everyday’ is in touch with the basic lives of audiences and therefore very meaningful 
to them. At the same time, reference to the everyday avoids elaborate or open political 
confrontations, while at the same time, powerfully making sense how the everyday is 
linked to national politics. 
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CONCLUSION: BEYOND THE PERIPHERIES 
Depolarizing Repression and Resistance 
As a conclusion to the study, I summarize the dialectic that I trace throughout, viz-a- 
viz how repression is always connected to resistance. I revisit the small and large acts 
of resistance that are inevitably embedded in hegemonic and authoritarian acts and 
discourses and articulate the need to shift attention to some of the neglected areas in 
the study of nationalism as well as to view historical events as having meanings in 
constant flux. I focus on the need to re-conceptualize Zimbabwean nationalism by 
focusing on cultural texts and urge a re-reading of cultural texts ‘narrating’ 
Zimbabwean nationalism, bearing in mind the spacio-temporalities of these texts, 
their meanings and the identities of both text characters and text audiences over time 
and space. I find it prudent to turn to the ‘everyday’ – music, slogans, funerals, sport 
and humour – to explain the neglected richness of the ‘voices of the weak’ in 
Zimbabwe. The power that these have is not erased simply because of the ideology of 
the composer, since this is usually altered at different levels of engagement. I have 
suggested that it may be in popular culture and entertainment that we find the most 
incisive and ingenuous responses to authoritarianism that is entrenched in 
nationalism, gender and sexuality. 
 
It is interesting that some of the women musicians are very ‘un-feminine’ and refuse 
the model of respectable domesticity that is associated with the modern urban 
Zimbabwean woman. There are points of engagement and disengagement with 
hegemony, reflecting the limitations of Althusser and Foucault’s theories that 
entrench the audience as homogeneous in terms of identity, information reception, 
meaning making and responsiveness. Thus, the audience emerges as exhibiting some 
significant power to negotiate certain positions during specific contexts as they 
interact with hegemonic texts, and ideology as an instrument is also accessible and 
useful to them rather than being exclusive to those in ‘power.’ 
 
Cultural Performances, Instrumentalization, Fluidity and Nationalism  
As shown in the study, the dominant narratives of Zimbabwean nationalism are 
scripted on a patriarchal template and this has been challenged by different parties at 
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particular moments. In following Norma Kriger (2003), I argue that the national 
liberation movements of ZAPU and ZANU were patriarchal and that the current 
patriarchal nature of ZANU-PF is a continuum of the past which is replicated and 
configured in the present. In the construction of Zimbabwean nationalism, especially 
in the new millennium, masculine military identities have been fostered in the defence 
of a threatened nation. 
 
Noting the above, the puzzle that emerges concerns the dynamics between the 
performances of Zimbabwean nationalism in cultural texts and discourses on 
sexuality and gender. As I argue, popular cultural texts perform a particular project of 
nationalism and national subjectivity which not only tallies with that crafted by the 
Zimbabwean state but which is also saturated with conventional sexual and gender 
images, categories and epistemic regimes. The texts position citizens in relation to 
‘family’ and ‘kinship’ (at a micro level) which then extends to the nation (at a macro 
level), giving rise to gendered and sexualized hierarchies. This kind of structure is 
reified by alluding to the organization in the animal world. The chimurenga notion 
which has been recurrent in the study conceptualizes struggle not as a past but as a 
present and a future that is rooted in and valorizes the past. The struggle is a ‘living’ 
thing – it is personified. Making the struggle alive is very important as it gives sense 
to discourses of enemies and friends and ultimately to vigilantism and ‘crushing’ of 
enemies and ‘sellouts’ along a paternalistic deployment. Notably, texts that narrate 
‘pastness’ draw nostalgic and melancholic sensibilities that powerfully ‘invite’ people 
into a selected memory lane, ‘sensitizing’ them to have a moral debt to ZANU-PF. 
 
However, there is also a way in which the same texts give meanings and reactions that 
are subversive to the ones initially meant by the state or authority and in this way, 
destabilizing normative categories.  As indicated, especially in chapter 3 and 4, this is 
often evidenced in the voices of the weak, innovative sloganeering, vulgarized music, 
and the trickster strategy in statecraft as well as humour. It is this kind of discussion 
that brings a discursive approach, a shift from the dominant narratives to other ways 
of seeing and imagining, allowing a decentering of Zimbabwean nationalism. 
 
The Zimbabwean case enunciates that “Popular culture… is not a cultural space 
where the values of the masses are completely defiled by the ruling classes or 
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simplistically affirmed by the “people” (Maurice Vambe, 2011). Recognizable is that 
in Zimbabwe, Chimurenga, as a narrative of struggle is a cultural and spiritual space 
instantaneously moving along a private-public thread modelled out of a shifting blend 
of ideological features where edifices of ideological control recurrently attempt to 
alter, redirect and include dissenting ideals, to avert the working through of their full 
implications (Toy Bennett, 1994). 
 
Personhood, Location, Passion and Nationalism  
What has surfaced is that a struggle or chimurenga is not a simple term, but a very 
complex one. Although people may agree in the presence of a struggle and believe in 
its existence, there is no consensus as to when, how and where exactly it started and 
the same questions arise with regard to its end. Also, though people believe in the 
struggle, they do not experience it the same way or the same way all the time. More 
so, the causes and constituencies of the struggle, how and when to struggle, as well as 
the gains and losses of the struggle are problematic aspects. This complex existence 
of struggle is very characteristic of the Zimbabwean situation. Being the backbone of 
Zimbabwean nationalism, struggle or chimurenga is characterized by complexities, 
hence gives rise to a complex Zimbabwean nationalism. A chimurenga is defined by 
age, sex, gender, status and specific situations. It is about one’s current circumstances 
and passions and is therefore always a matter of urgency and has agency. Meanings 
are more influenced by personal circumstances and the existing passion. These 
meanings and passions direct one to alliances. This direction to alliances, however, 
does not necessarily build into a permanent binary construction of one’s enemies and 
friends as is supposed by reproduction theories. It is just a direction to an alliance that 
answers to the current circumstances and passions and accidentally increases the 
distance towards where alliances were non-existent or impossible. Once the 
circumstances are overcome and the passion fulfilled, new circumstances and a new 
passion emerges and old alliances are dissolved or partly dissolved and new ones 
surface or old ones are revived, offering some kind of erasure in Derrida’s sense. 
 
Althusser’s theory reflects the ways hegemony works and helps us understand the role 
of hegemony in Zimbabwe’s popular culture. However, the work of hegemony has 
been shown to be very complex and having stakes and disadvantages depending on 
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situations. The subjects of the Zimbabwean nation’s responses to hegemony have 
been too temporal and complex to suit Althusser’s template. What has surfaced, 
however, is that the notion of chimurenga (struggle) is significant to Zimbabwean 
nationalism. However, how it is defined, articulated, and the moments of articulation 
is a complex issue. This leads one to locate chimurenga and therefore, Zimbabwean 
nationalism in the everyday narratives of people where constructions are relative to 
temporal personal experiences and passions or quests. A meaningful national struggle 
should not have a foreclosure, but should remain open and always in the ‘becoming.’ 
 
Despite the resilience of popular and subversive struggles, state narratives have 
circulated limited definitions and perceptions of chimurenga, which in turn have 
produced skewed forms of citizenship and belonging. In Zimbabwe, citizenship and 
belonging is fabricated out of the Western micro ideal of the nation. It is patrilineal, 
power and hierarchically orientated as it is centered on the Western family epitome. It 
negates the pre-colonial matriarchal formulations that balanced masculinity and 
femininity and esteemed autonomy instead of power in its Western sagacity. 
 
Contrary to the Western prototype, the matriarchal formulation is household centered. 
Zimbabwean nationalism, which provides the ‘rite of passage’ for citizenship and 
belonging, is problematic. Although it is talked of in terms of a Zimbabwean 
‘uniqueness’ and borrowing from sensual stories of the nation and struggle narratives 
in order to interpellate subjects, it is largely informed by and practiced through ideas 
from the Western metropolis. As such, it offers highly violent, masculinist, and 
polarized foundations of citizenship and belonging. Stories of origin, narratives of 
struggle and discourses around land are fabricated timeously to conjure people’s 
senses so that the rather elitist power project of Zimbabwean nationalism is masked.   
As I have shown, the senses are a significant field for affection, yet they are also 
temporary, spacious and elastic, hence meaning is always under erasure and 
negotiated through the everyday. 
 
In Zimbabwe, song is a very important site where nationalism is re/negotiated. The 
role played by music as ‘popular culture’ in political campaigning and in the 
perpetuation, sustenance of political hegemonies and generally, in interpellating 
subjects of the nation is a very significant one.  Music and its accompaniment of 
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‘song and dance’ are a common and popular channel through which hegemonies are 
re/constructed, re/negotiated and perpetuated. Music, as popular culture, has the 
ability to reach and influence audiences in a very persuasive manner that is unknown 
to other formal modes of communication. Songs, be they state-centric or songs of the 
everyday, also offer an arena on which to engage with Zimbabwean nationalism and 
therefore, problematizing its grand and narrow standing.  The songs are re/invented to 
suit the space. 
 
As has been discussed in the study, the general view of nationalism and resistance as 
enshrined in militarized forms and grand rebellions’ are not the totality of resistances 
nor the better forms or choices. In fact, highly militarized resistances are masculine 
and construct masculine national projects and therefore play to the present imperial 
gallery that ZANU-PF is heading. Better forms of resistances are waged by the 
ordinary people through the everyday. Music therefore, also offers a space where 
subversion and resistance take place in very complex ways. Song is part of the 
everyday where chimurenga is waged in a non-violent manner. Maybe even more 
significantly, it is part of the everyday, associated with leisure and entertainment that 
generates great pleasure and satisfaction. And when ‘the political’ engages the minds, 
spirits and psyches of oppressed people, it may provide surprisingly resilient 
outcomes in the face of even the most formidably militarized state. 
 
In a nutshell, in this study, I avow that most works on Zimbabwean nationalism have 
focused on the cohesive, obvious and perhaps simplistic ways in which Robert 
Mugabe and ZANU-PF have maintained power. More comprehensive studies have to 
be done on the non-coercive, intricate and insidious ways which have invited ‘willing’ 
acceptance for continued rule. In this study, I invite a re/thinking of Zimbabwean 
nation construction; of how ZANU-PF’s dominance in general and Mugabe’s rule in 
particular have been naturalized and made the ‘common sense’; of how Mugabe 
remains the chief ideologue of Zimbabweaness; of how despite Mugabe’s obvious 
brutality, a significant number of voters still adore him even in the absence of any 
physical force. 
 
I have attempted unpacking the complex and interesting conduits that have sustained 
ZANU-PF and its system, notably  appeals to the sensual that lead to a rather 
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psychological sense of indebtedness to ZANU-PF in general and Mugabe in 
particular. Interesting also, is how ‘dominant oppositional voices’ have, to a certain 
extent, failed to debunk hegemonic narratives of the Zimbabwean nation. I have also 
problematized theories of reproduction that mark hegemony as total and uniquely an 
instrument of ‘fixed’ elite groups.  My major argument is that in the construction of 
Zimbabwean nationalism, texts – whether pro-state or anti-state – have had fluid 
interpretations and temporal meanings. Even the highly spectacular deployment of 
gender and sexuality to naturalize a nationalism informed by the ‘efficacy’ of a 
phallocentric power ‘cult’ is full of contestations and ruptures. The emanating 
ambiguities and temporalities allow repression and subversion to exist side by side, 
giving human agency. By and large, I locate popular culture or the ‘everyday’ as a 
rich, interesting and fluid ambiance on which reproduction, subversion and resistance 
are negotiated. 
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Appendix A: Main Song Lyrics 
Song 1: Muri Musoja (You are a Soldier/Warrior) Mbare Chimurenga Choir 
Painorira painorira musango; 
Hoo VaMugabe muri musoja musatye 
Ve Zimbabwe takatsemura dombo; 
Ve Zimbabwe takatora mkombe; 
Mkombe wacho wekutora ivhu 
Hoo tinotenda magamba 
Tinotenda magamba emuno muZimbabwe. 
Hoo pa Chimoio pane dhamu reropa revana. 
Hoo pa Nyadzonia pane dhamu reropa revana 
Kana ndichiti magamba handireve chigamba, 
Ndinoreva magamba emuno muZimbabwe 
Kana ndichiti Nehanda handireve kahanda, 
Ndinoreva Nehanda mudzimu mukuru muZimbabwe 
Hoo pa Chinhoyi pane dhamu reropa revana 
Uko kuMboroma kune dhamu reropa revana 
VaMugabe, murimusoja, 
Musambotya, 
Ndimwi chete makagona kutsigira, kutorwa kweivhu, 
Saka isu vana veZimbabwe, 
Takakutsigirai, 
Ivhu rakafirwa nevana 
PaChimoio, paNyadzonya, 
NokuZambia chaiko, 
Mumakomo vana vakasaramo, 
Kurikutsigira kutorwa kweivhu 
[Honorable Mugabe, when the war takes off fear not, you are a soldier. As 
Zimbabweans, we broke the record; we set the pace for land repossession. We thank 
our heroes for their sacrifices, many lost their lives. Mr Mugabe you are the one and 
only, who supported, the repossession of land, so we the children of Zimbabwe, are in 
full support of you. At Chimoio, Nyadzonya, even in Zambia, on the mountains, 
children perished defending the land]. 
  
Song 2: Hondo (War) Happison Mabika and Patience Takaona (Dread Reckless and 
Sister Fearless)  
Zvatakanga tarwa hondo yechimurenga wani 
Ko VaNkomo neZAPU yavo waivanetserei 
Zvatakanga tarwa hondo yechimurenga tapedza nhayi 
Tokumbira kuziva Tongogara akafa nei? 
Ko Gukurahundi wakaironga seiko wega? 
Tokumbira kuziva kuti zvakafamba sei 
Ko Gukurahundi wakaironga seiko nhai  
Tokumbira kuziva kuti pakafa vangani 
Zvaunogara uchingopopota hondo yawakaona wega 
Inga vana amai vedu vaikubikirai 
Zvaunogara uchingopopota sewakaiona wega hondo 
Inga wani vana sisi vedu vaikutandadzai 
Ko hondo yeminda, wakaironga seiko wega 
Wati wamboona kuti yakauraya nyika sei 
Ko hondo yeminda wakaironga Seiko wega nhai 
Wati wamboona here kuti yakatipa nzara sei 
Pandakafa nechando panguva yemurambatsvina 
Iwe vana vako vaiva varere mumba 
Ndikafunga vana vangu panguva yemurambatvsina 
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Misodzi yangu inoerekana yaerera 
Tony Blair waunopomera mhosva  yawakapara wega 
Hwupfumi hwenyika hwakaparadzwa newe 
Kuipa kweZanu, varume makakuona mega 
Border Gezi naMahachi vakafa vasina kurwara 
Mabasa eZanu, vasikana makaaona mega nhai 
VaNkala vakauraiwa takangoyeva 
[Since the war of liberation had been won, why did you have to crush Nkomo and 
Zapu, how did Tongogara die, why did you plan Gukurahundi (the Matebeleland-
Midlands massacres and how many people were killed? You always talk as if you are 
the only one who made sacrifices and suffered during the war and forget how 
ordinary people helped for example by providing food and you also forget how 
women were sexually abused by some guerrillas. Take note of the hunger and 
economic downfall caused by the chaotic land reforms and the suffering caused by 
‘Operation Murambatsvina.’ Yet you blame Tony Blair for all your failures, and have 
turned the Zanu Pf party into a bunch of cold-blood murderers who go even to the 
extent of devouring own members such as Border Gezi and Mahachi]  
  
Song 3: What is a patriot? Raymond Majongwe 
Is it about those who carried the gun? 
What of those who were not yet born? 
Those of us who were even too young to go and fetch firewood 
What is a patriot? 
What is patriotism? 
Is it a fight for or an honour? 
Who are the sell outs? 
Who are the enemies of the state? 
Who then are the patriotic citizens? 
Is it about the messenger or the messaging? 
Is it about the deed, the doing or the doer? 
Does it solve historical, economic and social biases? 
Does it unite or divide the nation 
Does it enforce justice and prosperity? 
Where is the school of patriotism? 
Who are the patriots? 
 
Song 4: Sendekera Last Chiyanga (Tambaoga) 
Ivhu iri ramunoona machinda ndiro rinonzi Zimbabwe 
Kana mvura ikanaya gore rino tichazadza matura 
Iwe neni tine basa, rekushandira nyika 
Zvinodadisa kwazvo, Ivhu ravaredu 
Ngava gumbuke zvavo, vanewaya, Isu tave kufara 
Ndiyoka hondo yeminda, hondo yegutsa ruzhinji 
Ndiyoka hondo yevanhu, Hondo yekuwana hupfumi 
Huyayi tibatane nhasi, Tose tinzi Mushandira pamwe 
Ndiyoka hondo yeminda – Sendekera 
Hondo yegutsa ruzhinji – Shandira nyika iwe mwana wevhu 
Zvinodadisa kwazvo – Sendekera 
Ivhu rava redu – Shingirira iwe mwana wevhu 
Ngava gumbuke zvavo – Vane waya? 
Isu tave kufara – Tsungirira iwe mwana wevhu 
Ivhu riye rauya – Sendekera 
Rauya zvachose –Sendekera 
Mhururu Zimbabwe – Sendekera 
Vakuru gadzirai ramangwana, vadiki vawane basa! 
Vadiki tarisai nhaka yenyu, vakuru maita basa! 
Iye woye , Iye woye 
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Ivhu iri ramunoona machinda ndiro rinonzi Zimbabwe 
Kana mvura ikanaya chete gore rino tichazadza matura 
Shingirira iwe mwana wevhu 
Tsungirira iwe mwana wevhu 
Sendekera iwe mwana wevhu 
Iwe neni tine basa 
rekushandira nyika 
Zvinodadisa kwazvo 
[This land that you see is what is called Zimbabwe. If rain falls in abundance, we 
shall fill silos with grain. You and I should work for the country’s good; it gives all of 
us pride. They can be sad but we are happy. This struggle for land is one for and by 
the majority. This is a people’s war, a war to gain economic wealth. Everyone should 
participate so that we are strengthened; this is the war for land, a war for the good of 
the majority. This gives all of us pride, the land is now ours. Let them be sad for they 
are mad, we are all happy that land we fought for has come, it has come for good! 
Zimbabweans should celebrate. Elders, should make provisions for tomorrow, the 
youth should witness what great achievements the elders have performed. Rain should 
fall so that we reap abundantly. Strive on Zimbabweans, be committed Zimbabweans. 
You and I should work hard for the country]. 
 
Song 5: Agreement  Last Chiyanga (Tambaoga) 
Takabvuma kusainirana agirimende 
Patakavhota takasainirana agririmende 
Kuti mutungamiriri weZimbabwe ndiGabhuriyeri 
Musatinetsa musatishupa maBhirishiti  
The Bhuleya that I know is a toilet 
Kuti ndishanye ikoko vanoda tsamba yokwakatsekera 
Kuti vauye kuno havadi tsamba yokwakatsekera 
Ende land tichangoitora chete muchida musingadi 
Patakavhota takasainirana agirimende 
Kuti mutungamiriri weZimbabwe ndiBobho 
[We agreed to sign an agreement, when we voted, we signed an agreement, that 
Gabriel is the leader of Zimbabwe, don’t trouble us, don’t harass us you ‘Brishit’, the 
blair that I know is a toilet, for me to visit them they need a letter from …, for them to 
visit here they don’t need the very letter, whether you like it or not, we will take over 
land, when we voted we  signed an agreement, that the leader of Zimbabwe is Bob] 
 
Song 6: Rambai Makashinga’ (Remain resolute) Tambaoga 
Tade minda tirambe takashinga isu 
Shingirirai, gadzirirai, rimai namasimba, tese tirambe takashinga, ivhu zvarauya 
Murambe makashinga imwi 
Shingirirai, gadzirirai, ivhu rava redu, zvino tava kutonga, Zimbabwe ndeyedu 
Mumabasa murambe makashinga imwi 
Shingirirai, gadzirirai, shandai nemasimba tichivaka nyika yedu, ivhu zvarauya 
Makashinga 
Rambai makashinga 
Makashinga hoye 
Rimai makashinga 
Kohwai makashinga 
Mukohwe pakuru 
Ivhu iri 
Takaritora nehondo 
Ticharima neshungu 
Tichashanda nesimba 
Tigokohwa zvomene 
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Tigopfuma zvokwadi 
Mukohwe pakuru baba namai 
Kukohwa pakuru Zimbabwe 
Iro badza rima 
Hero gejo rima 
Bopa mombe mufaro 
Harvester iyo kohwa 
Ivhu nderako iri mwana wevhu 
Kohwa pakuru Zimbabwe 
Ivhu iri, takaritora nehondo 
Takaritora neshungu 
Rambai makashinga vana vadiki rambai makashinga 
Rambai makashinga mabornfree rambai makashinga 
Rambai makashinga vana amai rambai makashinga 
Rambai makashinga vana baba rambai makashinga 
[If we want land we should remain resolute, we should be perseverant, should prepare 
and put all our efforts into farming since we got the land and it is now ours, now we 
are ruling and Zimbabwe now belongs to us. Those who work should remain resolute, 
should be well prepared and work hard to build our nation since the land is now in our 
hands. We should be hard working and get bumper harvests, the land has been 
possessed after a struggle and we have to work hard to have bumper harvests and get 
wealthy. Here is the hoe, hear is the plough, yoke the cattle and start ploughing, get 
that harvester and reap, the land is yours child of the soil, remain resolute young 
people, the born frees, mothers and fathers]  
  
Song 7: Uya uone kutapira kunoita kurima Andy Brown and Tambaoga 
Huya uone kutapira kunoita manhanga iwe muZimbabwe 
Huya uone kutapira kunoita zvirimwa muno muZimbabwe 
Aha kutapira, Aha kutapira, Aha kutapira, Aha kutapira 
South Africa uchakamirirei kurima mumunda mako? 
Mozambique usambofa wakatengesa ivhu rako 
Namibia kutapira kunoita kurima 
Zambia kutapira kunoita manhanga 
Africa usafa wakanyengerwa 
Tapi tapi tapi tapi 
Kubva kumabvazuva kumadokero 
Hapana kana chatinoshaya 
Zimbabwe temba nevhu rako 
Mozambique temba nenyika yako 
Vanoseka vasiye vaseke 
Vanotaura vasiye vataure 
MuZimbabwe takatobatana 
Africa kanhi takatobatana 
Mozambique ngatibatane 
Zimbabwe iwe kutapira kunoita kurima. 
[Come and witness how sweet farming is Zimbabwe, come and witness how sweet 
crops are in Zimbabwe, South Africa why are you waiting to farm your land, 
Mozambique never give away your land, Namibia, look how sweet farming is, 
Zambia look how sweet ….are, Africa never be fooled, from the North to the South, 
there is nothing we have in short, Zimbabwe trust your soil, Mozambique trust your 
land, Ignore those who laugh at you, Ignore those who criticize you, In Zimbabwe we 
are united, In Africa we are united, Mozambique lets be united.] 
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Song 8: Gumbazvose (One who takes everything) Paul Madzore 
Tererai tereraiwo 
Varombo tirimunhamo 
Nhamo yacho yavana Mugumbazvose 
Varombo tiri mugango 
Gango racho ravana Mugumbazvose 
Nyika yose vakatora pamadiro 
Nhasi vogovana pachavo pahukama 
Nyika yose vakatora pamadiro 
Asi chandaona chabuda hapana 
Zvitorozve vakatora pamadiro 
Mitengo nhasi vanokwidza pavanodira 
Paya dzimba vakaputsa pamadiro 
Vachiti vari pakuramba tsvina 
Gore riya vanhu vakauraya pamadiro 
Vachiti ivo kugukurahundi 
Nhasi uno nherera dzinochema 
Vehukamawo vanochema 
Varombowe tiri mugango 
Paunobuda chete unoona uri muguva 
Nhasi uno chembere dzinochema 
Nevarwerezve vanochema 
Nhasi uno zvirema zvinochema 
Nemapofuwo anochema 
[Please listen to our cries, we, the poor are suffering because of greedy and corrupt 
leadership. We are really in their roasting pan. They got all the land and businesses 
and distributed amongst themselves. However, there is no productivity and they 
increase costs of commodities and services as they please. They have also destroyed 
houses in the name of cleaning up urban areas, they once killed people in the name of 
wiping up dissidents and now orphans are suffering. The old, the sick, the disabled 
and the blind are all suffering because of these greedy and corrupt leaders].  
 
Song 9: Sabhuku (Headman) Clive Malunga 
Ndakarima munda wangu, 
Ukadyiwa nemombe,  
Mombe dzacho ndedzamambo, 
Ndichaita seiko? 
Tine mutemo mumusha uno, 
Mutemo wokutanga mambo haatongwe, 
Mutemo wechipiri mambo haaripe, 
Ndichaita Seiko? 
[I cultivated my land; it was then invaded by the headman’s cattle, what then is my 
recourse? The order of things in this village is that the headman is immune to 
prosecution, and also that he is immune to compensatory justice. In such a case, what 
options do I have?] 
 
Song 10: Andinzwi (I do not get it) Oliver Mtukudzi  
Can anybody give an answer to my question? 
What is a hero? 
Do you have to die to be a hero? 
A national hero? 
To me Safirio Madzikatire is a hero 
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A national hero, our national hero,  
Yes I remember some of his lyrics in his plays, Andinzwi 
That’s a hero!! There is a hero!! 
What a hero Mukadota!! 
He is a hero 
What a hero Mukadota!! 
 
Song 11: Baba Nkomo (Father Nkomo) Hosiah Chipanga 
Baba Nkomo vandibvunza 
Mandiita gamba, ko zvamandiradzika pano 
Mumwe wangu aripi? 
Baba Nkomo vandibvunza 
Mandiita gamba, ko zvamandiradzika pano 
Ndabalingi aripi? 
VaChitepo vandibvunza 
Mandiita gamba, ko zvamandiradzika pano 
Mumwe wangu aripi? 
VaChitepo vandibvunza 
Mandiita gamba, ko zvamandiradzika pano 
Chikerema aripi? 
VaTangwena vandibvunza 
Mandiita gamba, ko zvamandiradzika pano 
Mumwe wangu aripi? 
VaTangwena vandibvunza 
Mandiita gamba, ko zvamandiradzika pano 
Banana aripi? 
[I have heard voices from late heroes like Mr Nkomo, Chitepo and Tangwena, 
questioning the absence of their war-colleagues such as Ndabalingi Sithole, James 
Chikerema and Canaan Banana from the National Heroes Acre].  
 
Song 12: Tinoda kudeleta Machinja ose’ (We want to wipe off all MDC members) 
ZANU PF rally song 
Delete delete delete 
Toda kudhilita maChinja ose 
MaChinja ose 
Toda kudhilita maChinja ose 
Delete delete delete 
[Wipe out all MDC members; we want to wipe out all of them].  
 
Song 13: Nyatsoteerera’ (Listen carefully/Pay great attention) Mbare Chimurenga 
Choir 
Nyatsoteerera unzwe kutonga 
Aaah muhofisi, muna Bhobho nyatsoteerera unzwe kutonga 
Unzwe kutonga nyatsoteerera unzwe kutonga 
Aaah muhofisi, muna Bhobho nyatsoteerera unzwe kutonga 
[Listen carefully and hear Bob/Mugabe’s rule/power while he is in his office/on his 
throne]. 
 
Song 14: Ndimi Mega’ (You are the One/You are the Only One) Mbare Chimurenga 
Choir 
VaMugabe 
Ndimwi mega baba 
Muri mukuru mukuru 
Pakutonga 
Ndimwi mega baba 
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Pakuronga 
Ndimwi mega baba 
Pakugona 
Ndimwi mega baba 
Muri mukuru mukuru 
[Honorable Mugabe, you are the one and only father, ruler, organizer and able person. 
You are magnificent] 
  
Song 15: Changamukai’ (Wise up /Be Vigilant) Mbare Chimurenga Choir 
Changamukai, changamukaiwo; 
Haya yei yere, yeha yeha, changamukai.  
VaMugabe varikutongawo; 
Haya yei yere, yeha yeha, changamukai. 
Ivhu redu takatora kare 
Haya yei yere, yeha yeha, changamukai. 
Changosara iwe chirimawo 
Haya yei yere, yeha yeha, changamukai. 
Baba Mugabe mamuka seiko? 
Haya yei yere, yeha yeha, changamukai. 
Baba Mugabe madoka chere? 
Haya yei yere, yeha yeha, changamukai. 
Livuka njani Baba Mugabe wo? 
Haya yei yere, yeha yeha, changamukai. 
Isu vana veZimbabwe, Ivhu takatora 
Chasara iwe neni ngatibatei mapadza tirime. 
Ivhu rakafirwa nevana pa Chimoio, pa Nyadzonia. 
Upfumi muno munyika tinahwo. 
Changamukai vana veZimbabwe.  
[Wise up, Mr. Mugabe is ruling the country, we repossessed our land and what is left 
is for you to farm. Good morning Father Mugabe, how has been your day? We took 
the land, now we have to work on it, our children made sacrifices for the land, our 
country has abundant resources, and we just have to be vigilant].  
 
Song 16: MuZimbabwe’ (In Zimbabwe) Mbare Chimurenga Choir 
MuZimbabwe 
Heee 
Tererai 
Heee 
Tauya 
Heee 
Tauya shuwa 
Tauya kuzosimudzira nyika yatakatora isu nehwushingi 
Toita sei? 
Kubatana pamwe chete 
ZANU-PF takabatana 
Tozviziva VaMugabe vari kutonga 
ZANU-PF takabatana 
[In Zimbabwe, please listen, we have come develop the country that came out of our 
bravery. Let us unite and work together, in ZANU-PF unity is paramount and we 
acknowledge Mr. Mugabe’s leadership]. 
 
Song 17: Nyika Yedu (Our Country/Land) Mbare Chimurenga Choir 
Nyika yedu! 
VaMugabe ndivo vanotonga. 
Nyika yedu yeZimbabwe. 
VaMugabe ndivo vanotonga. 
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Ku Harare, 
Heee baba, vaMugabe ndivo vanotonga. 
Ku Bulawayo, 
Heee baba, vaMugabe ndivo vanotonga. 
Ku Masvingo, 
Heee baba, vaMugabe ndivo vanotonga. 
Kwa Mutare 
Heee baba, vaMugabe ndivo vanotonga. 
Beitibriji 
Heee baba, vaMugabe ndivo vanotonga. 
Ko ku Kwekwe? 
Heee baba, vaMugabe ndivo vanotonga. 
Ku Kadoma 
Heee baba, vaMugabe ndivo vanotonga. 
Ku Chegutu 
Heee baba, vaMugabe ndivo vanotonga. 
Ku Daruweni 
Heee baba, vaMugabe ndivo vanotonga. 
Ko ku Binga? 
Heee baba, vaMugabe ndivo vanotonga. 
Kwese kwese 
Heee baba, vaMugabe ndivo vanotonga. 
[In our country, Zimbabwe, Mr. Mugabe is the one who rules. He rules in Harare, 
Bulawayo, Masvingo, Mutare, Beitbridge, Kwekwe, Kadoma, Chegutu, Darwin, 
Binga and everywhere else] 
  
Song 18: Timhu’ (Team) Mbare Chimurenga Choir 
Timhu ndikusetere timhu 
Heee ndikusetere timhu  
Pekutanga tarira pana aniko? 
Heee Pana Baba Mugabe. 
Pechi two tarira pana aniko? 
Heee Pana Mai Mujuru. 
Pechitatu tarira pana aniko? 
Heee Pana ivo vaNkomo. 
Hoo tongai makadaro 
Chimbo tongai makadaro  
Hoo mirai makadaro 
Chimbo mirai makadaro  
[I am setting up the team for you, first on line if Father Mugabe, the second is Mother 
Mujuru and the third one is Mr Nkomo. This is the team that I have set and no one 
else should join the game. These are the only leaders that should govern]. 
 
Song 19: Makorokoto’ (Congratulations) Mbare Chimurenga Choir 
Makorokoto matenderwa makorokoto 
Baba Mugabe makorokoto matenderwa makorokoto 
Kutonga Zimbabwe makorokoto matenderwa makorokoto 
Kutora minda makorokoto matenderwa makorokoto 
Mwana waBona makorokoto matenderwa makorokoto 
Baba vaBona makorokoto matenderwa makorokoto 
[Congratulations Father Mugabe, you have been given all the blessings to govern 
Zimbabwe and to repossess the land. Father Mugabe, the son of Bona, and Bona’s 
father congratulations for the role that you have been given]. 
 
Song 20: Wasakara Oliver Mtukudzi 
Bvuma iwe 
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Bvuma chete 
Bvuma wasakara 
Bvuma waunyana 
Kumbera, chiiko kuchembera? 
Kuchembera mucherechedzo, wenguva yakareba 
Kuchembera ndizvo-ndizvo, nenguva yakareba 
Imi mai makwegura 
Hamucharugona machembera 
Makuraka musazoramba 
Nemi baba tarisai muone, mwana yava mhandara 
Makuraka musazoramba 
[Accept and acknowledge your old age, accept that you have lived long and can 
longer do the things that you used to do, mother and father, do not deny your old age, 
but embrace it]. 
  
Song 21: Tipeiwo nguva yokuchema Gamba redu’ (Give us time/space to mourn our 
Hero) MDC Funeral hymn 
Tipeiwo nguva rokuchema gamba redu 
Hona rakapondwa 
Gamba redu 
Shuwa rakapondwa 
Tonde akapondwa 
[Give us time to morn our hero, our hero was murdered]. 
 
Song 22: Anga ari Commander’ (He was an army commander) MDC Funeral hymn  
Anga ari commander 
Pavamutora 
Anga ari commander 
Ndosara nani 
[He was a commander, now that he has been taken away, who shall be guiding me?] 
 
Song 23: Iva Gamba (Be a Hero/Warrior) MDC Funeral hymn 
Iva gamba 
Iva gamba utarise mhandu 
Iva segamba utarise mhandu 
Vana mai nana baba  
Musarambe makadaro 
Mukaramba makadaro munodyiwa nemunyati 
Zvekare ndezvekarezvakaenda naMugabe 
Iva segamba utarise mhandu 
[Be a hero and look out for enemies. Mothers and fathers, do not be fooled by the 
past, be vigilant]. 
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Appendix B: Image Sources 
 
Image Title Sources 
1 Morgan Tsvangirai 
and the MDC as sell-
outs 
 http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-
UOwiBGETxfg/UyxGi6ZFNvI/AAAAAAAAA
PM/JGUTPJDZ8w8/s1600/sell-outs+pic.jpg  
 Willems, W. 2009, pp. 132  
2 ZANU-PF Election 
Posters linked to 
Land 
 https://zimbabweelection.files.wordpress.com/20
13/07/2379103021_4473d165ff.jpg  
 Vote Zanu pf. Our land our sovereignty. Cde R. 
G. Mugabe. Zanu pf 
 Punishing dissent, silencing citizens: The 
Zimbabwean elections 2008 pp. 60 
3 Flush Them Down: 
The Only Good Blair 
is a Toilet 
 He has done all these things for you. Flush them 
down! The only good blair is a toilet. We 
thought you knew. March 9 and 10 vote for the 
people, vote for maturity, experience and 
wisdom 
4 ‘Mbare Will Never 
Be ZANU-PF’ 
 Screen shot, ‘Mitsetse’ , Mhenya Mauro 
productions  
5 ‘Zimbabwe Shall 
Never Be A Chinese 
Colony Again’ 
 Screen shot, ‘VeZanu’, Freedom series 
production 
6 Part of Soapstone 
bird curving returned 
from Germany  
 Dewey, W. 2006, pp 2-3 
 
7 National Heroes Acre 
(Zimbabwe)                                    
 https://www.google.co.za/search?q=national+her
oes+acre+zimbabwe&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source
=univ&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj-
q7_y9qvJAhXD7RQKHbIZBOYQsAQIJg&biw
=1008&bih=619 
8 Chibondo/Monkey 
William Mine Bones 
 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
1372034/Zimbabwes-killing-fields-Mass-grave-
600-bodies-shaft.html  
  http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/image-
gallery/ 
9 ZAPU Party Symbol  http://www.zimbabwenewsnetwork.com/thumbn
ail.php?file=zapu_782007212.jpg&size=article_
medium 
10 Anti-Joshua Nkomo 
poster 
 Screen shots, Panorama, BBC MCMLXXXIII. 
11 The Mthwakazi 
People’s Congress 
 http://oeas.info/resources/mthz.jpg 
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(MPC) Flag 
12 Tonderai Ndira: A 
Zimbabwean hero 
 Screen shots, Documentary on state sponsored 
violence against M.D.C members 
13 ‘Zero to Hero’ 
Advert 
 http://photos1.blogger.com/blogger/6835/888/32
0/Zero%20To%20Hero%2005.jpg 
14 The Jongwe (Rooster 
chicken/Cockerel) 
ZANU-PF Symbol 
 http://www.thestandard.co.zw/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/zanu-pf-card.jpg   
 https://adam1cor.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/z
anu-pf-badge-c1985.jpg  
 http://allafrica.com/download/pic/main/main/csii
d/00021146:71a22e16c0553adc6f37e937dbd5da
73:arc614x376:w1200.jpg 
15 MDC Open Palm 
Symbol 
 https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/common
s/thumb/b/b0/Flag_of_the_Movement_for_Dem
ocratic_Change.svg/200px-
Flag_of_the_Movement_for_Democratic_Chang
e.svg.png  
 https://www.newsday.co.zw/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/mdc-t-stadium.jpg  
16 ZANU-PF ‘Team’ 
(Mugabe, Mujuru and 
Nkomo) 
 Screen shots, ‘Team’, Mbare Chimurenga Choir, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aKCxy7at4
L4  
17  ‘Bhora Mugedhi’ 
 
 http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/wp-
content/gallery/election-posters-2013/zanu-pf-
lest-we-forget.jpg  
 http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-
7EaWlHYA80k/U707tUlP1jI/AAAAAAAAAkg
/bKSIFi6PmKU/s1600/bhora+mugedhi.jpg  
 Screen shot, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TfUF-
Mry7UA  
 http://www.herald.co.zw/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/campaigntruckinmaron
dera.jpg  
 http://www.zimbabweelection.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/ZANU-PF.jpg   
18 MDC and ZANU-PF 
Football Metaphors 
 http://cdn.24.co.za/files/Cms/General/d/2468/a4
b2242b2b5b40e995b1ec32ec62f647.jpg  
 https://www.newsday.co.zw/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/mdc-t-stadium.jpg 
 https://www.newsday.co.zw/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/zanu.jpg  
 http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/wp-
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content/gallery/election-posters-2013/mugabe-
circa-1980.jpg  
 http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/wp-
content/gallery/election-posters-2013/zanu-pf-
lest-we-forget.jpg 
 Screen shot, ‘Same same’, Freedom series 
productions  
19 MDC Heroes  Screen shots, Documentary on state sponsored 
violence against M.D.C members   
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Appendix C: Image Inscriptions 
 
Image Title Inscriptions 
1 Morgan 
Tsvangirai and 
the MDC as sell-
outs 
 Zimbabwe has no place for sell outs  
 Don’t sell your country, quit MDC and return to the 
people. This is how Judas Iscariot –the traitor of 
traitors –sold out. Some white people, the British 
government and all traitors say: “If the MDC had 
not been formed, the land would not have been 
returned to the people.” What they are saying is 
similar to what Judas Iscariot, the traitor of traitors 
said, “If I had not betrayed Jesus for 30 pieces of 
silver, he would not have died for you!” Don’t be a 
sellout, return to the people! On March 9 and 10 
vote for the people: vote for maturity, experience, 
and wisdom. Zanu pf. 
 Tsvangirai and his sellouts think Zimbabwe is tea. 
Don’t let him sell your birthright. Don’t let him sell 
your heritage. Don’t let him sell your soul. Don’t let 
him sell your country. Don’t let him sell your land. 
Zimbabwe will never be a colony again! On March 
1 and 10 vote for the people: vote for maturity, 
experience and wisdom. Zanu pf. 
2 ZANU-PF 
Election Posters 
linked to Land 
 Vote Zanu pf. Cde Robert Gabriel Mugabe. 
Defending our land and sovereignty. March 2008 
general elections. Zanu pf.  
 Vote Zanu pf. Our land our sovereignty. Cde R. G. 
Mugabe. Zanu pf 
 Vote Zanu pf. With R. G. Mugabe, Zimbabwe will 
never be a colony again! 
3 Flush Them 
Down: The Only 
Good Blair is a 
Toilet 
 He has done all these things for you. Flush them 
down! The only good blair is a toilet. We thought 
you knew. March 9 and 10 vote for the people, vote 
for maturity, experience and wisdom  
 
4 ‘Mbare Will 
Never Be ZANU-
PF’ 
 Mbare will never be Zanu pf  
 
5 ‘Zimbabwe Shall 
Never Be A 
Chinese Colony 
Again’ 
 Zimbabwe shall never be a Chinese colony again  
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6 Part of Soapstone 
bird curving 
returned from 
Germany  
 
7 National Heroes 
Acre (Zimbabwe)                                    
 
8 Chibondo/Monke
y William Mine 
Bones 
 
9 ZAPU Party 
Symbol 
 Zimbabwe African People’s Union. ZAPU 
10 Anti-Joshua 
Nkomo poster 
 Nkomo should be killed 
11 The Mthwakazi 
People’s 
Congress (MPC) 
Flag 
 
12 Tonderai Ndira: 
A Zimbabwean 
hero 
 Gamba reZimbabwe 
 Tonderai ‘Serge’ Ndira. A hero of Zimbabwe. 
Assassinated 14 May 2008 
13 ‘Zero to Hero’ 
Advert 
 Zero to hero. Zuva rabuda- Ilanga seliphumile. 
Restore value in the month of our heroes.  
 
14 The Jongwe 
(Rooster 
chicken/Cockerel) 
ZANU-PF 
Symbol 
 Zimbabwe African National Union. Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) 
membership card. Let us build Zimbabwe  
 Zanu pf will win  
 Zanu pf 
15 MDC Open Palm 
Symbol 
  MDC  
 MDC. A new Zimbabwe 
16 ZANU-PF 
‘Team’ (Mugabe, 
Mujuru and 
Nkomo) 
   
17  ‘Bhora Mugedhi’ 
 
 Team Zanu pf 2013. Lest we forget. Don’t let them 
take you for a ride again, Vote Zanu pf. Bhora 
mugedhi. Ibhola egedini. Team Zanu pf. Mugabe 
Robert Gabriel. Zanu pf  
 Bhora mugedhi. Indigenisation and economic 
empowerment. Register to vote for Zanu pf 2013 
 Bhora mugedhi. Ibhola egedini 
 The herald 
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18 MDC and ZANU-
PF Football 
Metaphors 
  89…90…Game over  
 Give them the red card  
 Team Zanu pf 2013. Peace begins with me. Peace 
begins with you. Peace begins with all of us. Vote 
Zanu pf. Taking back the economy. Indigenise, 
empower, develop and create employment.  
 Indigenise, empower, develop and create 
employment. Team Zanu pf 2013. Our president. 
Vote Zanu pf.  
 Team Zanu pf 2013. Lest we forget. Don’t let them 
take you for a ride again, Vote Zanu pf. Bhora 
mugedhi. Ibhola egedini. Team Zanu pf. Mugabe 
Robert Gabriel. Zanu pf 
19 MDC Heroes   Tonderai ‘Serge’ Ndira. A hero of Zimbabwe. 
Assassinated 14 May 2008 
 Godfrey Kauzani. D.O.B:...D.O.D: 10-05-08 
 Cain Nyeve. D.O.B: 11-04-69. D.O.D: 10-05-08 
 Better Chokururama. D.O.B: 05-03-76. D.O.D: 08-
05-08 
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Appendix D: Consent Letter from Solidarity Peace Trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
